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Introduction
This dissertation deals with two topical issues in the ﬁeld of industrial organization
and regulation: corporate mergers and dynamic regulation. In three separate essays,
we provide a positive analysis of three particular questions in these areas of research.
First, Chapter 1 takes on the issue of optimal dynamic regulation and procure-
ment when the supplier’s technology is (i) subject to learning eﬀects, and (ii) pri-
vately known to the supplier. That private knowledge on technology is a key factor
in regulatory practice has been a central theme in the literature for years (see the
inﬂuential work of Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). However, relatively little is still known
about dynamic aspects of regulation and the interplay between regulation and inno-
vation. This is particularly unfortunate because innovation plays a prominent role
in many traditional ﬁelds of government regulation such as telecommunications or
electric utilities. In such industries, adequate regulatory practice must invariably
take account of its dynamic impact on innovation.
Chapter 1 contributes to closing this gap by considering a well-documented kind
of innovation: innovation through ‘learning by doing’. Under learning by doing,
the regulator’s task is to induce a level of production that takes careful account of
future cost-savings induced through learning eﬀects. However, this task is again
complicated by ﬁrms enjoying superior knowledge on their technology. Hence, a
key question is whether this private knowledge should lead the regulator to under-
or overexploit learning eﬀects relative to the full-information benchmark—that is,
whether he induces ineﬃciently little or ineﬃciently much innovation. We ﬁnd that
the answer crucially depends on how ﬁrms’ learning potential and their absolute level
of eﬃciency are related: If learning leads inherently more eﬃcient agents to expand
their lead over less eﬃcient agents, then learning eﬀects will be underexploited. If,
however, learning leads inherently less eﬃcient agents to catch up, then learning
eﬀects will be overexploited.
To our knowledge, this insight—particularly the possibility of learning eﬀects be-
ing overexploited—is new to the regulation and procurement literature. Although
recent studies by Lewis and Yildirim (2002a,b) also investigate regulation and pro-
curement under learning by doing, they conclude that private information should
2always lead to an underexploitation of learning eﬀects. We argue in Chapter 1 that
the reason for our diﬀerence in ﬁndings lies in Lewis and Yildirim’s considering in-
formation only on the cost side of learning-by-doing and neglecting the fact that
agents may hold private information also on their inherent learning rates.
Chapter 2 takes up another area of industrial organization in which private infor-
mation allegedly plays an important role: corporate mergers. There is considerable
evidence that mergers are often unproﬁtable. Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence
abound describing merger cases in which at least one party expressed ex-post regret
about the merger, in some cases even explicitly attributing this to having misjudged
the merger partner.1 In Chapter 2, we explore the extent to which these two observa-
tions may be explained by merger candidates holding superior information on their
own ﬁrm. We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess
private information pertaining both to the proﬁtability of the prospective merged
entity and to each ﬁrm’s stand-alone proﬁts. Using a mechanism-design approach,
we investigate the scope for merger negotiation processes (‘merger mechanisms’)
which gather agents’ dispersed information and reach a merger decision—subject
to the constraint that the merger decision avoids outcomes involving ex-post re-
gret on behalf of any of the merging parties. Importantly, what sets this problem
apart from the classical problem of bilateral trade under asymmetric information
(see Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) is that, in addition to using transfers and the
trade-decision (the merger decision, in our case) to elicit agents’ private information,
the mechanism can condition agents’ payoﬀs if trade occurs on the ex-post value of
trade, by specifying how proﬁts in the new entity are to be shared.
In this setting, we show that if agents’ information is relevant only to proﬁts of the
prospective merged entity, then the fact that this information is privately dispersed
poses no problem: the negotiation process will lead agents to reveal this information
and implement a merger if and only if the merger is proﬁtable, and it will never result
in any ex-post regret. As soon as private information is relevant also to ﬁrms’ proﬁts
if the merger is not implemented, however, we obtain a markedly diﬀerent result: In
this case, any merger negotiation process must necessarily result in ex-post regret for
some constellation of private information. The important lesson to be drawn from
this second result is that generally, asymmetric information indeed poses a real
problem to merger negotiations: Even if jointly , parties possess all the information
to assess the proﬁtability of a merger deal, under any ever so cleverly designed
negotiation process, parties necessarily still run the risk of entering a merger deal
which is idiosyncratically unproﬁtable if this information is dispersed across parties
and relevant to their outside option. More generally, our results indicate that the
problem which asymmetric information poses to eﬃcient merger decisions may lie
1A telling case in point is the 1998 merger between Hypobank and Vereinsbank, in which “it took
more than two years for Vereinsbank to discover the full horror of its partner’s balance sheet”(The
Economist, July 20th 2000, ‘How mergers go wrong’).
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more in its inhibiting mergers that would be eﬃcient than in its provoking mergers
that are ineﬃcient. This result, while in line with classical results on bilateral trade,
suggests that the widespread ‘merger-mania’-discussion may be focussing too much
attention on the frequent occurrence of unproﬁtable mergers than on proﬁtable
merger opportunities that are foregone.
Finally, Chapter 3 investigates a further and perhaps even more widespread con-
ventional wisdom concerning mergers which contends that mergers come in waves.
Motivated by the recent surge in potential explanations of such a phenomenon,2 our
focus in Chapter 3 is to empirically (re-)evaluate the underlying merger-wave hy-
pothesis using more recent data. Starting from Nelson’s (1959) seminal observation
that aggregate merger activity is characterized by “large bursts of activity separated
by lengthy intervals of very low activity,” we motivate a time-series model of merger
activity in which waves are caused by switches in an unobserved state.
We ﬁnd that such a model provides valuable insight into both US and UK merger
activity over the last 30 years by clearly identifying wave periods (i.e., states). Some-
what surprisingly, however, while we obtain a sharp indication of a wave in US
merger activity beginning in 1995, we ﬁnd no evidence whatsoever of a wave in the
80s. This ﬁnding is at odds not only with conventional wisdom, but also with pre-
vious ﬁndings by Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997) who identify an 80s merger
wave using a similar model. We argue that this apparent contradiction is caused
by a further key feature of our analysis: the use of more recent Bayesian estimation
methods which take adequate account of uncertainty about the model’s parameters
rather than just uncertainty about the unobserved states.
Eventually, we hope that the update on the empirical facts concerning merger
waves which we present in Chapter 3 will serve as a useful input for the ongoing
discussion on their cause.
We conclude this overview with a note to the reader concerning the hierarchical
structure of this dissertation, which reproduces the format familiar from handbook
series in economics: Each chapter forms an independent unit, complete with its own
appendix and list of references. Moreover, sections, propositions, equations, ﬁgures
etc. in each chapter are numbered independently. Any references across chapters
are made explicit. This format appeared most adequate and readable given the fact
that the individual chapters are essentially self contained.
2We might add that, in keeping with the theme of the other two chapters, some of these
theoretical explanations are again based on informational asymmetries (see Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan, 2004, for instance).
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Chapter 1
Incentive Contracts under
Learning by Doing
Dennis Ga¨rtner
1 Introduction
Supply relations in which a ﬁrm procures goods or services from another ﬁrm are
typically ridden with problems of asymmetric information. The canonical case con-
sidered in the literature is that of a supplier enjoying private information concerning
his marginal cost of production (see for instance Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002, for a
textbook treatment). A characteristic feature of these models is that the supplier’s
marginal costs are assumed exogenously given. However, the production of many of
the goods typically traded in such supplier relations involves learning eﬀects in the
sense that the supplying ﬁrm can lower its marginal costs as it gains experience with
rising production volumes.1 Such relations will therefore involve endogenous cost
structures as the supplier’s marginal costs come to depend not only on exogenous
factors, but also on the endogenous volume of trade. This paper explores the impact
of endogenizing marginal costs on optimal procurement: Does private information
concerning suppliers’ extent of learning eﬀects lead to contracts that exploit learning
1Learning eﬀects have been documented in numerous industries, such as in the production
of airplanes (Wright, 1936; Alchian, 1963), ships (Rapping, 1965; Thompson, 2001; Thornton
and Thompson, 2001), chemicals (Stobaugh and Townsend, 1975; Lieberman, 1984), machine
tools (Hirsch, 1952, 1956), computers and semiconductors (Nye, 1996; Gruber, 1998), electrical
equipment (Preston and Keachie, 1964; Sultan, 1975), nuclear power (Joskow and Rozanski, 1979;
Roberts and Burwell, 1981; Lester and McCabe, 1993) and in the weapons industry (Fox, 1988;
Gansler, 1989). While these studies all pertain to cost reducing learning eﬀects, a recent strand of
literature also seeks do document qualitative learning eﬀects in production (see Moul, 2001).
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eﬀects only to an ineﬃciently low extent? More generally, how does the endogenous
formation of agents’ private information aﬀect contractual arrangements?
Such issues arise not only in traditional vertical procurement relations. They
concern also the question of how to regulate a monopolistic service supplier with
private information on costs (Baron and Myerson, 1982; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1986).
While we already have a fairly good understanding of optimal regulation in station-
ary settings (see the inﬂuential work of Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993), relatively little
is still known about the impact of regulation in dynamic settings where suppliers’
technology is endogenous.2 Speciﬁcally, technological improvements through learn-
ing eﬀects should play a signiﬁcant role in electricity or telecommunication markets,
for instance, making it important to understand the long-run interplay between
regulation and innovation.
To tackle these issues, we set up a simple model of procurement over two periods,
where in each period, the supplier produces and sells some amount of a good to the
procuring ﬁrm in exchange for a monetary transfer. First-period marginal costs
are exogenously given (and publicly known). However, to capture learning eﬀects,
second-period marginal costs are assumed to depend on the level of ﬁrst-period
production. Furthermore, the strength of this learning eﬀect is assumed to be known
only to the supplier.
Our main ﬁnding is that whether private information causes learning-eﬀects to be
over- or underexploited relative to the eﬃcient benchmark crucially depends on how
agents’ learning rates diﬀer. If learning causes inherently more eﬃcient agents to
extend their technological lead over less eﬃcient agents, then quantities procured will
underexploit learning eﬀects. In this case, the principal’s incentive to underexploit
learning eﬀects may even be so strong as to let ﬁrst-period output fall short of its
static optimum, implying that learning eﬀects are not exploited at all. However, if
learning causes inherently less eﬃcient agents to catch up on more eﬃcient agents,
then the principal has an incentive to overexploit learning eﬀects. This incentive
not only leads to ineﬃciently high levels of output in the ﬁrst period—it may also
lead to an ineﬃciently high level of overall trade.
We ﬁrst derive these results in full generality under the assumption of full com-
mitment , implying that parties can sign a contract which settles both periods’ ex-
changes at the beginning of the relationship, and—more importantly—that they can
commit not to renege on this contract. In a further step we show, however, that
our main ﬁndings do not crucially depend on this assumption by considering the op-
posite case of spot commitment , where the principal can commit only to exchanges
in the current period. Even though limited commitment is generally understood to
be detrimental to long-term investments, we show that if learning eﬀects lead the
2A notable exception is Baron and Besanko (1984), who consider dynamic procurement relations
in a full-commitment setting. While they allow for innovation in the supplier’s technology by
endogenous unobservable eﬀort, they do not consider learning eﬀects in production.
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less eﬃcient agent to catch up, overexploitation can result also in the case of spot
commitment.
The basic intuition for why distortionary incentives depend on how agents’ learn-
ing rates diﬀer is simple: By the familiar rent-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ, distortions in out-
put are driven by the principal’s incentive to limit the rent payable to more eﬃcient
agents, which in turn corresponds to their cost advantage over less eﬃcient agents. If
learning magniﬁes eﬃciency diﬀerences, the usual downward distortion results. How-
ever, if learning leads less eﬃcient agents to catch up, the cost advantage enjoyed
by more eﬃcient agents decreases with ﬁrst-period output, in which case upward
distortions, and thereby ineﬃciently high investments into learning, result.
The paper closest in spirit to ours is Lewis and Yildirim (2002a). In the con-
text of optimal regulation under spot commitment, the authors analyze how dy-
namic regulation deals with suppliers’ learning eﬀects under private information (in
a companion paper, Lewis and Yildirim, 2002b, also apply these results to vertical
procurement relations). One of the key conclusions is that optimal policy indeed
encourages learning eﬀects, but at an ineﬃciently low level. However, their model
diﬀers from ours in an important respect. Private information in their model pertains
exclusively to the cost side of learning: while agent and principal have symmetric
knowledge concerning the impact of higher output today on marginal costs tomorrow
(i.e. on learning eﬀects themselves), each period involves a transitory ‘cost shock’
which oﬀsets production costs in that period only and which is known only to the
agent. Hence, if we think of learning eﬀects as inducing a cost-beneﬁt tradeoﬀ—
where costs are ineﬃciently high output today from a static viewpoint and beneﬁts
are lower marginal costs tomorrow—then private information in their model con-
cerns only the cost side of this tradeoﬀ. In contrast, this paper focusses on the
beneﬁt side by letting agents enjoy private information on their learning technology.
An important contribution of this paper to the existing literature thus lies in
showing that focussing merely on cost-side private information misses key issues
concerning optimal regulation and procurement when learning eﬀects are present.
Particularly, it fails to identify the possibility of an overexploitation of learning
eﬀects and of an ineﬃciently high level of overall trade.
On a more basic level, this paper’s contribution may be seen as sharpening basic
economic intuition concerning the connection between asymmetric information and
the volume of trade: It has become a virtual commonplace to associate private
information with ineﬃciently low trade. Our results bring back to mind that this
intuition depends crucially on the presumption that increased trade exacerbates the
value of private information and thereby informational rents. While such a structure
arises naturally in many models, we argue that learning by doing provides a case in
point where it is just as natural for the reverse to be true.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a basic two-
period model of learning by doing and describes the full-information benchmark.
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Section 3 presents the optimal contract under asymmetric information and full com-
mitment. We discuss both its eﬃciency properties and whether it even makes use
of learning economies in the ﬁrst place. Section 4 investigates contracts under spot
commitment. We analyze the additional restrictions on output schedules relative
to full commitment and show that the main insights of Section 3—particularly the
possibility of ineﬃciently high trade—generalize to the case of spot commitment. Fi-
nally, Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of the results and further possible
applications.
2 A Simple Model of Learning By Doing
This section presents the basic model and, as a benchmark for our later analysis,
characterizes the eﬃcient allocation.
2.1 Setting up the Model
We consider a simple model in which a principal procures a good from an agent
over two periods t ∈ {1, 2}. Let qt ∈ Qt denote the amount of the good procured
in period t and let zt ∈ IR denote the monetary transfer from the principal to the
agent in that period. Unless stated diﬀerently, we let Qt ≡ IR0. In each period t,
let the principal’s utility be given by vt = S(qt)− zt, where S ′ > 0 and S ′′ < 0. The
principal discounts with δ ∈ (0, 1), overall utility from transactions over the two
periods being V = v1 + δv2. The agent produces the good at a constant marginal
cost ct > 0 within each period, yielding a utility of ut = zt−ctqt in each period t. The
agent discounts with the same factor δ, leading to an overall utility of U = u1+ δu2.
Both principal and agent are assumed risk neutral.3
The remaining assumptions detail the agent’s production technology and its
dependence on private information (we brieﬂy discuss their relaxation in the context
of contracts under full commitment in Section 3.5). To focus our analysis, we assume
the agent’s ﬁrst-period marginal costs c1 to be observable.
4 However, we let the agent
possess private information concerning the structure of second-period costs. Private
information is represented by the scalar θ (the agent’s “type”), which is drawn from
a commonly known distribution over Θ, and which the agent privately observes
3Letting principal and agent share the same risk attitude and time preference focusses our
analysis by avoiding motives to trade risk or intertemporal utility.
4As we discuss in Section 3.5 in more detail, introducing private information on ﬁrst-period costs
c1 introduces a second, competing motive for the principal to distort quantities in order to reduce
ﬁrst-period informational rent. This second motive in isolation already being well understood in
the standard framework without learning, letting c1 be observable serves to make this papers’
contribution more transparent.
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c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
q1
c2
c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
q1
c2
(a) More Eﬃcient Agent
Learns Faster.
(b) Less Eﬃcient Agent
Learns Faster.
Figure 1: Types of Learning Eﬀects.
prior to ﬁrst-period production (and prior to contracting). For simplicity, most of
our analysis will assume two types Θ = {θ, θ} with θ > θ and Prob(θ = θ) = ν.
Second-period marginal costs c2 are a function of θ and ﬁrst-period output q1.
We model the presence of learning eﬀects in production by letting ∂c2/∂q1 < 0: The
higher ﬁrst-period production, the lower the marginal costs of production in period
2 (for any given type θ).5
Next, we assume that c2 is strictly decreasing in θ for all q1. Thus, an agent with
a higher θ is more eﬃcient in that he produces any output schedule q = (q1, q2) at a
lower cost. Note that this assumption represents more than a mere normalization of
the type space Θ: Since it is assumed to hold for all q1, it will provide a key sorting
condition in our derivation of the optimal contract under asymmetric information.
We call |∂c2/∂q1| the agent’s learning rate, and say that an agent learns faster
if he has a higher learning rate. Note that an agent may learn faster even though
he is less eﬃcient (i.e., has a lower θ). Indeed, key aspects of our analysis will
crucially depend on whether learning rates increase or decrease in θ. To facilitate
this, we assume that learning rates either increase or decrease in θ for all q1. Figure
1 illustrates the relevant constellations.
The following example not only provides an illustration of the setup, but—due
to its analytical tractability—will prove useful for numerical examples given further
below:
Example 1. Let second-period costs be given by c2(q1, θ) = c(θ) − γ(θ)q1 with c
strictly increasing in θ, and with γ > 0, and let the principal’s objective function be
given by S(qt) = aqt− bq2t , where a, b > 0. Then more eﬃcient agents learn faster if
γ is increasing in θ, whereas less eﬃcient agents learn faster if γ is decreasing in θ.6
5Note that we assume marginal costs to be constant within each period but change discontinu-
ously from one period to the next. This assumption serves to isolate learning eﬀects from simple
scale economies. Indeed, what distinguishes the two is that learning by doing depends on both
previous production volumes and on time.
6To make this example entirely compatible with our assumptions, the range of permissible q1
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In what follows, we will consider various settings for negotiating the exchanged
quantities and transfers. Common to these settings, however, is the usual assump-
tion of full bargaining power resting with the principal: The principal oﬀers a con-
tract (or a choice of contracts) to the agent, which the agent can decide to accept
or reject. If the agent rejects, he obtains a (type-independent) reservation payoﬀ of
zero and negotiations end.
2.2 The Eﬃcient Full-Information Benchmark
As a point of comparison for our later analysis, we ﬁrst consider the eﬃcient full-
information benchmark. Assume for a moment that the agent’s type θ is known to
the principal. For any output schedule q = (q1, q2), the joint surplus of trade is then
given by
W (q; θ) ≡ S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]. (1)
Given his bargaining power and any known type θ, the informed principal will oﬀer
a contract (q∗(θ), z∗(θ)) which is eﬃcient (i.e., ﬁrst best), specifying production
levels q∗(θ) = (q∗1(θ), q
∗
2(θ)) which maximize joint surplus W (q; θ), and payments
z∗(θ) = (z∗1(θ), z
∗
2(θ)) which leave the agent his reservation utility.
7
For later comparisons, we deﬁne conditional ﬁrst-best output levels as follows.
For any (q2; θ), let qˆ
∗
1(q2; θ) ≡ argmaxq2 W (q1, q2; θ) and, similarly, for any (q1, θ) let
qˆ∗2(q1; θ) ≡ argmaxq1 W (q1, q2; θ).
Lemma 2.1. The ﬁrst-best output schedule q∗(θ) and the contingent ﬁrst-best output
levels qˆ∗1(q2; θ) and qˆ
∗
2(q1; θ) have the following properties:
(a) qˆ∗2 is increasing in both q1 and θ;
(b) qˆ∗1 is increasing in q2, and increasing (decreasing) in θ if more (less) eﬃcient
agents learn faster;
(c) q∗ is increasing in θ if more eﬃcient agents learn faster.
The proof of this and all later results is presented in the Appendix. As a general
matter, we establish comparative static results such as Lemma 2.1 using super-
modular analysis (cf. Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Topkis, 1998). This approach
exploits basic complementarity relations among arguments of the objective function
and avoids imposing any unnecessary concavitity assumptions on objectives.8 The
and q2, (i.e., Q1 and Q2) must be bounded from above so as to ensure S′(qt) > 0 and c2(q1, θ) >
c2(q1, θ) > 0.
7Note that the ﬁrst-best transfer schedule z∗ will never be unique. Indeed, if (q∗, z∗) is a
ﬁrst-best contract, then any contract (q∗, z˜) with the same discounted value of transfers (i.e., with
z˜1 + δz˜2 = z∗1 + δz
∗
2) will also be ﬁrst-best.
8Nonetheless, readers unfamiliar with this technique will quickly verify the results under addi-
tional concavity assumptions by means of the ﬁrst-order approach.
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latter is particularly valuable in our setting due to the concavity which learning
eﬀects naturally introduce into the cost function.9
These technical issues aside, the intuition for the above results is conceivably sim-
ple: Higher ﬁrst-period output lowers the cost of additional second-period output,
thereby raising incentives to expand the latter. Conversely, higher second-period
output raises incentives to lower that output’s costs through learning eﬀects by ex-
panding ﬁrst-period output. Thus, each period’s conditionally eﬃcient output rises
in the other period’s output level. Moreover, a higher θ makes additional second-
period output less costly, which is why qˆ∗2 is increasing in θ. Incentives to raise
ﬁrst-period output in turn rise in the agent’s learning rate, which is why qˆ∗1’s re-
sponse to a change in θ depends on how the learning rate changes in θ. Finally, if
more eﬃcient agents also learn faster, these eﬀects complement each other, making
q∗ rise in θ. Note that no such robust comparative result is available if the less
eﬃcient agent learns faster: a rise in θ then provides direct incentives to raise q2
and lower q1, which are counteracted however by the complementarity between q1
and q2, leaving the overall result ambiguous.
3 Contracts under Full Commitment
In contractual problems with investment characteristics, the outcome is generally
sensitive to the level of intertemporal commitment available to the principal (see
for instance Fudenberg et al., 1990). In this section, we investigate our problem of
learning by doing under the most extreme form of commitment: We assume that at
the start of period one (but after the agent has learned his type), the principal can
oﬀer a contract settling all future exchange which cannot be reneged on.
3.1 Characterizing the Optimal Contract
The full-commitment setting has the convenient property that, by the revelation
principle and the stationarity of private information, we may equivalently restrict our
attention to truth-revealing mechanisms of the type {q(θ˜), z(θ˜)}θ˜∈Θ which specify
9Supermodular analysis extends also to situations where optimizers are not unique. In this case,
comparative static results are interpretable in terms of ordering relations among sets. Although
all our results permit such an interpretation, to avoid tedious notation, we will be somewhat loose
in distinguishing between the set of optimizers and its individual elements.
Moreover, while comparative statics derived by this technique are very general in terms of
covering also the possibility of corner solutions, this comes at the cost of all results applying
only in a weak sense (i.e., “increasing” in Lemma 2.1 is to be read as “nondecreasing”). Since
essentially all complementarity relations underlying our results are in fact strict , strict versions
of our comparative static predictions are easily established for interior maximizers under mild
additional conditions (see Edlin and Shannon, 1998, for technical details).
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contracts (i.e., exchanged quantities and transfers) for each type, and where these
contracts are designed so as to make it optimal for the agent to truthfully reveal his
type. For any such contract, we let
U(θ) ≡ z1(θ)− c1q1(θ) + δ
{
z2(θ)− c2[q1(θ), θ]q2(θ)
}
(2)
denote the θ-type’s equilibrium rent .
To relax notation in this section, for any function of θ ∈ {θ, θ}, we let an upper
(lower) bar indicate that the function is evaluated at θ (θ) and drop the argument
θ. Thus, for instance, U ≡ U(θ) and U ≡ U(θ). Finally, we let
Φ(q) ≡ δq2[c2(q1)− c2(q1)] (3)
denote the cost advantage enjoyed by the θ-agent over the θ-agent for any output
schedule q = (q1, q2). Intuitively, this cost advantage measures the value of private
information enjoyed by the more eﬃcient θ-type.
With this notation in place, the optimal contract under full commitment can be
characterized as follows:
Proposition 3.1. The menu of contracts oﬀered by the uninformed principal under
full commitment is such that production schedules qSB and qSB solve
qSB ∈ argmax
q
W (q) and qSB ∈ argmax
q
{
W (q)− ν
1−νΦ(q)
}
. (4)
Transfers zSB and zSB = are chosen such that types’ equilibrium rents are U =
Φ(qSB) and U = 0.
This result is easily understood by recognizing that, despite the presence of learn-
ing eﬀects, sorting (i.e., the relevance of incentive constraints) is entirely driven by
the assumption that c2 is decreasing in θ. Since this unambiguously makes the
θ-agent more eﬃcient, the relevant incentive problem is keeping him from falsely
reporting θ by granting him a rent equal to his cost advantage Φ(q) for the corre-
sponding production schedule—and leaving the θ-agent a rent of zero. Deducting
these rents from joint surplus, the principal is left with reduced form proﬁts (i.e.,
incorporating the optimal choice of transfers z and z) of
Π(q,q) ≡ ν[W (q)− Φ(q)]+ (1− ν)W (q), (5)
maximization of which corresponds to condition (4).
The objective function (5) embodies the usual rent-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ faced by
an uninformed principal: His menu of contracts trades oﬀ expected joint surplus
νW (q)+(1−ν)W (q) against the expected rent payments νΦ(q) required to induce
truthful reporting by the θ-type. This tradeoﬀ leads to ineﬃciencies whose precise
nature we analyze next.
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3.2 Partial Distortionary Incentives
A trivial implication of Proposition 3.1 is the usual ‘no distortion at the top’-result:
In spite of information being private, the eﬃcient θ-type still produces ﬁrst-best
quantities in both periods, so qSB = q∗. This leaves us with an investigation of
the nature of distortions ‘at the bottom’, that is, of ineﬃciencies inherent in the
contract oﬀered to the ineﬃcient θ-type.
The rent-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ responsible for this distortion involves the simulta-
neous use of two instruments, q1
SB and q2
SB. To clarify their individual roles and
make the principal’s motives more transparent, we ﬁrst analyze what we shall call
‘partial’ distortionary incentives. In analogy to the conditional ﬁrst-best production
schedules qˆ1
∗(q2) and qˆ2
∗(q1), we let qˆ1
SB(q2) and qˆ2
SB(q1) denote the levels of q1 and
q2, respectively, which maximize W (q)− ν1−νΦ(q) conditional on the other period’s
output level. With these deﬁnitions in place, the following partial distortionary
motives can be identiﬁed:
Proposition 3.2. Under full commitment, the uninformed principal faces the fol-
lowing (partial) distortionary incentives in designing the θ-type’s production sched-
ule:
(a) Conditional on any ﬁrst-period output q1, the uninformed principal will distort
second-period output downward, so qˆ2
SB(q1)  qˆ2∗(q1) for all q1 ∈ Q1.
(b) Conditional on any second-period output q2, the uninformed principal will dis-
tort ﬁrst-period output
(i) downward if the more eﬃcient agent learns faster, so qˆ1
SB(q2)  qˆ1∗(q2)
for all q2 ∈ Q2, and
(ii) upward if the less eﬃcient agent learns faster, so qˆ1
SB(q2)  qˆ1∗(q2) for
all q2 ∈ Q2.
Part (a) concerning second-period distortionary incentives is not surprising: Given
a ﬁrst-period output level, second-period marginal costs c2 are a datum, and hence
the principal’s optimization problem is identical to the standard one-period model of
procurement with privately known and constant marginal costs, for which downward
distortion (i.e., ineﬃciently low trade) is a well-known result.
More interestingly, Part (b) identiﬁes the distortionary incentives involved in
choosing ﬁrst-period output—and thereby the extent to which learning eﬀects are
under- or overexploited for any given second-period output. That the direction of
these distortions crucially depends on which agent learns faster is quickly understood
by referring back to our illustration of the two cases in Figure 1: If the more eﬃcient
agent learns faster, decreasing q1 leads types’ second-period costs c2 to converge,
thereby reducing the θ-type’s cost advantage (for ﬁxed q2) and hence the rent payable
to him. Conversely, if the less eﬃcient agent learns faster, the same eﬀect is achieved
by an increase in q1.
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Figure 2: The Direction of Overall Distortions.
3.3 Overall Distortions in Trade
The partial distortions analyzed above provide a direct measure of the over- or
underexploitation of learning eﬀects by asking whether the uninformed principal’s
contracts can be pareto-improved upon by expanding or reducing ﬁrst-period out-
put. Since the principal ultimately distorts both periods’ output schedules simulta-
neously, however, attaining the full welfare optimum will also require simultaneous
adjustments in both quantities.
As the next result shows, if the more eﬃcient type learns faster, attaining the
full welfare optimum requires expanding both periods’ output: Partial distortions
in this case are representative of overall distortions, so overall trade is ineﬃciently
low.
Proposition 3.3. Under full commitment, if the more eﬃcient type learns faster,
then private information causes an overall downward distortion in both ﬁrst- and
second-period output for the ineﬃcient type, so qSB  q∗.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the results under the additional assumption that both W
and W − νΦ are strictly concave. By the implied uniqueness of the maximizers and
by Lemma 2.1, the conditional ﬁrst-best outputs qˆ1
∗(q2) and qˆ2
∗(q1) are increasing
functions. Moreover, concavity of W implies that the qˆ1
∗-curve crosses the qˆ2
∗-curve
from below at q∗ = (q1∗, q2∗) in (q1, q2)-space. Now by Proposition 3.2(a), the qˆ2
SB-
curve will lie south of the qˆ2
∗-curve, and by Proposition 3.2(bi), the qˆ1
SB-curve will lie
west of the qˆ1
∗-curve. Hence, the equilibrium under private information—determined
by the intersection of the qˆ2
SB- and the qˆ1
SB-curve—must lie in the shaded area in
Figure 2(a). As illustrated, this area must lie in the southwest quadrant of q∗.
Why an analogous argument fails when the less eﬃcient agent learns faster is
illustrated in Figure 2(b). Again, the qˆ2
SB-curve must lie south of the qˆ2
∗-curve.
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However, Proposition 3.2(bii) in this case tells us that there will be an upward
distortion in ﬁrst-period output given any second-period output, so that the new
equilibrium must lie east of the qˆ1
∗-curve. Hence, only equilibria with q1SB < q1∗
and q2
SB > q2
∗ can be excluded.10
Particularly, if the less eﬃcient agent learns faster, it is possible for overall dis-
tortions to be upward in both periods, so that q1
SB > q1
∗ and q2SB > q2∗. This is
illustrated by the following extension to Example 1:
Example 2. Assume the value of output to the principal is given by S(qt) = 100qt−
80q2t , cost structures are c1 = 75, c2(q1) = 30−60q1, and c2(q1) = 50−95q1, types are
equally likely, and the common discount factor is δ = 0.7. First-best production then
entails q∗ = (0.30, 0.55) and q∗ = (0.38, 0.54), whereas contracts under asymmetric
information and full commitment will entail qSB = (0.49, 0.58) for the θ-type.
Alternative parameterizations of Example 1 will produce the other two possible
directions in overall distortions.
3.4 Are Learning Eﬀects Exploited At All?
Having gauged the outcome under incomplete information against eﬃcient bench-
marks, this section investigates whether downward distortionary incentives can be
so severe as to eliminate the exploitation of learning eﬀects altogether. For com-
parison, we consider the outcome which results if either ﬁrst-period output has no
impact on second-period marginal costs, so ∂
∂q1
c2 ≡ 0, or both principal and agent
behave myopically, so δ = 0. The resulting choice of q1 in either case will maximize
ﬁrst-period surplus S(q1)−c1q1 alone. Motivated by this, we introduce the following
terminology:
Deﬁnition 3.4. Let q◦1 ≡ argmaxq1{S(q1) − c1q1}. A ﬁrst-period output level q1
exploits learning eﬀects if q1  q◦1; it neglects learning eﬀects if q1  q◦.
Equivalently (recall that S ′′ < 0), learning eﬀects are exploited if the marginal
beneﬁt of ﬁrst-period output S ′ (weakly) falls short of marginal costs c1, and ne-
glected if the reverse holds.
Obviously, ﬁrst-best quantities always exploit learning eﬀects. This need not
be true for q1
SB, the ﬁrst-period quantity procured from the θ-type. The following
result gives suﬃcient conditions for either case:
10A simple generalization of this last argument (generalized beyond the graphical analysis’ ad-
ditional assumptions) runs as follows. Let q∗ denote the ﬁrst-best output schedule (if the ﬁrst-
best output schedule is not unique, let q∗ denote any ﬁrst-best schedule such that there ex-
ists no other ﬁrst-best output schedule involving lower ﬁrst- and higher second-period output).
Then for any q = (q1, q2) with q1 < q1∗ and q2 > q2∗, we have W (q) < W (q∗). Moreover,
Φ(q)  Φ(q∗) for any such q because Φ is decreasing in q1 and increasing in q2. But then
(1− ν)W (q)− νΦ(q) < (1− ν)W (q∗)− νΦ(q∗), so that no such q can maximize the uninformed
principal’s objective in (4).
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Proposition 3.5. The contract oﬀered to the θ-agent exploits learning eﬀects if∣∣ ∂
∂q1
c2(q1)
∣∣  ν · ∣∣ ∂
∂q1
c2(q1)
∣∣ (6)
for all q1 ∈ Q1; it neglects learning eﬀects if (6) is reversed for all q1 ∈ Q1.
Thus, learning eﬀects are exploited if either the eﬃcient agent does not learn
too much faster than the ineﬃcient agent, or if eﬃcient types are scarce enough.
Intuitively, both ensure that the principal’s rent-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ is suﬃciently in
favor of eﬃciency—the former by reducing the eﬃcient type’s cost advantage and
thereby his rent, the latter by making it less likely that such a rent will have to be
paid in the ﬁrst place.
In relation to our previous results in Section 3.3, Proposition 3.5 shows that
even though downward distortions in q1 may ensue if the ineﬃcient agent learns
faster, they will never be so strong as to eliminate the exploitation of learning
eﬀects altogether. In relation to the previous literature, Proposition 3.5 points out
that this may however be the case if the eﬃcient agent learns faster, depending
on the distribution of types and how strongly learning rates diﬀer. Particularly,
the possibility of learning eﬀects being neglected is absent in Lewis and Yildirim’s
(2002a) model.
3.5 Extensions and Limitations
Our analysis thus far has relied on several simplifying assumptions. Before the next
section proceeds to relax what might seem the most serious and restrictive one—the
assumption of full commitment—, we brieﬂy discuss other possible extensions and
the challenge they pose to our ﬁndings.
‘Varying Learning Advantages’: Assuming that one of the agents unambiguously
learns faster has simpliﬁed our identiﬁcation of ﬁrst-period distortions, but has been
immaterial to the derivation of the optimal contract itself in Proposition 3.1. With-
out this assumption, it is still true that only the θ-type’s output is distorted, q2 is
distorted downward given q1, but the direction of the distortion in q1 given q2 will
be ambiguous.
More speciﬁcally, consider the cost functions shown in Figure 3(a), where the
eﬃcient θ-agent learns faster for q1 < q
′
1 and slower for q1 > q
′
1. Our characterization
of partial distortions in q1 is then still valid to the extent that they will be downward
if q1 < q
′
1, and upward if q1 > q
′
1. However, which regime is relevant is ambiguous
and depends, inter alia, on the value of output relative to its costs.
Intersecting Cost Curves: In contrast, the assumption that the θ-type has lower
second-period costs c2 for any q1 has indeed been vital to our derivation of the
optimal contract by determining which of the incentive constraints must bind. This
assumption precludes, however, the possibility of one agent ‘overtaking’ the other
due to learning eﬀects.
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Figure 3: Examples of more General Second-Period Cost Functions.
Such a case is illustrated in Figure 3(b). Here, a straightforward extension to
our previous analysis shows that (partial) distortions in q1(θ
B) can only occur for
q1(θ
B) < q′1 and will be upward, whereas distortions in q1(θ
A) can only occur for
q1(θ
A) > q′1 and will be downward. However, which of these distortions occurs in
the optimum is again ambiguous, and both may in fact occur simultaneously.
The previous two examples generalize the main theme of our above analysis in
the following straightforward way: Distortions, if they occur, aim to reduce the
(locally) less eﬃcient agent’s cost-disadvantage. Whether this requires an increase
or a decrease in ﬁrst-period output depends on relative learning rates.
Private Information on First-Period Costs: We have assumed type-independent
ﬁrst-period costs c1 to focus on the role of asymmetric information on the returns
to learning by doing. If c1 also depends on θ, we may generalize the θ-type’s com-
parative cost advantage to Φ(q1, q2) ≡ [c1(θ) − c1(θ)]q1 + δ[c2(q1, θ) − c2(q1, θ)]q2.
Under the assumption that c1(θ)  c1(θ), the θ-type is still unambiguously more
eﬃcient in both periods, and the derivation of the optimal contract goes through
unchanged.11 Particularly, the θ-type’s output schedule remains undistorted. There
is now, however, an additional motive to distort q1 downward in order to reduce
the θ-type’s rent for ﬁrst-period cost advantages, which—depending on which agent
learns faster—will either reinforce or counteract the distortionary incentives identi-
ﬁed above.
Finally, we note that if c2(q1, θ) = c2(q1, θ) for all q1, in addition, so that private
information concerns the cost-side exclusively , then we are essentially in the setting
considered by Lewis and Yildirim (2002a,b), and learning-eﬀects will always be
underexploited for the θ-type.
11If c1(θ) > c1(θ), we again face a situation in which it is unclear which incentive constraint
binds at the optimum.
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Alternative Valuations of Output: We have assumed that the principal values out-
put at S(q1) + δS(q2). However, our key results concerning (partial) distortionary
incentives in Proposition 3.2 are robust to more general valuation functions S˜(q).12
A particularly interesting extension involves letting S˜ depend on q2 alone: In this
case, our model represents a pure investment problem with privately known returns,
but where the level of investment is contractible. Reinterpreting our above results,
underinvestment then ensues (in both a partial and an overall sense) if investment
returns (in terms of cost savings) become more sensitive to private information with
higher investment levels, whereas overinvestment (at least in a partial sense) occurs
in the reverse case.
4 Contracts under Spot Commitment
The above analysis has been based on the premise that in the ﬁrst period, the princi-
pal can fully commit to a contract spanning both procurement periods. Particularly,
this requires the principal being able to preclude any interim renegotiations on the
original contract, even if they are mutually advantageous. This may be somewhat
troubling, as advantageous renegotiations indeed exist at the beginning of the second
period whenever the agent turns out to be bad: By the nature of the truth-revealing
contract, the principal learns this in the ﬁrst period already. But then there is no
longer a point in having the agent produce an ineﬃciently low quantity in the second
period. Indeed, the principal can always oﬀer a new contract which induces eﬃcient
production by the bad agent and constitutes a strict Pareto-improvement over the
old contract. To complete this well-known argument, agents’ anticipation of this
incentive to renege will in turn change their own ﬁrst-period incentives, making it
impossible to implement the above contract under limited commitment.
Limited commitment is generally understood to be a deterrent to long-term in-
vestments (see for instance Fudenberg et al., 1990). As the exploitation of learning
eﬀects over several periods is inherently long termed (the costs of higher output
today leads to lower production costs only tomorrow), we would expect invest-
ment into learning to be aﬀected by the inability to commit to long-term contracts.
Speciﬁcally, we have seen above that under full commitment, learning eﬀects can be
exploited even when agents are privately informed about their learning abilities. We
12Except for our analysis in Section 3.4, all above results in fact easily generalize to cases in which
the valuation function S˜(q) displays complementarities in q1 and q2 in the sense that ∂2S˜/∂q1∂q2 
0. To understand this, note that the analysis has employed the particular form of valuation function
only to the extent that it implies additive separability of valuations in q1 and q2, which in turn
implies that, due to cost-side eﬀects alone, the surplus function W is complementary in q1 and q2.
Comparative static results reliant on this complementarity (i.e., Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 3.3)
are thus robust to valuation functions which preserve this complementarity.
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have further seen that in some circumstances, private information may even lead to
learning eﬀects being over-exploited relative to the social optimum. It should thus
be interesting to see how these results are altered by limited commitment.
To analyze this, we assume in this section that rather than being able to oﬀer
contingent contracts describing all quantities and transfers q1, q2, z1, and z2 at
the beginning of period one, the principal is limited to oﬀering spot contracts in
each period: At the beginning of period one, he can oﬀer a menu which settles
ﬁrst-period exchanges q1 and z1, whereas he can oﬀer a menu which settles second-
period exchanges q2 and z2 only at the beginning of period two. Furthermore, in
each period, the agent can decline, which yields him a reservation utility of 0 and
terminates the game.13
It is important to stress that this section assumes that the principal is not able to
commit to a second-period contract in period one. Indeed, by a standard argument
(see for instance Salanie´, 1997, p. 146), the principal can reproduce any sequence
of spot contracts (and, more generally, any sequence of complete contracts under
limited commitment) by fully committing in period one. Thus, if the principal can
fully commit, it will be (weakly) optimal for him to do so, and the analysis of
Section 3 applies.
However, there are cases where it is indeed realistic to assume that the principal
cannot commit. First, under virtually all legal systems, courts of law cannot prevent
parties from renegotiating on a contract if all parties agree to do so. Hence, pure
contractual long-term commitments with scope for pareto-improving renegotiations
are essentially meaningless.14 Second, regulatory authorities often cannot commit to
decisions beyond the life-span of the current administration. Finally, it appears to
be a simple matter of fact that real-world procurement and regulatory relations are
often governed by short-term contracts, even if the relationship itself is long termed
(see Lewis and Yildirim, 2002a, on the latter).
We investigate spot contracts in ﬁve steps. First, Section 4.1 analyzes the ex-
tent to which spot commitment is compatible with full revelation of information
in the ﬁrst period. We show that full ﬁrst-period revelation—and thereby the full-
commitment allocation—is typically not achievable due to the well-known ratchet
eﬀect. Next, Section 4.2 sets the stage for more general mechanisms with only partial
ﬁrst-period revelation of information by appealing to an extended revelation princi-
ple due to Bester and Strausz (2001). Based thereon, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 character-
13An intermediate level of commitment which we do not analyze here is that of long-term com-
mitment (see for instance Laﬀont and Tirole, 1990), which grants the principal the opportunity
to oﬀer contracts spanning all periods of gameplay, but does not let him commit not to renege, i.e.
to oﬀer a new contract which supersedes the original one, in later periods.
14Parties may however ﬁnd a non-contractual way to commit. For instance, if the principal
procures some input into his own production from the agent, he may be able to commit to a
certain second-period quantity by means of irreversible ﬁrst-period investments that are speciﬁc
to the level of second-period quantity, such as by choosing the size of his assembly plant.
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ize the sequence of equilibrium spot contracts. Finally, using this characterization,
Section 4.5 presents numeric examples to show that even under spot-commitment,
it is possible for learning eﬀects to be over-exploited.
4.1 First-Period Information Revelation and the Ratchet
Eﬀect
In the full-commitment setting of Section 3, the principal oﬀers a contract such that
the agent fully reveals himself at the start of the ﬁrst period and thereby determines
the terms of trade for the entire relationship. Under spot commitment, inducing
such reporting behavior is much more diﬃcult and in most cases even impossible.
The next result, which is essentially an application of the well-known ‘ratchet’ result
(cf. Freixas et al., 1985; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1987, 1988) to our model, shows that
full ﬁrst-period revelation can be an equilibrium phenomenon only under heavy
restrictions on quantities implemented thereby:
Lemma 4.1. Under spot contracting, both agents truthfully revealing their type in
the ﬁrst period can only be an equilibrium if the quantities procured from the ineﬃ-
cient type, (q1, q2), are such that the eﬃcient agent has no cost advantage, that is,
if Φ(q1, q2) = 0.
See the Appendix for the proof.
The intuition for this observation is straightforward: First, full information reve-
lation in period one implies that the principal is fully informed about the agent’s type
when designing the second-period contract, which lets him extract the full surplus in
the second period and leaves each type a second-period rent of zero. Now suppose the
principal oﬀers a contract to the θ-agent for which the θ-agent has a strict second-
period cost-advantage, that is, for which Φ(q1, q2) = δq2[c2(q1, θ) − c2(q1, θ)] > 0.
Since limited commitment prevents the principal from paying the θ-agent a posi-
tive second-period rent, the principal can only keep the θ-agent from misreporting
and grabbing the resulting positive second-period rent if the false report leads to
a strict decrease in his ﬁrst-period rent. However, since ﬁrst-period rents are inde-
pendent of θ due to identical ﬁrst-period production costs c1, a θ-agent could then
strictly increase his overall payoﬀ by a “take-the-money-and-run”-strategy, that is,
by misreporting in period one (yielding a strictly positive ﬁrst-period rent), and by
subsequently rejecting the second-period contract to obtain his reservation payoﬀ of
zero.
We have thus shown that truthful revelation in the ﬁrst-period can be an equilib-
rium only if the quantities procured from the θ-agent are such that the θ-agent has
no cost-advantage. Additionally, however, due to the spot nature of commitment,
the principal cannot simply commit to oﬀering a contract with this property in the
ﬁrst period: such a contract must be sequentially optimal. This poses no problem if
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there exists a ﬁrst-period q1 which equates agents’ second-period costs. Whenever
this is not the case, however, then the only way to keep the θ-agent from having a
cost advantage over the θ-agent under the latter’s contract is by shutting down the
θ-agent in the second period, so q2 = 0—and this shutdown must be sequentially
optimal, that is, it must constitute a “credible threat”:
Corollary 4.2. Truthful revelation in the ﬁrst period can only be an equilibrium if
c2(q1, θ) = c2(q1, θ) for some q1 ∈ Q1, or if argmaxq2{S(q2) − c2(q1, θ)q2} = 0 for
some q1 ∈ Q1.
Corollary 4.2 implies in particular that truth-telling cannot be an equilibrium in
environments for which c2(q1, θ) < c2(q1, θ) for all q1 (so that the θ-type never fully
catches up) and S ′(0) > c2(0, θ) (so that positive second-period production by the
θ-type is eﬃcient even if he produced nothing in the ﬁrst period, i.e., if he enjoyed
no learning). As an immediate consequence, full revelation of information cannot
be an equilibrium in a large class of environments.
As an alternative to full ﬁrst-period revelation, the principal may of course make
the ﬁrst-period allocation altogether independent of any ﬁrst-period message. This
will trivially circumvent any ﬁrst-period incentive problems—but will typically entail
high eﬃciency losses. As we will see, the optimal sequence of spot contracts can—
and typically will—involve revelation behavior in between these two polar cases:
Agents will reveal their type only partially in period one, in a way to be made
precise in the next section.
We will also see that the described constraints to full ﬁrst-period revelation
are paralleled by similar constraints to partial revelation: First, more information
revelation by the eﬃcient type in period one reduces his rent in period two, which
represents an instance of the ratchet eﬀect. Therefore, the eﬃcient type can only
be induced to reveal more information if he is compensated with a higher ﬁrst-
period rent. Second, however, the higher ﬁrst-period rent to the eﬃcient agent
will make it more proﬁtable for the ineﬃcient agent to report falsely in period
one, since he can always ‘take the money and run’. Consequently, as under full
ﬁrst-period revelation, both types’ ﬁrst-period incentive constraints will bind in a
partially revealing equilibrium.15 On the other hand, we will see that the eﬃcient
agent will generally obtain a strictly positive second-period for revealing his residual
information in period two.
15This clear result concerning the relevance of both incentive constraint stands in stark contrast
to the usual ambiguity under spot contracts. Indeed, in their two-type model of spot-contracting
with constant (but privately) known costs, Laﬀont and Tirole (1987) emphasize the point that,
depending on the speciﬁc parameterization, four distinct types of equilibria can result depending
on which incentive constraint binds. As we will see, the problem of ambiguity is avoided in our
model by the simplifying assumption of identical ﬁrst-period costs.
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4.2 Spot Contracts and the Revelation Principle
In full generality, interaction in our two-period learning-by-doing model with spot
commitment proceeds as follows: First, in each period t = 1, 2, the principal an-
nounces a message space Mt and a corresponding menu of outputs and transfers,
qt : Mt → Qt and zt : Mt → IR, specifying the quantity purchased and the trans-
fer made in period t for any message mt ∈ Mt. Second, in each period, the agent
decides whether to accept the contract or not, and in the former case announces a
message mt ∈ Mt according to a reporting strategy which is given by a probability
distribution over messages Mt for each possible type θ ∈ {θ, θ}. Moreover, play-
ers’ strategies in each period of course depend on the history of the game to date.
As usual, we require equilibrium strategies to be optimal in the sense of a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
As in any mechanism design problem, a main obstacle in the search for equilib-
ria of this game comes from the principal’s inﬁnite degrees of freedom in designing
the message space Mt. In settings in which the principal can fully commit to all
future actions (such as in Section 3), this problem is easily resolved through the rev-
elation principle, according to which there is no loss in generality in (i) restricting
the message space to type space and (ii) restricting agents’ reporting strategies to
strategies in which agents report their true type in equilibrium. With spot com-
mitment, however, the classical revelation principle is only applicable to the last
(i.e., second) period, whereas reducing the dimensionality of the set of ﬁrst-period
strategies requires a recent extension thereof due to Bester and Strausz (2001).
More speciﬁcally, consider ﬁrst the second period: For any conceivable history
of the game (and correspondingly updated beliefs of the principal), the problem
of designing the optimal second-period contract is identical to the standard ad-
verse selection model. Thus, we may restrict the set of second-period mechanisms
{M2, q2(·), z2(·)} to ones in which M2 = {θ, θ} and q2(·), z2(·) is such that the agent
ﬁnds it optimal to report his true type with probability one.
This is not so for the ﬁrst period, since by assumption, the principal cannot
commit himself to contracts oﬀered in the second period. As illustrated in Section
4.1, the agent’s ﬁrst-period message reveals information to the principal which the
principal may use in designing the second-period contract to the agent’s disadvan-
tage. However, due to an extension of the revelation principle in Bester and Strausz
(2001), in solving for the optimal contract, we may restrict our attention to contracts
where (i) the agent’s message space corresponds to the type space (so M1 = {θ, θ}),
and (ii) truth-telling is an optimal strategy for each type of agent in the sense that
he reveals his true type with some strictly positive probability (but not necessarily
equal to 1).16
16There are three noteworthy diﬀerences between the classical revelation principle and that
presented in Bester and Strausz (2001): First , as noted, the extended revelation principle requires
including also ‘weakly truth-revealing’ mechanisms in which agents reveal their true type only with
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Hence, without further loss of generality, we may reduce our mechanism-design
problem to one in which (i) Mt = {θ, θ} in each period t = 1, 2, (ii) agents ﬁnd it
optimal to always report their true type in the second period, and (iii) agents of
any type θ ∈ {θ, θ} ﬁnd it optimal to report their true type with some probability
p1(θ) > 0 in the ﬁrst period (and report the false type with probability 1− p1(θ)).17
Equipped with this major simpliﬁcation, we now proceed to characterize the
optimal series of spot contracts. In the spirit of backward induction, we ﬁrst char-
acterize the set of sequentially optimal second-period mechanisms for any history of
the game in Section 4.3, and then proceed to characterize the optimal ﬁrst-period
spot contract in Section 4.4.
4.3 The Second-Period Spot Contract
4.3.1 The Formation of Second-Period Beliefs
At the beginning of the second period, the principal updates his beliefs on the agent’s
type based on the history of the game and agents’ reporting strategies p1(θ). Letting
ν2(θ˜1) denote the assessed probability that the agent is of type θ if he sent signal θ˜1
in the ﬁrst period, Bayes’ Law delivers
ν2(θ˜1) =

p1(θ) · ν
p1(θ) · ν + [1− p1(θ)] · (1− ν)
, θ˜1 = θ,
[1− p1(θ)] · ν
[1− p1(θ)] · ν + p1(θ) · (1− ν)
, θ˜1 = θ.
(7)
Note that this belief is always well-deﬁned since each type reports truthfully with
some strictly positive probability, so that each signal is observed with nonzero prob-
ability in equilibrium.
Condition (7) formalizes the way in which agents’ ﬁrst-period reporting strategies
p1(·) aﬀect the informativeness of the ﬁrst-period report θ˜1. Instructive polar cases
arise for p1(θ) = 1− p1(θ), in which case ν2(θ) = ν2(θ) = ν, so that the ﬁrst-period
report θ˜1 is entirely uninformative, and for p1(θ) = p1(θ) = 1, in which case ν2(θ) = 1
a certain nonzero probability. Second , while the classical revelation principle contends that any
incentive feasible mechanism can be replicated by a truth-revealing one, the extended revelation
principle covers only incentive eﬃcient ones (i.e., mechanisms such there exists no other incentive
feasible mechanism which yields a strictly higher payoﬀ to the principal and the same payoﬀ
to the agent). The latter presents no restriction, however, if we are only interested in ﬁnding
contracts which maximize the principal’s proﬁts. Finally , in terms of allocational outcomes, the
procedure delivers a, but not necessarily all , mechanisms which maximize the principal’s payoﬀ.
Particularly, while the principal cannot strictly increase his payoﬀ with a richer message space,
it does not preclude the existence of mechanisms with richer message spaces which permit the
principal to achieve the same payoﬀ.
17We note that a similar simplifying assumption was already made in Laﬀont and Tirole (1987,
1993) in the context of dynamic regulation with spot commitment, but without the theoretical
underpinning provided by Bester and Strausz (2001).
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and ν2(θ) = 0, so that ﬁrst-period reports fully reveal the agents’ type (as analyzed
in Section 4.1 above).
4.3.2 The Optimal Second-Period Continuation Contract
Next, we consider the principal’s optimal design of the second-period contract given
his belief ν2(·) and given any history of the game. Observe ﬁrst that at the start
of the second period, for any given ﬁrst-period contract (q1(θ˜1), z1(θ˜1)) and any
reporting strategy p1(·), both the history of the game (i.e., ﬁrst-period outputs and
transfers) and the principal’s beliefs are completely summarized by the ﬁrst-period
report θ˜1. Hence, for any {p1(·), q1(·), z1(·)}, we may let (q2(θ˜1, θ˜2), z2(θ˜1, θ˜2)) denote
the second-period contract oﬀered to an agent who reported θ˜1 in the ﬁrst period
and who reports θ˜2 in the second period.
As noted above, the revelation principle lets us restrict attention to second-
period contracts which induce truthful revelation, so θ˜2 = θ for an agent of type θ
and any ﬁrst-period report θ˜1. Letting u2(θ˜1, θ) ≡ z2(θ)−c[q1(θ˜1), θ]q2(θ) denote the
second-period rent obtained by an agent of type θ who reported θ˜1 in period one,
we obtain the following characterization of optimal second-period contracts:
Proposition 4.3. For any ﬁrst-period strategies q1(·), z1(·), p1(·) and any ﬁrst-period
report θ1, the second-period continuation contract q2(θ˜1, θ), z2(θ˜1, θ) must be such that
(a) outputs satisfy
q2(θ˜1, θ) ∈ argmax
q2
{
ν2(θ˜1) ·
[
S(q2)− c2[q1(θ˜1), θ] · q2
]}
(8)
q2(θ˜1, θ) ∈ argmax
q2
{
[1− ν2(θ˜1)] ·
[
S(q2)− c2[q1(θ˜1), θ] · q2
]
− ν2(θ˜1) · Φ[q1(θ˜1), q2]/δ
}
, (9)
Φ[q1(θ˜1), q2(θ˜1, θ)]  Φ[q1(θ˜1), q2(θ˜1, θ)], (10)
where ν2(θ˜1) is determined by (7),
(b) transfers z2(θ˜1, θ) are such that u2(θ˜1, θ) = 0 and u2(θ˜1, θ) = Φ[q1(θ˜1),q2(θ)]/δ.
Moreover, for ν2(θ˜1) > 0, any q2(θ˜1, θ) which satisﬁes (8) and (9) will satisfy (10).
See the Appendix for the proof.
Although somewhat obscured by notation including all possible histories of the
game, Proposition 4.3 represents standard results: Conditional on ﬁrst-period out-
put, for ν2(θ˜1) ∈ (0, 1), the θ-type’s second-period output is eﬃcient, and the θ-type’s
output is distorted downward from its conditionally eﬃcient level in order to reduce
the rent payable to the θ-type.
However, since the principal’s belief ν2(θ˜1) is endogenous, we must also anticipate
cases in which ν2(θ˜1) = 1 and ν2(θ˜1) = 0: In contrast to Proposition 3.1, these cases
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are not precluded by the assumption that ν ∈ (0, 1). For ν2(θ˜1) = 1, the principal
attaches no probability to the agent being of type θ and will set q2(θ˜1, θ) with the sole
objective of eliminating the θ-agent’s rent, which he can always achieve by setting
q2(θ˜1, θ) = 0, so that Φ[q1(θ˜1), q2(θ˜1, θ)] = 0. If ν2(θ˜1) = 0, the θ-type’s output
will be eﬃcient, and any output of the θ-type will satisfy (8). Only in this latter
case will the implementability condition (10) be relevant, in the form of additional
restrictions on q2(θ˜1, θ) to ensure that incentive compatibility conditions can be met.
Without further loss of generality, however, we may simply replace condition (8) by
q2(θ˜1, θ) ∈ argmax
q2
[
S(q2)− c2[q1(θ˜1), θ] · q2
]
, (8’)
which allows us to neglect (10) altogether.18
4.4 The First-Period Spot Contract
In Proposition 4.3, we have fully characterized feasible outcomes of the second period
for any conceivable ﬁrst-period outcomes and strategies. Using this characterization,
we now proceed to characterize the optimal ﬁrst-period contract q1(·), z1(·).
We have already made use of the fact that, by Bester and Strausz (2001), there
is no loss of generality in restricting ﬁrst-period mechanisms to direct mechanisms
(i.e., with message space {θ, θ}). Moreover, by Bester and Strausz’s result, the
principal’s optimization problem may be formulated as choosing (i) the ﬁrst-period
contract (q1(·), z1(·)), (ii) the agent’s reporting strategy p1(·), and (iii) the second-
period continuation contract (q2(·), z2(·)) so as to maximize his expected payoﬀ,19
subject to
(i) p1(·) > 0;
(ii) the continuation contract (q2(θ˜1, θ), z2(θ˜1, θ)) satisfying Proposition 4.3;
(iii) the ﬁrst-period reporting strategy p1 being optimal for the agent given the
impact this has on his continuation payoﬀ;
(iv) ﬁrst-period participation constraints.
To operationalize the latter two requirements, in the by now familiar fashion, we
let u1(θ˜1) ≡ z1(θ˜1)−c1 ·q1(θ˜1) denote the ﬁrst-period rent of an agent who reports θ˜1
in the ﬁrst-period. Note that this ﬁrst-period rent is independent of the agent’s true
type θ due to the fact that we have assumed away ﬁrst-period cost asymmetries.
Moreover, we let U(θ) ≡ u1(θ) + δu2(θ, θ) denote the overall discounted rent of an
18That any q1(θ˜1, θ) and q1(θ˜1, θ) satisfying (8’) and (9) satisfy (10) also for ν2(θ˜1) = 0 is seen
by trivial extension of the proof of Proposition 4.3 in the Appendix. To understand why this is
without loss of generality, note that if ν2(θ˜1) = 0, the principal’s expected proﬁts are independent
of q2(θ˜1, θ) since he attaches zero probability to the corresponding sequence of reports.
19To understand the fact that the principal maximizes over the agent’s reporting strategy p1(·),
note that this maximization is of course subject to the strategy being optimal for the agent. A
similar comment applies to the principal maximizing ex-ante over q2(·), z2(·).
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agent of type θ who reports truthfully in period one (it will become clear immediately
that U(θ) is in fact the utility of an agent of type θ for any ﬁrst-period report made
with strictly positive probability in equilibrium).
Since p1(θ) > 0 for all θ, the reporting strategy being optimal requires that the
overall discounted rent obtained from truthful reporting must be at least as large
as that obtained from any other report, that is, U(θ) = maxθ˜1{u1(θ˜1) + δu2(θ˜1, θ)}
for all θ. Using the second-period rents u2(θ˜1, θ) derived in Proposition 4.3, these
conditions can be expressed as
U(θ)  U(θ) + Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] (11)
U(θ)  U(θ)− Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]. (12)
Moreover, whenever p1(θ) < 1 for some type θ, truth-telling must be a weakly
optimal strategy, in which case the corresponding incentive constraint must bind:
[1− p1(θ)]
{
U(θ)− U(θ)− Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]
}
= 0 (13)
[1− p1(θ)]
{
U(θ)− U(θ) + Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]
}
= 0. (14)
Finally, the discounted rent which accrues to the agent over the two periods must
at least match his outside opportunity of zero in order for the agent to participate:
U(θ)  0 (15)
U(θ)  0. (16)
Note that the agent will be willing to accept a ﬁrst-period contract yielding a neg-
ative rent u1, provided that he is compensated by a suﬃciently large rent in the
second-period contract.20
The incentive constraints (11) and (12) immediately deliver the implementability
condition
Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]  Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)], (17)
which says that the second-period rent obtained by an eﬃcient type, u2(θ˜1, θ), must
be maximal under truth-telling in period one (θ˜1 = θ).
Following the usual argument, (11) and the fact that Φ  0 implies that U(θ) 
U(θ), so that (11) and (16) imply (15). Thus, we may neglect constraint (15).
Moreover, (16) must bind (i.e., U(θ) = 0) in equilibrium: Otherwise, the principal
20 Moreover, we are implicitly assuming that it is optimal for the principal to induce participation
by either type of agent in every period. This is without loss of generality, however, because non-
participation by any type θ in any period t = 1, 2 is equivalent in terms of payoﬀs and incentive
feasibility constraints to a mechanism which leads to qt = 0 and zt = 0 for that type.
It is important to note that this does not , however, imply that the ‘take-the-money-and-run’-
actions described in Section 4.1 pose no restriction on incentive design. They are simply not an
equilibrium phenomenon (although q2 = 0 and z2 = 0 in the second period is essentially equivalent
to ‘running away’).
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could reduce U(θ) and U(θ) by the same small amount without violating any of the
remaining constraints, and thereby strictly raise his expected payoﬀ.21 Given this,
constraints (11) and (12) simplify to
Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]  U(θ)  Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]. (18)
The line of arguments up to this point should appear familiar from the full-com-
mitment case (see the proof of Proposition 3.1). The diﬀerence here comes from
the additional requirements of sequential rationality (see Proposition 4.3) and con-
straints (13) and (14), which—in the next step of the argument—cause the range of
permissible U(θ) implied by (18) to collapse to a single point:
Lemma 4.4. In equilibrium, the implementability condition (17) must bind. Equiv-
alently, both types’ ﬁrst-period incentive constraints (11) and (12) must bind in
equilibrium.
See the Appendix for the proof.22
The important implication of Lemma 4.4 is that in any spot equilibrium, the ﬁrst-
period report θ˜1 cannot be used to separate agents in that agents’ ﬁrst- and second-
period rents (and thereby also the cost advantage enjoyed by the θ-agent) must be
independent of ﬁrst-period reports. Observe that this parallels the result derived in
Lemma 4.1 for full ﬁrst-period revelation—the diﬀerence being that under partial
ﬁrst-period revelation, the θ-agent may obtain a strictly positive second-period rent
on residual information not revealed in the ﬁrst period.
To appreciate and understand Lemma 4.4, note that its clear-cut conclusion
concerning the relevance of both incentive constraint stands in stark contrast to
the usual ambiguity under spot contracts. Indeed, a key result in Laﬀont and Ti-
role’s (1987) two-type model of spot-contracting with constant (but privately known)
marginal costs is that, depending on the speciﬁc parameterization, four distinct types
of equilibria will result depending on which incentive constraint binds—an ambiguity
which is reminiscent of the standard one-period analysis when the Spence-Mirrlees
21Recall that the principal’s payoﬀ corresponds to expected surplus minus expected rents. By
(13) and (14), the rent payable to any agent θ must be U(θ) irrespectively of his ﬁrst-period report
whenever false reporting is part of the equilibrium (i.e., if p1(θ) < 1), so that expected rents
may simply be written as νU(θ) + (1 − ν)U(θ). Hence, the principal’s expected payoﬀ is strictly
decreasing in both U(θ) and U(θ).
22We note that the proof also shows that any equilibrium with p1(θ) = 1 must entail
Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] = Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] = 0, which generalizes Lemma 4.1 by dropping the require-
ment that p1(θ) = 1. To understand this, recall that the crucial point in the argument leading to
Lemma 4.1 was simply that a θ-type gets no rent in the second-period. But even if the θ-type does
not reveal himself with certainty in period one, so long as the θ-type does, the θ-type announcing
his true type (which must be weakly optimal) will fully reveal his type and therefore leave him
a second-period rent of zero. Hence, the θ-type receives no second-period rent, and invoking the
“take-the-money-and-run”-argument on behalf of the θ-type leads to the conclusion that neither
type can receive a ﬁrst-period rent.
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sorting condition is violated (cf. Guesnerie and Laﬀont, 1984). This ambiguity is
circumvented in our setting by focussing on the returns to learning by doing: As-
suming that ﬁrst-period costs c1 are type-independent implies that ﬁrst-period rents
u1 are type-independent as well, so that ﬁrst-period sorting (or ‘separation’) can be
based only on second period rents u2. Thus, in contrast to Laﬀont and Tirole (1987),
there is no conﬂict between ﬁrst- and second-period sorting conditions. Moreover,
since (i) ﬁrst-period separation can only be based on second-period rents, but (ii) the
ratchet eﬀect keeps the principal from being able to commit to raising second-period
rents due to ﬁrst-period information revelation, ﬁrst-period separation is altogether
infeasible in the sense stated in Lemma 4.4.
Thanks to Lemma 4.4, we may now describe the equilibrium sequence of spot
contracts and the accompanying reporting strategies by means of a straightforward
optimization problem:
Proposition 4.5. (a) In the spot equilibrium, p1(·), q1(·) and q2(·, ·) must maximize
the principal’s expected proﬁts, given by
νp1(θ)
{
S[q1(θ)]− c1q1(θ) + δ
[
S[q2(θ, θ)]− c2[q1(θ), θ]q2(θ, θ)
]}
+ν(1− p1(θ))
{
S[q1(θ)]− c1q1(θ) + δ
[
S[q2(θ, θ)]− c2[q1(θ), θ]q2(θ, θ)
]}
+(1− ν)p1(θ)
{
S[q1(θ)]− c1q1(θ) + δ
[
S[q2(θ, θ)]− c2[q1(θ), θ]q2(θ, θ)
]}
+(1− ν)(1− p1(θ))
{
S[q1(θ)]− c1q1(θ) + δ
[
S[q2(θ, θ)]− c2[q1(θ), θ]q2(θ, θ)
]}
−νΦ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)], (19)
subject to
(a1) p1(θ), p1(θ) > 0;
(a2) p1(·), q1(·), and q2(·, ·) satisfying Proposition 4.3, and
(a3) q1(·) and q2(·, θ) satisfying
Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] = Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)]. (20)
(b) Moreover, the accompanying transfers, z1(·) and z2(·) are chosen such that
(b1) u2(θ, θ) = u2(θ, θ) = Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] and u2(θ, θ) = u2(θ, θ) = 0, and
(b2) u1(θ) = u1(θ) = 0.
Proposition 4.5 reformulates the problem of ﬁnding the equilibrium under spot
commitment as an optimization problem which is considerably more straightforward
than its ﬁrst appearance might suggest. First, note that in the usual fashion, part
(b) of Proposition 4.5 concerning equilibrium transfers is irrelevant to ﬁnding the
equilibrium values of the allocationally relevant strategies q1(·), q2(·), and p1(·).
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Second, owing to Lemma 4.4, the optimization problem is subject to no inequality
constraints other than the immediate constraints on the optimizers themselves.23
Finally, it is worth noting that for p1(θ), p1(θ) < 1, objective and constraints are
invariant to relabeling the ﬁrst-period message space, so that there is no loss in
generality in restricting the maximizers to reporting strategies such that p1(θ) 
1 − p1(θ), which formalizes the idea that the ﬁrst-period message θ is ‘primarily
designed for’ the corresponding type θ, and similarly for the ﬁrst-period report θ.
To establish a link between Proposition 4.5 and the full-commitment case, ob-
serve that the restrictions stemming from spot commitment lie entirely in con-
straints (a2) and (a3): It is only due to these constraints that we cannot simply
set p1(θ) = p1(θ) = 1 and choose q1(·) and q2(·) accordingly to replicate the full-
commitment outcome. Moreover, from our above discussions, the source of these
constraints is intuitive: (a2) embodies the requirement that second-period contracts
be sequentially rational under spot commitment, and (a3) represents the fact that
ﬁrst-period separation of types is not possible under spot commitment due to the
ratchet eﬀect.
4.5 Numerical Results
Rather than derive results concerning the direction of distortions at the same level of
generality as in Section 3 for the full-commitment case, we conﬁne ourselves in this
section to presenting results for two speciﬁc examples. One reason for this is that,
as we shall see, in contrast to the full-commitment case, the partial nature of ﬁrst-
period information revelation under spot commitment suggests multiple meaningful
ways to measure these distortions. However, we will supply an example for which
distortions in output are upward for all these measures, which generalizes this paper’s
main theme by showing that upward distortions in output are possible under learning
by doing—even under spot contracts.
The examples in this section are based on speciﬁc parameterizations of Exam-
ple 1 in Section 2. We determine the equilibrium sequence of contracts and reporting
behavior by means of the optimization problem in Proposition 4.5. This optimiza-
tion may be implemented in terms of a basic three-dimensional grid search over
(p1(θ), p1(θ), q1(θ)): Each such tuple uniquely determines q2(θ, θ) and q2(θ, θ) by
requirement (a2). We may then construct the set of tuples (q1(θ),q2(θ, θ)) which
jointly satisfy requirements (a2) and (a3). In the setup of Example 1, where c2
and S ′ are linear in q2, this results in a quadratic condition, producing at most two
such tuples. Finally, for every such tuple, the resulting q1(θ) lets us uniquely deter-
mine q1(θ, θ) by requirement (a2). In this fashion, for every (p1(θ), p1(θ), q1(θ)), we
may determine the maximal expected proﬁts as given by (19), which completes the
23Recall from Section 4.3 that the inequality constraint (10) in Proposition 4.3 can be ignored
at no loss of generality by replacing condition (8) by condition (8’).
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Period 1 Period 2
q1(θ) q1(θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ)
Probability 63% 37% 50% 0% 37% 13%
Spot Contract (SC) 0.341 0.444 0.565 0.604 0.576 0.319
(1) q∗1, q
∗
2 0.301 0.380 0.550 – 0.538 –
(2) q∗1, q
∗
2|pSC1 0.314 0.380 0.555 0.580 0.538 0.500
(3) q∗1|pSC1 , qSC2 0.301 0.396
(4) q∗2|pSC1 , qSC1 0.565 0.604 0.576 0.514
Note: Row ‘Probability’ shows probability of observing quantity in spot equilibrium; row
‘Spot Contract (SC)’ shows quantities in equilibrium spot contract; remaining rows are
explained in the text.
Table 1: Evaluating Output Distortions in Example 3.
algorithm.
4.5.1 Example 3: Ineﬃcient Agent Learns Faster
We ﬁrst consider an example for which the ineﬃcient agent learns faster, which we
know under full commitment causes the ineﬃcient agent’s ﬁrst-period output to be
ineﬃciently high—at least given second-period output. Speciﬁcally, we use the same
setting used in Example 2 in Section 3 to illustrate the possibility of overall upward
distortions under full commitment:
Example 3. For the setting given in Example 2, equilibrium reporting strategies
under spot commitment are given by p1(θ) = 1 and p1(θ) = 0.74 for equilibrium
output menus given by q1(θ) = 0.34, q1(θ) = 0.44, q2(θ, θ) = 0.57, q2(θ, θ) = 0.60
24,
q2(θ, θ) = 0.58, and q2(θ, θ) = 0.32.
As noted, there are multiple ways to gauge distortions in the spot contract of
Example 3 (comparisons are summarized in Table 1):
(1) Comparison with Unconstrained First Best (q∗1, q
∗
2): First-best quantities as de-
scribed in Section 2 are shown in the third row of Table 1. Distortions are easy to
evaluate for the θ-type since he produces deterministic quantities in the spot equi-
librium (recall p(θ) = 1): His output is higher under the spot contract than under
the dynamic ﬁrst-best. Comparisons are complicated for the θ-agent by his equi-
librium quantities under the spot contract being stochastic. However, his average
ﬁrst-period quantity p1(θ)q1(θ) + (1− p1(θ))q1(θ) = 0.42 exceeds q∗1(θ), whereas his
average second-period output of 0.51 falls short of q∗2(θ). Average overall second-
24Since ν2(θ) = 1, the equilibrium value of q2(θ, θ) is not unique (see Proposition 4.3).
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period output (i.e., averaged over both agents and reports) under the spot contract
(0.54) is higher, however, than average ﬁrst-best second-period output (0.52).
(2) Comparison with First Best Conditional on First-Period Reporting (q∗1, q
∗
2|pSC1 ):
Next, eﬃcient levels of q1(·) and q2(·) given agents reporting strategies under the
spot contract are given in the fourth row of Table 1. Compared to this benchmark,
there is a clear upward distortion in both agents’ period output and the θ-type’s
second-period output. The direction of the distortion in the θ-type’s second-period
output depends on his ﬁrst-period report, but the average distortion under the spot
contract is again upward.
(3) Comparison with Eﬃcient First-Period Output Conditional on First-Period Re-
porting and Second-Period Output (q∗1|pSC1 , qSC2 ): Row ﬁve of Table 1 shows that
given (i) agents’ reporting strategies and (ii) second-period output, both type’s
ﬁrst-period output is ineﬃciently high under spot contracting.
(4) Comparison with Eﬃcient Second-Period Output Conditional on First-Period
Reporting and First-Period Output (q∗2|pSC1 , qSC1 ): Not surprisingly given Proposition
4.3, the last line of Table 1 shows that there is no distortion in the θ-agent’s second-
period output given his ﬁrst-period output. Moreover, since p1(θ) = 1 and therefore
ν2(θ) = 0, the θ-agent’s second-period is also eﬃcient under truthful reporting by
this measure, whereas it is ineﬃciently low for a θ-report.
There is a ﬁnal interesting comparative exercise not shown in Table 1: Imagine
a principal who faces the constraints of Proposition 4.5 regarding his strategies,
but who maximizes expected surplus rather than expected proﬁts . Technically, this
simply means ignoring the last term (the expected rent payment) in the objective
function (19) of Proposition 4.5. Intuitively, we might think of this as ﬁrst-and
second-period contracts being designed by two diﬀerent principals (‘principal t’, t =
1, 2), where the ‘benevolent’ principal 1 maximizes expected surplus while taking into
account that principal 2 observes ﬁrst-period messages and behaves opportunistically
in designing the second-period contract.25
It turns out in the setting of Example 3 that such a benevolent ﬁrst-period prin-
cipal will not collect any ﬁrst-period information: He will simply set q1 = 0.341,
which will entail second-period quantities of q2(θ) = 0.565 and q2(θ) = 0.465 con-
ditional on the second-period report.26 Compared to this benchmark, the above
25The term ‘benevolent’ may be somewhat misleading in the context of Laﬀont and Tirole’s
(1986) regulation model. In that model, the regulatory authority behaves like a ‘rational’ rather
than a ‘benevolent’ principal in trading oﬀ joint surplus against informational rents not because
it is selﬁsh, but because it is assumed either (i) that the authority is at least partly guided by
distributional concerns in favor of consumers, or (ii) that levying taxes to pay rents to the ﬁrm
involves some form of deadweight loss.
26We note in passing that—while clearly ineﬃcient compared to the dynamic ﬁrst best—such a
benevolent ﬁrst-period principal still exploits learning eﬀects in terms of Deﬁnition 3.4, since the
optimal static ﬁrst-period output in Example 3 would involve q1 = 0.16 for both types.
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results show that the opportunistic (i.e., rational) ﬁrst-period principal will imple-
ment only an upward distortion in the θ-type’s ﬁrst-period quantities by oﬀering
him a ﬁrst-period quantity of q1 = 0.444 for a truthful report—which a θ-type will
choose with probability 0.74, while it is never chosen by a θ-type.
This last comparative exercise is particularly instructive in that it provides a com-
prehensive account of ﬁrst-period distortionary motives—distortions in ﬁrst-period
quantities and the distortions in ﬁrst-period reporting behavior induced thereby.
Moreover, it is intuitive that a ‘benevolent ﬁrst-period principal’ will generally not
induce any information revelation in the ﬁrst period: Since he does not care about
rents paid to the agent in the second period, he will be interested in implementing
type-dependent ﬁrst-period quantities only to the extent that they enhance second-
period eﬃciency. However, second-period eﬃciency can only be enhanced by mak-
ing it more likely that the eﬃcient θ-type produces at a real cost advantage over
the θ-type. This in turn is precluded by Lemma 4.4, by which second-period cost
advantages must be identical for any ﬁrst-period report due to the ratchet eﬀect
precluding any ﬁrst-period separation. Hence, the benevolent ﬁrst-period princi-
pal will implement report-independent ﬁrst-period quantities—and it is quickly seen
that this is compatible only with non-informative reporting behavior on behalf of
both types.27,28 This also illustrates that an opportunistic principal will not imple-
ment report-dependent ﬁrst-period quantities to raise eﬃciency—but only to reduce
rents payable in the second period, in a sense reminiscent of the usual rent-eﬃciency
tradeoﬀ.
Mainly, however, the discussion surrounding Example 3 has shown that, along an
entire range of possible benchmarks, it is possible for learning eﬀects to be exploited
to an ineﬃciently high extent even under spot commitment.
4.5.2 Example 4: Eﬃcient Agent Learns Faster
To round oﬀ this section of numerical examples, Example 4 below presents a setting
in which the more eﬃcient agent also learns faster. As one may expect, results in
this example are less surprising in that the spot equilibrium entails unambiguous
downward distortion in quantities traded:
Example 4. Assume the value of output to the principal is given by S(qt) = 100qt−
80q2t , cost structures are c1 = 75, c2(q1, θ) = 60 − 70q1, and c2(q1, θ) = 65 − 60q1,
ν = 0.5, and δ = 0.7. The spot equilibrium then involves no revelation of information
27More precisely, given a ﬁrst-period message space M1 = {θ, θ}, any report-independent quan-
tities q1(θ) = q1(θ) and any reporting strategy p1(θ) of the θ-type, any informative reporting
strategy p1(θ) 	= 1 − p1(θ) on behalf of the θ-type will be suboptimal since revealing his type in
the ﬁrst period only serves to diminish his expected second-period utility.
28This insight is in line with the general notion that hold-up problems prevent private information
on long-term investment opportunities from being put to eﬃcient use under short-term contracts
(see for instance Fudenberg et al., 1990).
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Period 1 Period 2
q1(θ) q1(θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ) q2(θ, θ)
Probability 50% 50% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Spot Contract (SC) 0.237 0.237 0.354 0.354 0.262 0.252
(1) q∗1, q
∗
2 0.267 0.237 0.368 – 0.308 –
(2) q∗1, q
∗
2|pSC1 0.253 0.253 0.361 0.361 0.313 0.313
(3) q∗1|pSC1 , qSC2 0.245 0.245
(4) q∗2|pSC1 , qSC1 0.354 0.354 0.308 0.308
Note: See the explanation in Table 1 and in the text.
Table 2: Evaluating Output Distortions in Example 4.
in the ﬁrst period with q1 = 0.237, and second-period outputs (contingent only on
second-period reports) of q2(θ) = 0.354 and q2(θ) = 0.262.
Comparisons of output distortions are shown in Table 2.29 Relative to all bench-
marks, outputs are distorted downward in the equilibrium spot contract. Moreover,
in this setting, the ‘benevolent ﬁrst-period principal’ will implement the report-
independent ﬁrst-period quantity of q1 = 0.251, resulting in second-period quanti-
ties of q2(θ) = 0.360 and q2(θ) = 0.267. Hence, also relative to this benchmark,
quantities are unambiguously distorted downward.
5 Conclusion
Our model has analyzed how the introduction of privately known learning capa-
bilities into the standard dynamic model of adverse selection inﬂuences incentive
design. Contrary to previous work by Lewis and Yildirim (2002a), we have consid-
ered a setting in which agents are privately informed about the rate at which they
learn rather than just the cost side.
The focus of our investigation has been on whether this information being private
leads to an under- or an overexploitation of learning eﬀects relative to the eﬃcient
level. Under full commitment, we have shown that this crucially depends on whether
learning eﬀects let inherently more eﬃcient agents expand their lead, or whether they
enable inherently less eﬃcient agents to catch up. In the ﬁrst case, we obtain results
similar to Lewis and Yildirim’s in that learning eﬀects will be under-exploited—
29To present the results in the same format as Table 1, Table 2 equivalently presents the equilib-
rium in Example 4 as a mechanism with ﬁrst-period message but where contracts are independent
of this message and reporting strategies are completely uninformative (i.e., p1(θ) = 1− p1(θ)).
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the only diﬀerence being that in our case, this distortion can be so strong as to
eliminate the exploitation of learning eﬀects altogether. In the second case, we
obtain entirely new results: If learning eﬀects let inherently less eﬃcient agents
catch up, the principal has an incentive to overexploit learning eﬀects. Moreover,
we have shown that this eﬀect is not driven by the full-commitment assumption: An
overexploitation of learning eﬀects may result also under spot commitment, despite
the general notion that limited commitment tends to deter rather than encourage
long-term investments.
More generally, our analysis has shown that in order to predict an under- or
overexploitation of learning eﬀects in dynamic adverse selection settings, it is im-
portant to identify whether these learning eﬀects serve to magnify or to diminish
existing diﬀerences in eﬃciency between types. Concerning vertical procurement
relationships, for instance, we may seek to categorize supplying industries along
these lines according to their technology. For example, consider rather simple low-
tech inputs produced in more traditional ‘bread-and-butter’ industries where there
is little scope for large technological improvements. Even if there is originally some
scope for improvements through learning by doing, we would eventually expect all
agents to ‘catch on to the trick’ (some types sooner, some later), after which there
is little scope for further improvement. Thus, we would expect learning eﬀects to
quickly subside and to equalize agents’ productivity. In such industries, our model
would predict learning eﬀects to be over- rather than under-exploited. In contrast,
consider suppliers of more high-tech products such as the computer chip industry.
Here, we would expect signiﬁcant scope for long-run improvements in production
technologies. Further, we would expect inherently more innovative and creative
suppliers to ever increase their lead over less eﬃcient suppliers through accumulated
learning eﬀects. For such suppliers, our model predicts learning eﬀects to be under-
rather than overexploited. Similar technological arguments may be applied to the
regulation of monopolistic suppliers.
One may also imagine applications of our model outside of the realm of pure
procurement and regulation settings. Take, for instance, labor contracts of the type
considered in Miyazaki’s (1977) ‘internal labor market rat race’, where employees’
productivity on the job is privately known, and labor contracts specify how hard an
agent is expected to work on the job. Assume, in addition, that how hard an agent
works today inﬂuences his future productivity on the job. If we expect hard work to
make a less eﬃcient worker catch up with the more eﬃcient worker’s productivity,
we should expect the employer to ask agents to work ineﬃciently hard on the job—in
a sense interpretable as an aggravation of the ‘rat race’. If, on the other hand, we
expect harder work today to magnify productivity diﬀerences between workers (as
might be the case on more creative jobs), we should expect the employer to relax
workers’ workload below the eﬃcient level.
Other potential ﬁelds of application may include credit market problems in the
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style of Freixas and Laﬀont (1990), where the borrower is privately informed about
the returns to his project. If the future productivity of capital in the project sys-
tematically depends on the size of the loan today, then our analysis would predict
ineﬃciently high ﬁrst-period loans if raising loans has a larger impact on productiv-
ity in inherently less productive projects, and vice versa if productivity in inherently
more productive projects is more strongly aﬀected. Finally, the insights may be ap-
plied to models of discrimination in quantity or quality by a monopolistic supplier
of a consumption good (see Maskin and Riley, 1984; Mussa and Rosen, 1978) if we
assume that consumers get used to or even addicted to the good, so that consuming
more (or a higher quality) of the good today increases consumers’ willingness to pay
tomorrow.30 The learning-speed criterion of our model then pertains to whether
customers with a higher willingness to pay for the good also get used to the good
faster, or whether it is the customers who value the good less who get used to it at
a faster rate. Our analysis predicts an underexploitation of the ‘addiction factor’ in
the former case, and an overexploitation in the latter.
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Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Results in Section 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Using elementary robust comparative statics and supermodular anal-
ysis (cf. Topkis, 1998), the results require identifying suitable complementarity relations
among q1, q2 and θ in the objective functionW . Observe ﬁrst that ∂
2
∂q1∂q2
W = −δ ∂∂q1 c2 > 0,
so that W has increasing diﬀerences in q, implying that qˆ∗1 and qˆ∗2 are both increasing in
30The idea of such ‘rational addiction’ has been introduced by Becker and Murphy (1988), albeit
in the context of a competitive market. Boone and Shapiro (2005) have more recently investigated
a setting quite similar to the application we have in mind here, the main diﬀerence being that the
discriminating monopolist sells on ‘anonymous’ spot markets, that is, any information revealed to
him in the ﬁrst-period is useless in the second-period). However, in many settings, even if the seller
has a sizeable number of clients, he can nonetheless design a ‘personalized’ sequence of contracts,
as is done for instance by video rental chains by means of membership cards.
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the quantity produced in the other period. Next, ∂∂q2W = −δc2, which is increasing in
θ since we have assumed c2 to decrease in θ. Hence, W has increasing diﬀerences in
(q2, θ), implying that qˆ∗1 is increasing in θ. Finally,
∂
∂q1
W = −δq2 ∂∂q1 c2. Thus, W has
increasing diﬀerences in (q1, θ) if more eﬃcient agents learn faster (|∂c2/∂q1| increasing in
θ), and decreasing diﬀerences if less eﬃcient agents learn faster, yielding the comparative
static result for qˆ∗1 in θ. Finally, if more eﬃcient agents learn faster, W will thereby have
increasing diﬀerences in all pairs of arguments, implying that q∗ is increasing in θ.
A.2 Proofs of Results in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Using the Φ-function deﬁned in (3), the incentive constraints
may be written compactly as
U  U +Φ(q) (A.1)
U  U − Φ(q). (A.2)
Using the surplus functions W and W and agents’ rents U and U , the principal’s payoﬀ
from any contract may be written as
ν[W (q)− U ] + (1− ν)[W (q)− U ]. (A.3)
The principal maximizes this payoﬀ by choice of {q, U} and {q, U}, subject to incentive
constraints (A.1) and (A.2), and subject to the participation constraints, which we restate
here for easy reference:
U  0 (A.4)
U  0. (A.5)
Observe ﬁrst that only allocations satifsfying the implementability condition
Φ(q)  Φ(q) (A.6)
can be realized. This condition follows from combining (A.1) and (A.2).
Next, we argue that for any menu of allocations {q,q} satisfying (A.6), the principal
will optimally set U = 0 and U = Φ(q). To see this, note ﬁrst that constraint (A.4)
may be neglected: Since Φ  0, it is implied by (A.1) and (A.5). Given this insight, the
principal must optimally set U = 0: Otherwise, he could decrease U and U by the same
small amount without violating any of the remaining constraints, and thereby strictly
increase his payoﬀ (A.3). But then the remaining constraints, (A.1) and (A.2), simplify
to Φ(q)  U  Φ(q), so that the principal must optimally set U = Φ(q): If not, we could
decrease U by a small amount without violating any of the remaining constraints. Finally,
this implies that the only remaining constraint, (A.2), simply becomes (A.6).
Hence, the principal’s optimization problem may be restated as choosing q and q so
as to maximize
ν[W (q)− Φ(q)] + (1− ν)W (q) (A.7)
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subject to (A.6). Due to the additive separable structure and since ν ∈ (0, 1), this is
equivalent to condition (4). To complete the proof, it therefore remains to be shown that
any {q,q} satisfying (4) also satisfy (A.6). The former implies in particular that
W (q) W (q) and W (q)− ν
1− νΦ(q) W (q)−
ν
1− νΦ(q). (A.8)
Since W (q) −W (q) = Φ(q) for any q by the deﬁnition of W and W , the inequalities in
(A.8) may be added to yield Φ(q)/(1− ν)  Φ(q)/(1− ν), which implies (A.6).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We again employ supermodular analysis to derive the results.
To this end, deﬁne the real-valued function g(q; τ) such that
g(q; τ) =
{
W (q), for τ = 0,
W (q)− ν1−νΦ(q), for τ = 1.
(A.9)
(a) For any q,
∂
∂q2
g(q; 1)− ∂∂q2 g(q; 0) = − ν1−ν ∂∂q2Φ(q), (A.10)
which is strictly negative (see the deﬁnition of Φ). Thus, for any q1, g has strictly decreas-
ing diﬀerences in q2 and τ , implying that argmaxq2 g(q1, q2; τ) is decreasing in τ for any
q1. By deﬁnition of g, this set corresponds to the conditional second-period ﬁrst-best for
τ = 0 and to the conditional second-period second-best, which proves the claim.
(b) For any q,
∂
∂q1
g(q; 1)− ∂∂q1 g(q; 0) = − ν1−ν ∂∂q1Φ(q), (A.11)
the sign of which depends on whether the more eﬃcient θ-agent also learns faster ( ∂∂q1Φ(q) 
0) or whether the θ-agent learns faster ( ∂∂q1Φ(q)  0), with each of these inequalities being
strict for q2 > 0. Thus, whenever the more eﬃcient agent learns faster, g has decreasing
diﬀerences in q1 and τ for any q2 (and strictly so for any q2 > 0), which proves claim (bi).
On the other hand, whenever the less eﬃcient agent learns faster, g has increasing diﬀer-
ences in q1 and τ for any q2, thereby proving part (bii).
Proof of Proposition 3.3. We again employ the auxiliary function g(q; τ) deﬁned in (A.9)
in the proof of Proposition 3.2, so that q∗ ∈ argmaxq g(q; 0) and qSB ∈ argmaxq g(q; 1).
As established there, for the case at hand, g has strictly decreasing diﬀerences in q2 and
τ for any q1, and strictly decreasing diﬀerences in q1 and τ for any q2 > 0. Hence, g has
strictly decreasing diﬀerences in (q, τ). Moreover, g is supermodular in q for τ = 0 since
W is supermodular in q (see the proof of Proposition 2.1). Hence, the set of maximizers
of g is decreasing in τ , which proves the claim.31
31Note that supermodularity of g in q for τ = 1 is not required for the proof (and not generally
satisﬁed). The interested reader is invited to verify that, given a binary parameter space, Theo-
rem 2.8.1 in Topkis (1998) in fact requires supermodularity of the objective for only one of the
two parameter values: Together with increasing diﬀerences, this is easily seen to imply Topkis’
condition (2.8.1), which produces the result by Lemma 2.8.1.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5. Observe ﬁrst that qˆ1SB(0) = q◦1 since the principal’s optimal
choice of q1 conditional on q2 = 0 simply maximizes ﬁrst-period surplus.32 Moreover,
qˆ1
SB(qSB2 ) = q
SB
1 by deﬁnition of the full and conditional optima. Since q
SB
2  0, learning
eﬀects will thus be exploited if qˆ1SB(q2) is increasing in q2, and unexploited if it is decreas-
ing. This in turn depends on whether the principal’s objective W − νΦ has increasing or
decreasing diﬀerences in (q1, q2). Using the deﬁnitions of W and Φ, we have
∂2
∂q1∂q2
{
W (q)− ν1−νΦ(q)
}
= δ1−ν
[∣∣ ∂
∂q1
c2(q1)
∣∣− ν · ∣∣ ∂∂q1 c2(q1)∣∣ ],
so that the former will be the case whenever condition (6) holds (and the latter whenever
(6) is reversed), which completes the proof.
A.3 Proofs of Results in Section 4
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Consider an arbitrary ﬁrst-period mechanism. Let z1 and q1 denote
the resulting ﬁrst-period transfer and quantities for the θ-type (if the equilibrium outcome
is not deterministic, let them denote any particular realization), and z1 and q1 those
for the θ-type. If agents truthfully reveal their type through this mechanism, then the
principal knows the true type when oﬀering the new contract at the beginning of the
second period. Hence, the second-period contract will enable the principal to extract the
full second-period surplus and leave either type its reservation payoﬀ of 0.
Now consider agents’ incentives to mimic the other type. First, consider the θ-agent.
By mimicking the θ-agent in the ﬁrst period, he obtains a ﬁrst-period rent of z1 − c1q1.
In the second period, he can always quit (given that the more eﬃcient agent obtains no
second-period rent, this will typically be optimal), giving him a second-period payoﬀ of 0.
Hence, the θ-type not mimicking the θ-type in the ﬁrst period can only be optimal if
z1 − c1q1  z1 − c1q1.
Next, consider a θ-type mimicking the less eﬃcient θ-type. This gives him a rent of z1−c1q1
in the ﬁrst period, and second-period marginal costs below those of the θ-type. Since the
θ-type receives a zero second-period rent from his contract, the more eﬃcient θ-type can
always obtain a positive second-period rent of Φ(q1, q2)/δ from mimicking the ineﬃcient
type also in the second period.33 Thus, the eﬃcient θ-type not mimicking the ineﬃcient
θ-type can only be optimal if
z1 − c1q1  z1 − c1q1 +Φ(q1, q2).
Adding up the two incentive constraints shows that incentive compatibility requires that
Φ(q1, q2)  0. Since Φ is nonnegative by construction, this immediately implies that
Φ(q1, q2) = 0, which in turn implies that z1− c1q1 = z1− c1q1, so that agents must obtain
the same ﬁrst-period rent.
32The same is true of the conditional ﬁrst-best output, i.e. qˆ1∗(0) = q◦1 , which is why the qˆ1
SB-
and qˆ1∗-curves meet at q2 = 0 in Figure 2.
33To see this, note that the θ-agent’s obtains a second-period rent of z2 − c2(q1, θ)q2 from mim-
icking the θ-agent. Given that the θ-agent’s second-period rent of z2− c2(q1, θ)q2 is zero, the claim
follows from the deﬁnition of Φ.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3. In terms of rent/output-contracts and suppressing the condi-
tioning of q2, u2 and ν2 on θ˜1, the principal’s problem may be written as choosing
{q2(θ˜2), u2(θ˜2)} so as to maximize
ν2 ·
{
S[q2(θ)]− c2(q1, θ) · q2(θ)
}
+ (1− ν2) ·
{
S[q2(θ)]− c2(q1, θ) · q2(θ)
}
− ν2 · u2(θ)− (1− ν2)u2(θ)
subject to the constraints
u2(θ)  u2(θ) + Φ[q1, q2(θ)]/δ
u2(θ)  u2(θ)− Φ[q1, q2(θ)]/δ
u2(θ)  0
u2(θ)  0.
Adding the ﬁrst two constraints immediately yields the (second-period) implementability
condition (10). Replicating the argument for the full-commitment case, it is immediately
seen that the principal will optimally set u2(θ) = 0 and u2(θ) = Φ[q1, q2(θ)]/δ given any
q2(θ˜2), so that the quantities speciﬁed in the contract must maximize
ν2 ·
{
S[q2(θ)]− c2(q1, θ) · q2(θ)
}
+ (1− ν2) ·
{
S[q2(θ)]− c2(q1, θ) · q2(θ)
}
− ν2 · Φ[q1, q2(θ)]/δ (A.12)
subject to (10). Noting that (A.12) is additively separable in terms depending on q2(θ) and
on q2(θ) immediately yields the characterization of the optimal second-period quantities
given in (8) through (10).
Finally, to show that (10) holds whenever ν2 > 0, observe that (8) and (9) imply in
particular that
ν2
{
S[q2(θ)]− c2(q1, θ)q2(θ)
}
 ν2
{
S[q2(θ)]− c2(q1, θ)q2(θ)
}
(A.13)
and
(1− ν2)
{
S[q2(θ)]− c2(q1, θ)q2(θ)
}− ν2Φ[q1, q2(θ)] 
(1− ν2)
{
S[q2(θ)]− c2(q1, θ)q2(θ)
}− ν2Φ[q1, q2(θ)] (A.14)
Multiplying condition (A.13) by (1−ν2)/ν2 and combining it with condition (A.14) yields
(10).
To prove Lemma 4.4, we use the following properties of the second-period continuation
outcome as described by Proposition 4.3:
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Lemma A.1. For any ﬁrst-period strategies q1(·), z1(·) and any ﬁrst-period report θ˜1,
(a) if ν2(θ˜1) ∈ (0, 1), the set of q2(θ˜1, ·) which satisfy Proposition 4.3 is unique. Denot-
ing this solution by qˆ2(θ˜1, ·), both qˆ2(θ˜1, θ) and Φ[q1(·), qˆ2(θ˜1, θ)] are continuous and
strictly decreasing in ν2(θ˜1) whenever Φ[q1(·), qˆ2(θ˜1, θ)] > 0;
(b) if ν2(θ˜1) = 1, then Φ[q1(θ˜1), q2(θ˜1, θ)] = 0 for any q2(θ˜1, θ) satisfying Proposition
4.3.
Proof of Lemma A.1. (a) Note ﬁrst that the objective function is strictly concave for
ν2(θ˜1) ∈ (0, 1) due to the assumption that S′′ < 0 and the linearity of the second-period
cost function (and thereby Φ) in q2. This implies uniqueness, continuity, and validity of
the ﬁrst-order approach for interior solutions to condition (8) in Proposition 4.3. Dropping
the conditioning on θ˜1, the ﬁrst-order condition for q2(θ) is
S′[q2(θ)] = c2(q1, θ) +
ν2
1− ν2 [c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ)]. (A.15)
(Note that the ﬁrst-order condition must bind since Φ > 0 implies that q2(θ) > 0.) Since
Φ > 0, c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ) > 0, so that the right-hand side of (A.15) is strictly increasing
in ν2. With the assumption that S′′ < 0, the claim that q2(θ) is strictly increasing
immediately follows. Moreover, for Φ > 0, Φ is strictly increasing in q2(θ), which proves
the second claim.
(b) For ν2(θ˜1) = 1, the principal attaches no probability to the agent being of type θ
and therefore—by condition(9) in Proposition 4.3—will set q2(θ˜1, θ) with the sole objective
of eliminating the θ-agent’s rent, which he can always achieve by setting q2(θ˜1, θ) = 0, so
that Φ[q1(θ˜1), q2(θ˜1, θ)] = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. For p1(θ), p1(θ) < 1, (17) must obviously bind by (13) and (14):
If both agents are indiﬀerent between ﬁrst-period messages, both incentive constraints
(and thereby (17)) must bind. For p1(θ) = 1, this is implied by sequential rationality:
p1(θ) = 1 implies ν2(θ) = 1, so Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] = 0 by Lemma A.1(b), which in turn
implies Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] = 0 by (17) and the fact that Φ  0 by assumption.
It thus remains to be argued that (17) must bind for p(θ) = 1 and p1(θ) < 1. This
is the only constellation of p1(θ) and p1(θ) in which the principal could leave (17) slack
without violating either incentive compatibility or sequential rationality. However, in this
case, doing so will always yield him a suboptimal level of proﬁts.
To this end, consider any set of strategies S ′ ≡ {p′1, q′1, q′2}34 such that (i) p′1(θ) = 1 and
p′1(θ) < 1, such that (ii) q′2(·) satisﬁes Proposition 4.3 (i.e., sequential rationality), and such
that (iii) the implementability condition (17) is slack (i.e., such that Φ[q′1(θ), q′2(θ, θ)] >
Φ[q′1(θ), q′2(θ, θ)]). We will show that S ′ cannot maximize the principal’s expected payoﬀ by
constructing two alternative sets of strategies, S ′′ and S ′′′, both of which satisfy condition
34To ease notation, we suppress the strategies z1 and z2. Note that for any p1, q1, q2, second-
period rents are determined by Proposition 4.3, and optimal ﬁrst-period rents satisfy U(θ) = 0 and
U(θ) = Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] (see the discussion in the text immediately prior to Lemma 4.4), which in
turn implicitly determines the corresponding strategies z1, z2.
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(17) and Proposition 4.3 (i.e., sequential optimality of q2(·)), and by arguing that either
S ′′ or S ′′′ must yield a strictly higher expected payoﬀ to the principal.
Consider ﬁrst the strategies S ′′ ≡ {p′′1, q′′1 , q′′2}, which diﬀer from S ′ only in p1(θ) and
q2(θ, θ): We choose p′′1(θ) > p′1(θ) and q′′2(θ, θ) such that q′′2(θ, θ) satisﬁes Proposition 4.3
and that S ′′ satisﬁes the implementability condition (17), that is, that
Φ[q′1(θ), q
′′
2(θ, θ)]  Φ[q′1(θ), q′2(θ, θ)]. (A.16)
This is possible by choosing p′′1(θ) > p′1(θ) small enough, due to Lemma A.1.35
Before comparing the payoﬀs resulting under S ′ and S ′′, we need to ensure that setting
q′′2(·) = q′2(·) for the remaining elements of S ′′ does not lead S ′′ to violate Proposition 4.3.
But given that q′1(θ, ·) satisfy Proposition 4.3 for S ′, they do also for S ′′ since ν2(θ) = 0
for both strategy sets. The same is true of q2(θ, θ) since ν2(θ) > 0 for both S ′ and S ′′.
Hence, we may proceed to compare the principal’s payoﬀs under S ′ and S ′′. To avoid te-
dious notation and make the proof more transparent, for any strategy set S and any report
θ˜1, θ, we let Γ1(θ˜) ≡ S[q1(θ˜1)]− c1q1(θ˜1) and Γ2(θ˜1, θ) ≡ S[q2(θ˜2, θ)]− c2[q1(θ˜1), θ]q2(θ˜2, θ)
denote the ﬁrst- and second-period surplus generated by an agent of type θ who reports θ˜1
in the ﬁrst period, and we let Φˆ(θ˜1, θ) ≡ Φ[q1(θ˜1), q2(θ˜1, θ)] denote the second-period rent
obtained by a θ-agent who reports θ˜1 in the ﬁrst period. Moreover, we let Π(S) denote
the principal’s expected proﬁts under S.
Using this notation, the principal’s proﬁts under any S with p1(θ) = 1 may be com-
pactly written as
Π(S) = ν{Γ1(θ) + δΓ2(θ, θ)− Φˆ(θ, θ)}
+(1− ν)p1(θ)
{
Γ1(θ) + δΓ2(θ, θ)
}
+(1− ν)(1− p1(θ))
{
Γ1(θ) + δΓ2(θ, θ)
}
. (A.17)
where, to determine rents payable to the agent, we have used the insight that U(θ) =
0 (see the discussion in the main text), which for p1(θ) < 1 in turn implies U(θ) =
Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] by (14), that is, by the fact that the θ-agent’s incentive constraint must
bind.
Using (A.17) along with the fact that the strategy sets S ′ and S ′′ diﬀer only in p1(θ)
and q2(θ, θ), and thereby only in p1(θ), Γ2(θ, θ), and Φˆ(θ, θ) in terms of the ‘reduced form’,
35Recall that by Lemma A.1, for any given q1(·), Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] is strictly, but continuously
decreasing in ν2(θ) for ν2(θ) ∈ (0, 1) and Φ[q1(θ), q2(θ, θ)] > 0. Here, under S ′, ν′2(θ) ∈ (0, 1) since
p′1(θ) = 1 and p
′
1(θ) < 1, and Φ[q
′
1(θ), q
′
2(θ, θ)] > 0 since otherwise, (17) could not have been slack
under S ′ in the ﬁrst place. Thus, starting from S ′, we may marginally increase p′1(θ) and adjust
q′2(θ, θ)] in accordance with Proposition 4.3 without violating (17).
Moreover, while not essential for the proof, we note that it is in fact always possible to choose
p′′1(θ) > p
′
1(θ) such that (A.16) binds by choosing p
′′
1(θ) large enough: for p
′′
1(θ) = 1, ν
′′
2 (θ) = 0, so
that Φ[q′1(θ), q
′′
2 (θ, θ)] = 0 by Lemma A.1(b). By the continuity of Φ[q
′
1(θ), q
′′
2 (θ, θ)] in ν2(θ), there
must therefore exist a p′′1(θ) ∈ (p′1(θ), 1] for which (A.16) binds.
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we obtain
Π(S ′′)−Π(S ′)
= (1− ν)(p′′1(θ)− p′1(θ))
{[
Γ′1(θ) + δΓ
′
2(θ, θ)
]− [Γ′1(θ) + δΓ′2(θ, θ)]}
+ (1− ν)(1− p′′1(θ))δ
[
Γ′′2(θ, θ)− Γ′2(θ, θ)
]− ν[Φˆ′′(θ, θ)− Φˆ′(θ, θ)]. (A.18)
By (A.18), the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between S ′′ and S ′ may be decomposed into (i) the
eﬀect of the increase in p1(θ) (ﬁrst term on right-hand side), and (ii) the eﬀect of the
ensuing decrease in q2(θ, θ) (second term).
To obtain a lower bound on the second term, we use the fact that q′′2(θ, θ) must be
sequentially optimal in S ′′ as described Proposition 4.3, with ν ′′2 (θ) = ν
/
[ν+(1−p′′1(θ))(1−
ν)] and q′′1(θ) = q′1(θ), so
q′′2(θ, θ) ∈ argmax
q2
(1− ν)(1− p′′1(θ))δ
[
S(q2)− c2[q′1(θ), θ]q2
]− νΦ[q′1(θ), q2], (A.19)
which implies in particular that
(1− ν)(1− p′′1(θ))δ
[
Γ′′2(θ, θ)− Γ′2(θ, θ)
]− ν[Φˆ′′(θ, θ)− Φˆ′(θ, θ)] > 0. (A.20)
Inequality (A.20) is strict due to the result that maximizers of (A.19) are unique and
strictly increasing in p1(θ) by Lemma A.1. Hence, letting
κ′ ≡ (1− ν){[Γ′1(θ) + δΓ′2(θ, θ)]− [Γ′1(θ) + δΓ′2(θ, θ)]} (A.21)
denote the (weighted) increase in discounted surplus from an agent of type θ reporting
truthfully rather than lying under S ′, we have
Π(S ′′)−Π(S ′) > (p′′1(θ)− p′1(θ)) · κ, (A.22)
implying that S ′′ will strictly dominate S ′ in terms of the principal’s proﬁts whenever
under S ′, the θ-agent generates a (weakly) larger surplus by truth-telling rather than
lying.36
If this is not the case, so the θ-agent’s surplus is strictly higher under false reporting,
then the separation of types in the ﬁrst period is not proﬁtable in the ﬁrst place and the
principal will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to decrease p1(θ) relative to S ′. We will show particularly
that a strategy set involving no ﬁrst-period separation at all will be more proﬁtable than
S ′ whenever κ′ < 0.
To this end, deﬁne the strategy set S ′′′ such that, for any report θ˜1 ∈ {θ, θ}, q′′′1 (θ˜1) =
q′1(θ), q′′′2 (θ˜1, θ) = q′2(θ, θ), reporting strategies are uninformative (so p′′′1 (θ) = 1 − p′′′1 (θ),
implying that ν2(θ) = ν2(θ) = ν), and q′′′2 (θ, θ) = q′′′2 (θ, θ) is such as to satisfy Proposition
36Note that the argument presented can essentially be understood as an application of the
envelope theorem—after noting that for any given q1(·), ﬁrst- and second-period objectives are
congruent and sequential optimization will therefore lead to a maximization of overall discounted
proﬁts, and that (as argued in the proof of Lemma A.1) the second-period objective is concave in
second-period quantities.
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4.3. Note that the implementability condition (17) trivially binds since output schedules
are independent of ﬁrst-period messages. Moreover, sequential optimality of q′2(θ˜1, θ)
in S ′′′ is again implied by the sequential optimality in S ′′′ since ν2 > 1 in both cases.
To simplify notation, we suppress conditioning on the (meaningless) report θ˜1, letting
q′′′1 ≡ q′′′1 (θ) = q′′′1 (θ), letting q′′′2 (θ) ≡ q′′′2 (θ, θ) = q′′′2 (θ, θ), and q′′′2 (θ) ≡ q′′′2 (θ, θ) = q′′′2 (θ, θ)
(and similarly suppressing θ˜1 in Γ′′′t and Φˆ′′′), so that the principal’s proﬁts under S ′′′ may
be written as
Π(S ′′′) = ν[Γ′1(θ) + δΓ′2(θ, θ)− Φˆ′′′(θ)] + (1− ν)[Γ′1(θ) + δΓ′′′2 (θ)], (A.23)
so that—again using the generic characterization of payoﬀs in (A.17) for S ′ —the diﬀerence
in payoﬀs between S ′′′ and S ′ becomes
Π(S ′′′)−Π(S ′) = (1− ν)p′1(θ)
{[
Γ′1(θ) + δΓ
′
2(θ, θ)
]− [Γ′1(θ) + δΓ′2(θ, θ)]}
+ (1− ν)δ[Γ′′′2 (θ)− Γ′2(θ, θ)]− ν[Φ˜′′′(θ)− Φ˜′(θ, θ)].
Again, sequential optimality of q′′′2 (·) yields a lower bound of zero on the second term:
Given that ν2 = ν (note that ν2 is also independent of the report θ˜1 under S ′′′), q′′′2 (θ)
must satisfy
q′′′2 (θ) ∈ argmax
q2
(1− ν)δ[S(q2)− c2[q′1(θ), θ]q2 − νΦ[q′1(θ), q2],
implying in particular that
(1− ν)δ[Γ′′′2 (θ)− Γ′2(θ, θ)]− ν[Φˆ′′′(θ)− Φˆ′(θ, θ)] > 0,
and hence, using the deﬁnition of κ′ in (A.21),
Π(S ′′′)−Π(S ′) > −p′1(θ) · κ. (A.24)
We have thus shown that, depending on the sign of κ′ under S ′, either S ′′ or S ′′′ (or both)
must yield a strictly higher payoﬀ to the principal than S ′, which completes the proof.37
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Chapter 2
Ex-Post Implementable Merger
Mechanisms
Dennis Ga¨rtner and Armin Schmutzler
1 Introduction
There is a widespread perception that merger decisions are not necessarily eﬃcient.
The focus of the literature has been on the frequent occurrence of unhappy mar-
riages, where at least one of the involved ﬁrms regrets the decision with the beneﬁt
of hindsight.1 To explain these events, the literature has invoked agency arguments,
emphasizing the incentives of managers to expand their empire (cf. Jensen, 1986;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). The present paper oﬀers an alternative route towards
understanding the intrinsic problems of merger decisions by examining the conﬂict of
interests between ﬁrms rather than agency conﬂicts within ﬁrms. We argue that, ab-
sent any misalignment of incentives within either ﬁrm, the misalignment of incentives
between ﬁrms can still present a fundamental impediment to the implementation of
eﬃcient merger decisions. We show that it is usually impossible to simultaneously
prevent unhappy marriages and guarantee that mergers which should take place are
actually carried out. In this sense, the paper relates to the theorem of Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) which shows the impossibility of eﬃcient bilateral trade of
indivisible goods under private valuations.
We consider a general mechanism design approach in a setting where two merger
candidates each possess private information. Each party’s information pertains to
its own proﬁts as well as the other’s if no merger occurs, and it is also relevant to
1See, for instance, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989), Agrawal et al. (1992), and Gugler et al.
(2003). For a dissenting view, see Healy et al. (1992).
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the proﬁts of the merged entity in the event that a merger occurs. For instance,
information may concern a ﬁrm’s productivity. Typically, both a ﬁrm’s stand-alone
proﬁts and the post-merger proﬁts of an entity to which it belongs should be higher
for more productive types. Moreover, if the ﬁrms compete in the same market, each
ﬁrm’s productivity will usually have a negative impact on the competitor’s stand-
alone proﬁts. As another example, information could represent a ﬁrm characteristic
that is only relevant to post-merger proﬁts. For instance, one might think of pri-
vate information as some measure of organizational culture such that higher merger
proﬁts require cultures to be more similar.
In this environment, we start by considering merger mechanisms which use a
combination of share allocations and transfers to elicit agents’ private information
(i.e., their type) and decide on the merger. More speciﬁcally, a direct merger mech-
anism consists of
(i) a merger decision for each combination of type reports,
(ii) a share function allocating to each agent a report-dependent share in the
merged entity,
(iii) a transfer function which demands a transfer from each agent, again dependent
on type reports.
We furthermore restrict attention to mechanisms which, in equilibrium, give
neither party any reason for ex-post regret.
Under a natural budget balance condition, we obtain the following results. First,
we show that a fundamental problem of any such mechanism is that shares and trans-
fers must essentially be invariant to agents’ reports, thus limiting their usefulness
for incentive design. Second and consequently, we show that except for special envi-
ronments, only trivial merger decisions of the type ‘always merge’ or ‘never merge’
are implementable. Third, the additional requirement of voluntary participation in
the mechanism further reduces the set of feasible mechanisms to ones which merely
reproduce the status quo. Fourth, we show that, for a wide class of merger environ-
ments, the essential impossibility of implementing mergers without ex-post regret
carries over to more general mechanisms where each partner’s payoﬀ can be condi-
tioned on the merged ﬁrm’s total proﬁt in an arbitrary fashion. Finally, we show
that our main conclusions crucially rely on the simultaneous presence of asymmetric
information on both parties’ outside options, as any remaining environments permit
implementation of the eﬃcient merger decision in a regret-free manner—in spite of
asymmetric information on merger proﬁts.
Classical mechanism design literature has long dealt with the issue of whether
and how mechanisms can implement eﬃcient decisions when information concerning
the beneﬁts and costs constitute individuals’ private knowledge (see e.g. Milgrom,
2004, for an overview). A major ﬁnding has been that in quite general settings,
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms solve this problem.2
2In fact, it has further been shown that VCG-mechanisms represent the only class of mechanisms
Chapter 2: Ex-Post Implementable Merger Mechanisms 49
For two reasons, however, this result is not directly applicable to our setting.
First, standard VCG mechanisms fail to implement the eﬃcient decision when val-
uations are interdependent (see, e.g., Mezzetti, 2004).3 Interdependent valuations
constitute a core feature of our model, however, since private information held by the
other—on own stand-alone proﬁts and joint proﬁts in the event of a merger—makes
each agent’s payoﬀ naturally dependent on the other’s information. Though there is
work suggesting that in general, there are limits to implementation when valuations
are interdependent,4 encouraging ﬁndings have been made for speciﬁc frameworks,
auctions in particular, by designing extended VCG mechanism which implement the
eﬃcient decision in spite of interdependent valuations.5
Second, in the private-valuations framework, VCG mechanisms are usually not
budget balanced (cf. Holmstrom, 1977; Green and Laﬀont, 1979), a key requirement
of merger mechanisms. Again, a generalization of this result to interdependent
valuations is not available, and analogies from the aforementioned auction literature
cannot be drawn, as budget balance is not an issue in auction contexts due to the
auctioneer being a natural third-party residual claimant.6
In sum, therefore, it is not possible to directly relate our main ﬁnding that only
trivial decision rules are implementable to the previous mechanism-design literature.
However, there is an important feature of merger mechanisms that nonetheless makes
this particularly strong result somewhat surprising: the availability of shares in
addition to transfers for incentive design. Like transfers, shares provide a means of
transferring utility between agents without aﬀecting joint surplus and thereby the
eﬃciency of the decision. In principle, one should expect this additional degree of
freedom in incentive design to improve the prospects of eﬃcient implementation.7 As
to implement the eﬃcient decision in dominant strategies (Green and Laﬀont, 1977, 1979; Walker,
1980).
3In addition to providing a nice account of why VCG mechanisms will fail, Mezzetti (2004) also
shows how the problem can be overcome by by extending the standard mechanism by a further
stage after the decision has been implemented, in which parties report their resulting gross decision
payoﬀs and transfers can be made contingent on these reports.
4 Jehiel et al. (2005) show in a general interdependent-values framework that, except for special
cases, only trivial choice rules are implementable when private information is multi-dimensional .
5Cre´mer and McLean (1985), Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Eso˝ and Maskin
(2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), Perry and Reny (2002),
Krishna (2003), and Ausubel (2004) all construct eﬃcient, ex-post eﬃcient mechanisms in settings
with interdependent valuations.
6However, Chung and Ely (2003) provide largely negative results concerning implementation of
eﬃcient decisions both in the context of bilateral trade and the provision of a public good, each
with interdependent valuations.
7Brusco et al. (2005) make a similar point. In the context of private-value auctions, this
additional freedom in incentive design by auctioning discrete shares in a good has already been
noted (see Hansen, 1985, and the comments in Cre´mer, 1987, and Samuelson, 1987). However, the
focus has been on the use of such ‘contingent payments’ on increased surplus extraction by the
auctioneer, rather than its impact on the set of implementable decisions—which is the focus of this
paper.
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a key step in our analysis shows, however, this intuition is largely invalid, as budget
balance keeps tight limits on how shares and transfers can respond to information
revealed.
A second way in which our results should appear particularly stark is that, not
only do we show the general inability to implement the eﬃcient decision rule, but
we in fact exclude any nontrivial decision rule.8 We establish a rationale for this in
a separate building block of our analysis, by showing that budget balance produces
a tight connection between implementability and eﬃciency in the sense that not
much more than eﬃcient decisions can be expected to be implementable in the ﬁrst
place.
Finally, an obvious fundamental ingredient to our result is the requirement of
ex-post incentive compatibility instead of weaker notions such as Bayesian-Nash
implementation. Our motivation for this is manyfold. First, a convenient feature
of ex-post implementable mechanisms is their independence of priors on the type
distribution, making the analysis more tractable and results more transparent. In
arguments related to this property, the recent literature has furthermore put forward
interesting theoretical justiﬁcations for this approach by investigating the robust-
ness of Bayesian Mechanisms with respect to beliefs about the type distribution
when valuations are interdependent.9 More importantly, however, our use of ex-post
implementability is less a hypothesis about participants’ behavior than it is a re-
striction on the mechanism itself, imposed with the sole purpose of answering this
paper’s main question: whether ex-post regret is an inevitable feature of merger
decisions or not. That is, even if we believe that ﬁrms entering merger deals op-
timize in a Bayesian sense, it is interesting to investigate the class of ‘regret-free’
mechanisms. Finally, even though the ex-post concept is strong, it is not so strong
as to have prohibited eﬃcient implementation in other settings with interdependent
values, such as in the aforementioned applications to auction theory.
The paper most closely related to ours is Brusco et al. (2005). These authors use
a mechanism design approach to analyze under which circumstances eﬃcient merger
decisions might come about in the presence of two-sided asymmetric information.
Their setting diﬀers considerably from ours, however. On the one hand, the mech-
anisms they consider are more general than ours. First, their mechanisms not only
determine whether a merger takes place, but also which two out of several ﬁrms
merge. Second, Brusco et al. (2005) consider Bayesian mechanisms. On the other
8This contrasts with results in settings with private valuations, where a fruitful way to address
the problem that VCG-mechanisms are typically not budget balanced has been to consider the
class of second-best , or incentive eﬃcient mechanisms. Unfortunately, most investigations of in-
terdependent-values frameworks so far have not gone beyond showing the ability or inability of
implementing the eﬃcient decision. A noteworthy except is Jehiel et al. (2005), who, like our
paper, characterize the full set of implementable decisions in the context of multi-dimensional
information.
9See Bergemann and Morris (2005) and Chung and Ely (2003) in particular, as well as the nice
survey given in Jehiel et al. (2005).
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hand, the merger environments they consider are in some ways more restrictive. For
instance, the private information of each party on its stand-alone productivity is
independent of its private information on synergies, so there is no sense in which
inherently ‘better’ ﬁrms can also be better merger partners. Also, each potential
partner’s private information is uninformative about the other ﬁrm’s stand-alone
proﬁt. This is problematic because whenever ﬁrms are engaged in some form of
market interaction, a ﬁrm’s private signal on own proﬁtability will translate into a
signal on the other ﬁrm’s proﬁtability.
Interestingly, there has recently been quite some investigation into the eﬃcient
dissolution of partnerships under interdependent valuations, which in some ways rep-
resents the inverse to the problem considered in this paper. This literature works
out conditions under which it is possible to eﬃciently dissolve joint ownership of a
ﬁrm when valuations for that ﬁrm are interdependent.10 In contrast to our paper,
whether it is eﬃcient to dissolve or not is generally not an issue (the social value
of the partnership is simply the share-weighted average of agents’ individual valua-
tions, so dissolution will be eﬃcient whenever agents’ valuations diﬀer). Rather, the
question is only one of allocating the single indivisible item owned by the partner-
ship to the agent with the highest valuation. Thus, the problem is strongly related
to auction design, with some additional diﬃculties implied by budget-balance re-
quirements. In our setting, on the other hand, the main question is whether the
partnership should be formed or not. In contrast, how shares in the partnership are
to be allocated in the event of a merger does not aﬀect eﬃciency, as agents have
pure common valuations concerning the partnership itself.
There is also a small number of papers which address the issue of mergers
under two-sided information by restricting attention to more speciﬁc mechanisms.
Like this paper, Borek et al. (2004) consider an environment where ﬁrm types af-
fect pre- and post-merger proﬁts. In situations where the gains or losses from a
merger are split according to some simple predetermined scheme,11 they investi-
gate circumstances under which both ﬁrms are willing to consent to a merger in a
Bayesian game. The equilibrium is typically associated with ex-post regret. Banal-
Estan˜ol and Seldeslachts (2005) also consider such a merger consent game; however
(i) asymmetric information concerns only the potential post-merger proﬁts and (ii)
additional complexity arises from the idea that both partners may or may not choose
costly ‘cultural adjustment’ decisions after the merger.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model with share-
transfer mechanisms. Section 3 derives restrictions on share and transfer functions
stemming exclusively from incentive compatibility. Section 4 works out additional
10See Fieseler et al. (2003), Jehiel and Pauzner (2003), Ornelas and Turner (2004) and the survey
in Moldovanu (2002).
11For instance, each ﬁrm might earn a ﬁxed share of proﬁts under a merger, or one ﬁrm is up
for sale at some ﬁxed price.
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restrictions which derive from budget balance and presents our main results. Section
5 analyzes additional constraints imposed by requiring voluntary participation in the
mechanism. Section 6 discusses generalized mechanisms that allow each partner’s
payoﬀ to depend on the merged ﬁrm’s proﬁt in a more general manner. Section
7 illustrates how the results developed apply to more speciﬁc classes of merger
environments. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
This section presents the basis for our analysis of implementable merger mechanisms.
Section 2.1 introduces the general setup and basic terminology. We motivate our
framework with speciﬁc examples in Section 2.2.
2.1 Merger Mechanisms
We consider merger mechanisms in an environment of the following type:
Deﬁnition 2.1. A merger environment E is a tuple (T1, T2, π1, π2, πM) with the
following components:
(i) Ti = [0, 1], i = 1, 2, is the type space for ﬁrm i;
(ii) πi : Ti × Tj → IR0 is the stand-alone proﬁt function for ﬁrm i;
(iii) πM : T1 × T2 → IR0 is the merger proﬁt function.
Thus, an environment describes how each ﬁrm’s stand-alone proﬁts as well as
joint proﬁts in the event of a merger depend on ﬁrms’ private information. We
should point out that the dependence of ﬁrms’ stand-alone proﬁts on other ﬁrms’
information is not crucial to our results, but represents a natural feature in many
conceivable applications (see Section 2.2 below).12 For expositional simplicity, un-
less stated otherwise, we will assume that πi and π
M are twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable. Moreover, note that the above deﬁnition assumes that each agent’s private
information, denoted by ti ∈ Ti, is univariate.13
For such an environment, we investigate mechanisms which use a system of
transfers and—provided that a merger occurs—share allocations in the merged entity
to implement a merger decision. Anticipating the usual revelation argument, we
restrict our attention to direct merger mechanisms:
12This feature is absent in Brusco et al. (2005).
13Given the largely negative results concerning eﬃcient implementation under interdependent
valuations with multi-dimensional as opposed to univariate information in auction settings (Jehiel
and Moldovanu, 2001) and in more general settings (Jehiel et al., 2005), we assume scalar-valued
information to improve the scope for eﬃcient implementation in our merger setting.
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Deﬁnition 2.2. A (direct) merger mechanism M is a tuple (m, s, p) consisting of
a merger decision function m, share functions s = (s1, s2), and transfer functions
p = (p1, p2), which are deﬁned as follows:
(i) The merger decision function m : T1 × T2 → {0, 1} maps a combination of
reports (t˜1, t˜2) by players 1 and 2 about their type into a merger decision,
with m(t˜1, t˜2) = 1 if and only if the merger takes place as a result of the
reports. We let M1 denote the subset of type space T1× T2 for which mergers
are implemented, and let M0 denote the subset for which mergers are not
implemented.
(ii) The share functions si : M
1 → [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2}, map a combination of reports
to a share in the merged entity’s proﬁt.
(iii) The transfer functions pi : T1× T2 → IR, i ∈ {1, 2}, assign a transfer payment
from player i to the mechanism operator as a function of reported types.
Given any merger environment E and any merger mechanism M, we let ui :
(Ti × Tj)2 → IR denote the individual payoﬀ functions , which assign proﬁts
ui(t˜i, t˜j; ti, tj)
= [1−m(t˜1, t˜2)] · πi(ti, tj) +m(t˜1, t˜2) · si(t˜i, t˜j) · πM(t1, t2)− pi(t˜i, t˜j) (1)
to player i as a function of reported and true types.
For reasons given in the introduction, we shall conﬁne ourselves to ﬁnding ex-
post implementable mechanisms, that is, mechanisms for which truthful reporting
is a best response to any given type of the competitor, given truthful reporting by
the other type. Formally, letting Ui(t˜i; ti, tj) = ui(t˜i, tj; ti, tj) denote ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ
given truthful reporting by the other ﬁrm, the requirement of ex-post incentive
compatibility can be compactly formulated as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.3. A merger mechanism M is (ex-post) incentive compatible (IC) if
Ui(ti; ti, tj)  Ui(t˜i; ti, tj) for all t˜i, ti ∈ Ti, tj ∈ Tj. (2)
We shall call a merger decision function m implementable if there exist share and
transfer functions s and p such that the mechanism (m, s, p) is incentive compatible.
Eﬃciency of a merger decision function is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.4. A merger decision function m is eﬃcient if
m(t1, t2) =
{
0 for (t1, t2) s.t. π
M < π1 + π2,
1 for (t1, t2) s.t. π
M > π1 + π2.
(3)
A merger mechanism M = (m, s, p) is eﬃcient if and only if m is eﬃcient.
Moreover, we shall call a merger decision m trivial if it is constant over the entire
type space T1 × T2.
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Since it is natural to assume that no third party should beneﬁt from or pay for
the mechanism, we introduce the following condition:14
Deﬁnition 2.5. A merger mechanisms satisﬁes budget balance (BB) if
1. p1(t˜1, t˜2) + p2(t˜2, t˜1) = 0 for all (t˜1, t˜2) ∈ T1 × T2, and
2. s1(t˜1, t˜2) + s2(t˜2, t˜1) = 1 for all (t˜1, t˜2) ∈M1.
(4)
(BB) is equivalent to requiring (i) that agents’ utilities u1 + u2 sum to realized
proﬁts (πM if a merger occurs and π1 + π2 if it does not), or (ii) that the surplus
generated by the mechanism, m · (1 − s1 − s2) · πM + p1 + p2, is zero, with each
requirement applying for any combination of types and reports.15
Finally, mechanisms in which agents will voluntarily participate must satisfy the
following requirement:
Deﬁnition 2.6. A merger mechanism satisﬁes individual rationality (IR) if, for any
i ∈ {1, 2},
Ui(ti; ti, tj)  πi(ti, tj) for all (ti, tj) ∈ Ti × Tj. (5)
Note that there is one particular mechanism which—albeit typically being ineﬃ-
cient—satisﬁes all of the above constraints, namely the mechanism which reproduces
the status quo by prescribing (i) never merge, and (ii) always require zero payments.
Such a mechanism satisﬁes (IC), (BB), and (IR).
2.2 Examples of Merger Environments
We illustrate our set-up with a few exemplary merger environments. In all these
examples, we consider two ﬁrms i = 1, 2 in a Cournot oligopoly with n  3 ﬁrms
facing linear demand, where each ﬁrm has constant marginal costs ci of production.
If ﬁrms 1 and 2 decide to merge, the new entity has marginal costs of cM in the
resulting (n−1)-ﬁrm oligopoly. The examples diﬀer in their interpretation of private
information t1, t2 and in the way that this information aﬀects stand-alone costs c1, c2
and the merged entity’s costs cM.
Example 1 (Averaging-Cost Mergers). Assume ci = c−ti for i = 1, 2, c ∈ IR>0,
and cM = 1
2
(c1 + c2)− γ, γ ∈ IR>0. Thus, stand-alone costs are private information,
and the merged entity’s costs are determined by the mean of the constituent ﬁrms’
14Such a condition has typically been invoked also in the aforementioned literature on partnership
dissolution.
15It is quickly seen that (BB) implies (ii) and that statements (i) and (ii) are equivalent. More-
over, it is easily checked that (ii) implies (BB) whenever merger proﬁts πM are not globally constant
in types, which establishes the claim for non-constant merger proﬁts. Equivalence does not hold
whenever πM is constant over T1 × T2, but in this case, there is in fact no point in distinguishing
shares from payments in our model.
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t1
t2
0
1
0 1
M1
M0
M0
(1) Averaging-Cost Mergers,
ci = 1.2− ti, cM = 12(c1 + c2)− 0.1.
t1
t2
0
1
0 1
M0
M1
M1
(2) Rationalization Mergers,
ci = 1.2− ti, cM = min{c1, c2}.
t1
t2
0
1
0 1
M0
M1
(3) Synergies, ci = 1,
cM = 1− t1 · t2.
t1
t2
0
1
0 1
M1
M0
M0
(4) Matching Corporate Culture,
ci = 1, c
M = 0.9 + (t1 − t2)2.
Figure 1: Eﬃcient Merger Decisions for Examples of Section 2.2.
stand-alone costs, minus some known synergy eﬀect.16 In this case, ∂
∂ti
πi > 0 and
∂
∂tj
πi < 0, as each ﬁrm’s stand-alone proﬁt is decreasing in its own marginal costs
and increasing in those of the potential merger partner. Furthermore, ∂
∂ti
πM > 0
for each i = 1, 2 since the merged ﬁrm’s marginal costs increase in the constituent
parties’ marginal costs. The top-left panel in Figure 1 illustrates the eﬃcient merger
decision for speciﬁc parameter values.17 Observe that merging is only proﬁtable if
ﬁrms’ pre-merger costs are suﬃciently similar and suﬃciently high.
Example 2 (Rationalization Mergers). As above, assume that ci = c − ti for
i = 1, 2, c ∈ IR>0, but now let cM = min{c1, c2}. Thus, the merger allows for
rationalization in the sense that the merged entity fully implements the more eﬃcient
16Note that without such a synergy eﬀect, merging will never be proﬁtable under linear demand
(see Salant et al., 1983).
17All illustrations in Figure 1 assume demand to be given by P (Q) = 3−Q, that the market is
(originally) served by n = 3 ﬁrms, and that marginal costs of the third ﬁrm are ﬁxed at c3 = 1.
All remaining parameters are noted in the corresponding captions.
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party’s technology. Contrary to Example 1, πM will only be strictly decreasing in
an agent’s type if that agent is more eﬃcient, whereas a change in the less eﬃcient
type will have no impact on merger proﬁts, so ∂
∂ti
πM = 0 for ti > tj. Figure 1
illustrates the eﬃcient merger decision. Note that there are two separate regions
where merging is proﬁtable, each one where types are suﬃciently dissimilar.18
Example 3 (Synergies). Assume now that c1 = c2 = c for some c ∈ IR > 0 and
that cM = c−t1 ·t2. This example may be thought of as a situation in which there are
synergies to be achieved by merging and each party possesses private information
concerning its synergy potential, where this potential in turn is (i) unrelated to
stand-alone proﬁts, but (ii) complementary to the potential merger partners’ synergy
potential. The resulting eﬃcient merger decision is illustrated in Figure 1.
Example 4 (Matching Corporate Culture). Many case studies attribute failed
mergers to incompatible corporate cultures of the merging ﬁrms.19 To represent
such a problem in our model, we let c1 = c2 = c for some c ∈ IR > 0, but we now let
cM = c−γ+(t1− t2)2 and interpret ti as some measure of ﬁrm i’s corporate culture.
Then the merged ﬁrm’s proﬁts πM increase with the similarity of the merged ﬁrms’
corporate cultures. Moreover, if diﬀerent corporate cultures are not per se better
or worse, each ﬁrms’ stand-alone proﬁts will be independent of its own cultural
measure and that of the other ﬁrm, which justiﬁes the type-independent ci’s. The
corresponding plot is shown in Figure 1.
3 General Incentive Compatibility Results
This section’s goal is to present a set of restrictions on permissible share and transfer
functions which are implied by the incentive compatibility requirement alone. We
will largely conﬁne ourselves to restrictions which derive from the condition that
marginal deviations from truthful reporting be unproﬁtable. In Section 3.1, we deal
with deviations that do not aﬀect the merger decision; in Section 3.2 we address de-
viations that do. These results will provide the basis for Section 4, where the further
incorporation of the budget-balance requirement (BB) will lead to our main results,
Propositions 4.3 and 4.9. Proposition 4.3 will show that essentially, only eﬃcient
merger decision functions are implementable. Proposition 4.9 will argue that on the
boundary between M0 and M1, proﬁt functions must satisfy a geometric condition
described as ‘proportional variation’. These two results are then combined to argue
that generally, only trivial merger decisions are implementable.
18See Barros (1998).
19See Larsson and Finkelstein (1999).
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For expository simplicity, it will often be useful to restrict attention to certain
well-behaved classes of mechanisms. Denoting the restrictions of pi to M
0 and M1
by p0i and p
1
i , respectively, we deﬁne a diﬀerentiable mechanism as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1. A mechanism M = (m, s, p) is diﬀerentiable if for each i = 1, 2,
the functions si, p
0
i and p
1
i are each diﬀerentiable over the interior of their respective
domains of deﬁnition.
The alternative requirements of a mechanism being continuous, twice diﬀeren-
tiable, etc. are to be read analogously. It should be pointed out that none of these
requirements place any restrictions on the original transfer function pi at points on
the boundary between M0 and M1.
3.1 Deviations without Eﬀect on the Merger Decision
We ﬁrst consider deviations which do not aﬀect the merger decision and as such can
be proﬁtable only by leading to a decrease in transfers or an increase in shares (or
both). As the next proposition shows, the need for a direct mechanism to prohibit
such deviations leads to strong restrictions on how transfers and shares may vary
over M0 and M1, respectively, given any merger decision function m.
Proposition 3.2. Any diﬀerentiable merger mechanismM = (m, s, p) must be such
that
(a) for any (t′i, tj), (t
′′
i , tj) ∈M0,
p0i (t
′
i, tj) = p
0
i (t
′′
i , tj),
(b) for any (t1, t2) ∈M1,
πM(t1, t2) · ∂∂t˜i si(ti, tj) =
∂
∂t˜i
p1i (ti, tj) (6)
∂
∂ti
πM(t1, t2) · ∂∂t˜i si(ti, tj)  0. (7)
See the Appendix for the proof.
By Proposition 3.2(a), given the other ﬁrm’s type tj, any ﬁrm i’s transfer must
be the same for any report which does not lead to a merger. The intuition for this
result is obvious, as any deviation from truthful reporting overM0 will aﬀect payoﬀs
only through transfers, so that transfers being non-constant in own report over M0
would inevitably provoke false reports by certain types.
Over M1, on the other hand, the mechanism has two instruments at its disposal,
giving it the freedom to let transfers and shares respond to changes in reported
types. As Proposition 3.2(b) shows, incentive compatibility puts some limits on this
freedom, however: By condition (6), the response of shares and transfers to own
reports are linked in that any increase in shares must be matched by a concomitant
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increase in transfers, the factor of proportionality given by πM(t1, t2). This condition
simply arises from the requirement that marginal deviations from truth-telling be
unproﬁtable. Additionally, condition (7) restricts the direction in which shares may
respond to reports by requiring higher merger proﬁts due to a marginal change in
an agent’s type to be complemented by (weakly) higher shares in the merged entity
for that agent.
Condition (7) is best understood as an application of the ‘Positive Association of
Diﬀerences’ (PAD) condition in Roberts (1979): If a change in agent i’s signal from
ti to t
′
i makes some alternative A relatively more preferable for agent i than some
other alternative B (gross of transfers), then an incentive compatible mechanism
must respect these preferences by not choosing A at signal ti and B at signal t
′
i.
20
In our case, a change in agent i’s signal ti which increases merger proﬁts π
M will
obviously make a larger share si more preferable to agent i, and condition (7) says
that an implementable mechanism must respect this by not allocating the agent a
smaller share in response to this change.21
3.2 Deviations which Aﬀect the Merger Decision
Having derived important restrictions on how shares and transfers may vary over
M0 andM1, we now derive related conditions for the boundary betweenM0 andM1,
that is, at type proﬁles where the merger decision m is discontinuous in at least one
agent’s report. We let M0 and M1 denote the closure of M0 and M1, respectively,
so that the relevant boundary is given byM0∩M1. Further, it is useful to introduce
the following notation:
Deﬁnition 3.3. For any diﬀerentiable mechanism, let p0i : M
0 → IR denote the
continuous extension of pi onto M0, and let p
1
i : M
1 → IR and si : M1 → [0, 1]
denote the continuous extensions of p1i and si, respectively, onto M
1, where the
continuous extensions are all taken with respect to t˜i.
22
20For readers not familiar with this result, it may be useful to note that in the standard model
of procurement under asymmetric information, where a principal buys a certain quantity of a good
produced by an agent possessing private information on his marginal costs of producing this good,
this condition produces the familiar requirement that the principal cannot procure a strictly larger
quantity of the good from an agent with higher costs than from one with lower costs.
21As shown in the proof in the Appendix, there is a more general, global version of condition (7)
which asserts that for any t′i, t
′′
i ∈ Ti and tj ∈ Tj such that (t′i, tj), (t′′i , tj) ∈M1, the share function
satisfy [si(t′′i , tj) − si(t′i, tj)] · [πM(t′′i , tj) − πM(t′i, tj)]  0. However, this will be largely irrelevant
to our results.
22Formally, p0i (t˜i, t˜j) = p
0
i (t˜i, t˜j) for any (ti, tj) ∈ M0, p1i (t˜i, t˜j) = p1i (t˜i, t˜j), and si(t˜i, t˜j) =
si(t˜i, t˜j) for any (t˜i, t˜j) ∈M1, whereas for any (t˜i, t˜j) ∈M0 ∩M1,
p0i (t˜i, t˜j) = lim{(t′i,t˜j)}∈M0→(t˜i,t˜j)
p0i (t˜
′
i, t˜j),
p1i (t˜i, t˜j) = lim{(t˜′i,t˜j)}∈M1→(t˜i,t˜j)
p1i (t˜
′
i, t˜j), s
1
i (t˜i, t˜j) = lim{(t˜′i,t˜j)}∈M1→(t˜i,t˜j)
s1i (t˜
′
i, t˜j).
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Using this notation, any mechanism must satisfy the following conditions at
points where the merger decision is locally sensitive to an agent’s report:
Proposition 3.4. Any diﬀerentiable incentive compatible mechanismM = (m, s, p)
must be such that, at any t = (t1, t2) ∈M0∩M1 where agent i can change the merger
decision m by a marginal deviation from truth-telling,
(a) si(t) · πM(t)− πi(t) = p1i (t)− p0i (t),
(b) si(t˜) ·πM(t)−πi(t) must be weakly increasing in ti locally at t˜ = t whenever m
is locally increasing in t˜i, and weakly decreasing in ti if m is locally decreasing
in t˜i.
See the Appendix for the proof.
Proposition 3.4(a) states that shares and transfers must be designed so that
types (t1, t2) located at the boundary of a merger region (i.e., types for which a
marginal deviation from truthful reporting will change the merger decision) will be
indiﬀerent between their payoﬀ under a merger and under no merger. Put diﬀerently,
whenever an agent can change the merger decision with a marginal deviation from
truth-telling, any resulting gross beneﬁts to merging , si(t) · πM(t) − πi(t) must be
matched by a corresponding increase in transfers, p1i (t)− p0i (t).
Moreover, Proposition 3.4(b) shows that at any such point on the boundary,
agents’ relative valuations of these gross beneﬁts to merging must be aligned with
the preferences implicit in the merger decision. Like the sign-condition on shares
in Proposition 3.2(b), this result can be interpreted as an implication of the PAD-
property, this time concerning the merger decision m rather than the share function
s. To see this, note that gross of transfers, payoﬀs to agent i will be si · πM if a
merger is executed, and πi if it is not. Hence, if si · ∂∂tiπM − ∂∂tiπi  0, a merger
will become relatively more preferable to agent i with increasing ti, and the PAD-
property requires the decision function m to respect this by not implementing a
merger for low ti and no merger for higher ti (locally). The converse holds if si ·
∂
∂ti
πM − ∂
∂ti
πi  0.
4 Imposing Budget Balance
Our analysis thus far has provided several necessary conditions on transfer and share
functions which must hold for any incentive-compatible merger decision function.
This section investigates additional restrictions imposed by budget balance.
To repeat, our goal is not just to check for implementability of eﬃcient merger
decisions, but to describe the full set of implementable decisions. In a ﬁrst step,
These extensions will always be well-deﬁned and exist since p0i is bounded w.r.t. t˜i over M
0 by
Proposition 3.2(a), and si is bounded between 0 and 1 over M1 by assumption, which in turn
implies that p1i is bounded w.r.t. t˜i by condition (6) in Proposition 3.2(b).
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Section 4.1 establishes a strong link between eﬃciency and implementability under
budget balance. We show essentially that type proﬁles such that a decision rule m
is sensitive to both agents’ information must lie on the boundary of the set where
merging is eﬃcient. In a second step, Section 4.2 shows that under budget balance,
incentive compatible share and transfer schemes must largely ignore reports. Next,
Section 4.3 combines this latter result with previous ﬁndings from Section 3 to show
that each agent’s gross beneﬁts to merging, si ·πM−πi, must be constant along lines
separating M0 from M1, with si also constant along each such line. These results
are brought together in Section 4.4, which leads to our central result that in general,
only trivial merger decisions will be implementable.
4.1 The Link between Eﬃciency and Implementability
We now show that budget balance severely limits the design of incentive-compatible
mechanisms, making it impossible to implement certain merger decisions m which
(i) are responsive to both agents’ reports and (ii) do not satisfy eﬃciency. To allow
for more compact formulation of our results, we introduce the following notation:
Deﬁnition 4.1. For any merger decision function m and any agent i ∈ {1, 2}, let
Ii(m) denote the set of all interior type combinations (t1, t2) ∈ (T1 × T2)◦ ≡ T ◦ such
that m is discontinuous in ti at (t1, t2). Furthermore, let I(m) ≡ I1(m)∪ I2(m), and
let I˜(m) ≡ I1(m) ∩ I2(m).23
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let I∗ ≡ {(t1, t2) ∈ T ◦ : πM = π1(t1, t2) + π2(t2, t1)} denote the set
of all interior type combinations such that merging and not merging yield the same
joint proﬁts.
Graphically, the set I(m) collects the boundaries between the merger- and no-
merger regions M1 and M0 in type space T1 × T2. The subsets I1, I2 denote the
sections where the decision is locally dependent on agent 1 or 2’s report, respectively.
Finally, I˜(m) collects parts of the boundary for which both agents can aﬀect the
merger deviation by a marginal deviation from truthtelling. Note that parts of the
boundary where the merger function is discontinuous only in agent i’s type, that is,
the parts given by Ii(m) \ I˜(m), will be perpendicular to the ti-axis.
Using this notation, this section’s main result may be stated as follows:
Proposition 4.3. Any incentive compatible mechanism (m, s, p) satisfying (BB)
must be such that I˜(m) ⊆ I∗.
23The notation I for this set borrows from Jehiel et al. (2005), who call I(m) the ‘indiﬀerence set’.
What gives it this name is that in equilibrium, by Proposition 3.4(a), at any (t1, t2) ∈ Ii(m) ⊆ I,
agent i will be indiﬀerent between merging and not merging.
Chapter 2: Ex-Post Implementable Merger Mechanisms 61
Proposition 4.3 says that any connected subset of I(m) which lies outside the
boundary I∗ of the set of types for which merging is eﬃcient must be either horizontal
or vertical. In other words, locally, any merger decision must be either eﬃcient,
or independent of at least one agent’s private information. This is an immediate
consequence of combining the following two independent results:
Lemma 4.4. For any incentive compatible mechanism satisfying (BB), πM  π1+π2
at any (t1, t2) ∈ M1 such that both agents can unilaterally inhibit the merger by a
deviation from truthful reporting.
Lemma 4.5. For any incentive compatible mechanism satisfying (BB), πM  π1+π2
at any (t1, t2) ∈ I˜(m).
See the Appendix for the proofs.
In words, Lemma 4.4 asserts that whenever a mechanism seeks to implement
a merger for type combinations such that either agent could unilaterally avoid the
merger by misreporting, the merger must be eﬃcient. This is because by (BB), the
corresponding deviation payoﬀs must sum to π1 + π2, whereas equilibrium payoﬀs
sum to πM. Hence, if πM < π1 + π2, deviating must be proﬁtable for at least one
agent. A similar argument can be made for type proﬁles in M0 close to I˜(m) by
considering deviations which induce a merger, which leads to Lemma 4.5.
4.2 The Limited Usefulness of Shares in Incentive Design
As a second building block of our analysis, this subsection in turn derives restrictions
on share and transfer functions s and p which hold for any m, thus extending our
previous analysis in Section 3 by the requirement of budget balance. The next result
shows that under budget balance (BB), incentive compatible share and transfer
schemes must essentially be independent of reports:
Proposition 4.6. Any twice diﬀerentiable incentive compatible mechanism (m, s, p)
satisfying (BB) must be such that
(a) for any (ti, tj), (t
′
i, t
′
j) ∈M0, i ∈ {1, 2}, we must have p0i (ti, tj) = p0i (t′i, t′j),
(b) for any (t1, t2) ∈ M1, i 	= j ∈ {1, 2}, such that ∂∂tj πM 	= 0, we must have
∂
∂t˜i
si =
∂
∂t˜i
sj =
∂
∂t˜i
p1i =
∂
∂t˜i
p1j = 0.
See the Appendix for the proofs.
Part (a) is straightforward. Recall that by Proposition 3.2(a), transfers over M0
must be independent of an agent’s own reports. Together with budget balance, this
trivially implies that transfers must also be independent of the other’s report.
In marginal terms, part (a) implies that transfer functions must satisfy ∂
∂ti
p0i =
∂
∂ti
p0j = 0 over M
0. Over M1, on the other hand, the mechanism has two incentive
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devices at its disposal: transfers p1i and shares si. As argued before, one might
expect this added degree of freedom to give the mechanism operator the possibility
of simultaneously varying shares and transfers in an incentive compatible manner.
Part (b) of the proposition shows, however, that budget balance similarly keeps
both shares and transfers from responding to an agent’s private information over
M1 whenever merger proﬁts are responsive to the other’s type. Essentially, this is
because the manner in which shares and transfers must jointly vary to respect (IC)
by Proposition 3.2(b) is compatible with (BB) only if they are constant.
To facilitate a more precise understanding of this key result, assume that joint
merger proﬁts πM are strictly increasing in both types—which by Proposition 3.2(b)
implies that both agents’ shares, s1 and s2, must be non-decreasing in reports.
24 Now
assume that, starting from an equilibrium situation, agent 2’s type t2 increases while
his report t˜2 is held ﬁxed. The resulting change in agent 1’s reporting incentives due
to a change in agent 2’s type is captured by the term ∂
2
∂t˜1∂t2
u1 =
∂
∂t˜1
s1 · ∂∂t2πM, which
will be non-negative by Proposition 3.2(b) when joint proﬁts are increasing in both
types, and strictly positive if agent 1’s share depends nontrivially on his report: the
increase in agent 2’s type inﬂates the cake of available merger proﬁts, of which agent
1 attempts to obtain a larger slice by distorting his type report upward.
In equilibrium, however, a change in agent 2’s type will always be accompanied
by a corresponding change in his report. Thus, the mechanism could in principle
compensate this ceteris paribus incentive to misreport by letting an increase in agent
2’s type report cause a downward readjustment in agent 1’s reporting incentives, that
is, by designing the mechanism such that
∂2
∂t˜1∂t˜2
u1 +
∂2
∂t˜1∂t2
u1 = 0. (8)
In the speciﬁc setting sketched, this would require ∂
2
∂t˜1∂t˜2
u1 to be non-positive, and
strictly negative whenever agent 1’s report aﬀects his share nontrivially. Moreover,
by symmetry, exactly the same argument applies to agent 2 upon a change in agent
1’s type, thus similarly requiring ∂
2
∂t˜2∂t˜1
u2 to be non-positive, and strictly negative
whenever agent 2’s share depends nontrivially on his report.
In other words, to compensate for distortionary direct reporting incentives due
to a change in the other agent’s type, agents’ reports must (i) be substitutes in
both agents’ payoﬀ functions, and (ii) be strict substitutes whenever the concerned
agent’s share depends nontrivially on his own report. Now by budget balance,
however, joint payoﬀs u1 + u2 must always sum to joint merger proﬁts π
M (even
out of equilibrium), where the latter of course depends only on true types, not on
reports. This in turn implies that
∂2
∂t˜1∂t˜2
u1 +
∂2
∂t˜2∂t˜1
u2 = 0, (9)
24While we present the verbal argument for the case in which merger proﬁts are increasing in
both agent’s types, it should be clear that the same rationale carries over to other constellations
after appropriate sign changes.
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meaning that if reports are to be substitutes in agent 1’s payoﬀ, they must be
complements in agent 2’s payoﬀ. Combined with our previous argument, this im-
mediately implies that reports can never be strictly complementary for any agent
under (IC) and (BB), which in turn implies that shares must be locally independent
of reports, as stated in Proposition 4.6(b).
4.3 Implementation and Private Gross Beneﬁts to Merging
We now combine the constant-share and -transfer result of the previous subsection
with properties of the share- and transfer-functions derived in Proposition 3.4. As
we had argued there, incentive compatibility requires shares and transfers to be such
that on Ii(m), the gross beneﬁts to merging for agent i, si · πM − πi will be exactly
oﬀset by the corresponding discrete change in transfers p1i − p0i . Proposition 4.6
allows us to reinterpret this requirement in terms of level curves of si · πM − πi in
type space.
The following assumption simpliﬁes application of Proposition 4.6(b):
Assumption 4.7. The merged entity’s proﬁt function is strictly monotone in types,
so that ∂
∂ti
πM 	= 0 for all (t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2 and i ∈ {1, 2}.
Furthermore, we introduce the following terminology:
Deﬁnition 4.8. For any merger decision functionm, we say that a set A ∈ T1×T2 is
a merger region of m if it is a maximal smoothly path connected subset of the closure
ofM1, M1, in the sense that there exists no smoothly path connected A′ ⊆M1 such
that A  A′.25
Assumption 4.7 immediately implies that shares must be constant over any
merger region by Proposition 4.6(b) and the connectedness property, and thereby
(by continuity) also over any subset of I(m) which borders this merger region.26
With this terminology in place, our next result may be formulated as follows:
Proposition 4.9. If Assumption 4.7 holds, any twice diﬀerentiable merger mecha-
nism M = (m, s, p) which is implementable under (BB) must be such that, for any
i ∈ {1, 2} and any connected I ′ ⊆ Ii(m), there exists a s′i ∈ [0, 1] such that
s′i ·
[
πM(t′′)− πM(t′)] = πi(t′′)− πi(t′) (10)
25A set Θ is smoothly path connected if for every two points θ, θ′ ∈ Θ there exists a diﬀerentiable
function f : [0, 1]→ Θ such that f(0) = θ and f(1) = θ′.
26In principle, this leaves open the possibility of implementing diﬀerent shares over diﬀerent
(disjoint) merger regions in order to achieve the required alignment. As we noted in our discussion
surrounding Proposition 3.2(b) (and as is shown in that result’s proof in the Appendix) there is a
global version of condition (7), however, which requires global alignment in type between merger
proﬁts and shares.
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for any t′, t′′ ∈ I ′.27
In words, πi and π
M must vary proportionally on any connected subset of Ii(m),
in the sense that diﬀerences in πi are proportional to diﬀerences in π
M.
To understand this result, note ﬁrst that by Proposition 4.6, the continuous
extensions si, p0i and p
1
i are constant on I
′. Then, by Proposition 3.4(a), si ·πM−πi =
p1i −p0i for all (t1, t2) ∈ I ′ with constant values of si, p0i and p1i , from which the claim
immediately follows. Technically, the indiﬀerence set I(m) of any merger decision
must therefore correspond to a collection of level sets of s′i · πM − πi for some s′i.
More fundamentally, Proposition 4.9 shows that the mechanism must fully align
agents’ preferences over type proﬁles gross of transfers, si · πM − πi, and the pref-
erences over type proﬁles implicit in the merger decision m. To see this, think of
the boundary I(m) as an ‘indiﬀerence set’ of the mechanism over types: for all
type combinations t ∈ I(m), the mechanism is ‘indiﬀerent’ between implementing a
merger or not. By Proposition 4.9, at least one agent must similarly be indiﬀerent
between such type combinations in the sense that they yield the same gross beneﬁts
to merging, si · πM− πi. Thus, the share must be chosen such that on the boundary
of a merger region, both the mechanism and at least one agent value both agents’
private information on the same terms.28
This interpretation of Proposition 4.9 is further augmented by Proposition 3.4(b),
by which agents’ gross beneﬁts to merging si·πM−πi must be aligned with the merger
decision on the boundary. Thus, not only must I(m) coincide with indiﬀerence sets
of gross beneﬁts to merging si · πM − πi, but these beneﬁts to merging must also be
locally increasing in the direction in type space in which a merger is implemented.
Eventually, however, the problem is that all this must be achieved both by a
share that is locally constant, and on a boundary that is already strongly restricted
by Proposition 4.3. We consider the joint implication of these restrictions in the
next section.
4.4 Why Non-Trivial Mechanisms are Generally not Imple-
mentable
We now argue that the conditions derived so far essentially preclude the implementa-
tion of non-trivial merger decisions by means of share-transfer mechanisms in quite
27Note that on any such subset of I˜(m), where the decision function is discontinuous in both
types, condition (10) must of course hold simultaneously for both agents i = 1, 2. However, due
to the fact that I ′ ⊆ I∗ by Proposition 4.3, s′i · πM − πi being constant on I ′ for one agent i
immediately implies the same for the other agent j with s′j = 1− s′i.
28This part of our analysis has much in common with Jehiel et al. (2005), who derive similar
restrictions in the context of ex-post implementation with multidimensional information. On the
one hand, derivations are simpliﬁed in our case by the additional budget balance requirement and
one-dimensional information. On the other, the presence of shares makes the argument slightly
more involved (Jehiel et al., 2005, consider only binary decisions).
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general environments. Our analysis builds from Proposition 4.9, which implies a ge-
ometric condition which proﬁts function must satisfy on the boundary between M0
and M1. Proposition 4.10 will state the implications of this condition in marginal
terms. To formulate the result, for any f : IR2 → IR and v ∈ IR2, we let ∂vf = vT∇f
denote the directional derivative of f along v.
Proposition 4.10. Under any incentive compatible mechanism satisfying (BB),
(a) for any t ≡ (t1, t2) ∈ I ′ ⊆ I˜(m) where I ′ is connected, either ∇πM(t) = 0 or
the following conditions must hold simultaneously for any tangent r(t) of I∗
in t29:
(a1) ∂r(t)
(
∂r(t)πi
/
∂r(t)π
M
)
= 0,
(a2)
∂r(t)πi
∂r(t)πM
∈ [0, 1], and
(a3) letting q(t) = ∇(πM − π1 − π2), ∂r(t)πi
∂r(t)πM
· ∂q(t)πM − ∂q(t)πi  0.
(b) for any (t1, t2) ∈ I ′ ⊆ Ii(m) \ I˜(m) where I ′ is connected, either ∂∂tj πi =
∂
∂tj
πM = 0, or the following conditions must hold simultaneously:
(b1) ∂
∂tj
(
∂
∂tj
πi
/
∂
∂tj
πM
)
= 0,
(b2)
∂
∂tj
πi
∂
∂tj
πM
∈ [0, 1], and
(b3) m is locally increasing (decreasing) in ti if
∂
∂tj
πi
∂
∂tj
πM
· πM − πi is.
See the Appendix for the proof.
Statements (a1), (a2) and (b1), (b2), respectively, are immediate implications of
the proportional-variation requirement in (10). (a3) and (b3) rephrase the idea that
the mechanism must give types that are meant to merge greater incentives to do so
than types that are not meant to merge.
The power of Proposition 4.10 becomes clear in combination with Proposition
4.3: As the boundary of the merger set coincides with boundaries of the eﬃciency
set or with horizontal or vertical lines by Proposition 4.3, Proposition 4.10 boils
down to restrictions on the merger environment on the eﬃciency set I∗ and the
parallels to the axes. For instance, conditions 4.10 (a) and (b) together imply that
∂r(t)πi/∂r(t)π
M must be constant along the boundary of the eﬃciency set, or that
∂
∂tj
πi/
∂
∂tj
πM must be constant on a line parallel to the tj-axis for some i ∈ {1, 2}, j 	=
i. These conditions are obviously satisﬁed only by a small subclass of environments.
Intuitively, these requirements can only be satisﬁed if the eﬀects of modifying type
proﬁles on stand-alone proﬁts are very similar to those on joint proﬁts. In principle,
29 That is, for any r(t) ∈ {r′ ∈ IR2 : r′ ⊥ ∇πM(t)}
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these insights could be used to show that non-trivial mechanisms without ex-post
regret are not implementable in examples 1 and 2. However, we will show this using
a simpler approach in Section 6.
We will see in Section 7.2 below, however, there is an important class of ‘de-
generate’—but not irrelevant—merger environments where this result does not ap-
ply: If at least one agent’s stand-alone proﬁts πi are common knowledge, the eﬃcient
decision is indeed implementable.
5 Requiring Individual Rationality
We have argued above that in most general cases, the restrictions imposed by budget
balance will be so severe as to permit only trivial merger decisions of the sort ‘never
merge’ or ‘always merge’. We now argue that the participation constraints will
eliminate the latter option, so that under budget balance, an incentive compatible
mechanism can only reproduce the status quo.
To establish this, we use the very simple result that under budget balance, the
participation constraint prohibits the merger mechanism from ever implementing an
ineﬃcient merger:
Proposition 5.1. Any incentive compatible merger mechanism satisfying (BB) and
(IR) must be such that
πM(t1, t2)  π1(t1, t2) + π2(t2, t2) for all (t1, t2) ∈M1. (11)
Proof. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality (i.e., participation) imply
that for any (t1, t2) such that m(t1, t2) = 1,
si(ti, tj) · πM(t1, t2)− p1i (ti, tj)  πi(ti, tj),
which, by adding up across both types i = 1, 2, implies
[s1(t1, t2) + s2(t2, t1)] · πM(t1, t2)− p11(t1, t2)− p12(t2, t1)  π1(t1, t2) + π2(t2, t1).
Together with (BB), this in turn immediately implies (11).
Proposition 5.1 captures the simple fact that if a merger is executed even though
it is ineﬃcient, then—unless the mechanism operator tosses in subsidies—there are
simply not enough proﬁts around to satisfy both parties’ ex-post participation con-
straints. Thus, ex-post ineﬃciencies in an individually rational mechanism can never
be due to mergers occurring even though they are ineﬃcient, but only due to eﬃcient
mergers foregone.
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A simple corollary to Proposition 5.1 is that in any of the cases in which the
restrictions derived in Section 4 permit only trivial (i.e., constant) merger decisions,
the only implementable decision under voluntary participation is in fact the ‘never
merge’-rule. Furthermore, it is easily seen that under voluntary participation, trans-
fers if no merger occurs must be zero, so p0i = 0, i ∈ {1, 2} under (IR). Hence, such
a mechanism will always preserve the status quo:
Corollary 5.2. Under voluntary participation (BB) and (IR), if there exists any
type constellation (t1, t2) such that merging is strictly ineﬃcient (so π
M < π1 + π2),
then the only trivial implementable merger mechanism is that for which mergers
never occur, and payments are always zero.
6 Generalized Mechanisms
This section investigates implementation under more general mechanisms than the
share-transfer mechanisms analyzed hitherto. We derive conditions for non-trivial
implementation which, while not as generally exclusive as those derived in Section
4.4, nonetheless prevent non-trivial implementation in many merger environments
of interest.
The main motivation for doing so is that real mergers often involve contracts that
condition post-merger proﬁts of the participants to the deal on total merger proﬁts
in a non-linear fashion, so that the contracts cannot be captured by share-transfer
mechanisms.30 An additional beneﬁt of our generalization is that it sheds light on
the share-transfer case: Though our approach to generalized merger mechanisms
does not pertain to as many merger environments as our treatment of the share-
transfer mechanisms in the preceding sections, it yields very simple non-existence
results in those environments where it does apply. The environments are still fairly
general, including for instance our examples 1 and 2.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A generalized (direct) merger mechanism M is a tuple (m, πˆM, p0)
consisting of a merger decision functionm, merger-proﬁt sharing rules πˆM = (πˆM1 , πˆ
M
2 ),
and no-merger transfer functions p0 = (p01, p
0
2), which are deﬁned as follows:
(i) The merger decision function m : T1 × T2 → {0, 1} maps a combination of
reports t˜ = (t˜1, t˜2) into a merger outcome, resulting in sets M
0 and M1 as in
Deﬁnition 2.2.
30Such more general mechanisms are also analyzed by Brusco et al. (2005). Practical examples
include collars (Oﬃcer, 2004), which use changes in stock prices to determine the partners remu-
neration, and contingent value rights (Hietala et al., 2003), where sellers obtain put options on the
shares of the new entity.
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(ii) The merger-proﬁt sharing rules πˆMi : M
1 × IR0 → IR, i ∈ {1, 2}, map a
combination of reports t˜ for which m(t˜) = 1 and realized merger proﬁts πM(t)
into a payoﬀ to ﬁrm i.
(iii) The no-merger transfer functions p0i : M
0 → IR, i ∈ {1, 2}, assign a transfer
payment from player i to the mechanism operator for reported types t˜ such
that m(t˜) = 0.
For any combination of types t and reports t˜, the mechanism results in payoﬀs
ui(t˜; t) =
{
πi(t)− p0i (t˜), m(t˜) = 0,
πˆMi [t˜;π
M(t)], m(t˜) = 1
(12)
for each agent i. Thus, the mechanisms considered in this section permit condi-
tioning agents’ payoﬀs on joint merger proﬁts πM in a more general fashion than
is permitted by share-transfer mechanisms. Note that share-transfer mechanisms
obtain in this more general setting by restricting πˆMi to functions of the form
πˆMi [t˜, π
M(t)] = si(t˜) · πM(t)− p1i (t˜), that is, to functions which are aﬃne in πM.
Moreover, we introduce the following generalization of (BB):
Deﬁnition 6.2. A generalized merger mechanisms satisﬁes budget balance (BB’) if
∑
i=1,2
ui(t˜; t) =
{∑
i=1,2 πi(t), m = 0,
πM(t), m = 1,
(13)
for all t˜, t ∈ T1 × T2.
It is important to note that this generalization inherits from (BB) the property
that the budget must be balanced also oﬀ equilibrium, that is, when t˜ 	= t.
To simplify the argumentation, we will assume that the payoﬀ functions πˆMi ,
i = 1, 2, are diﬀerentiable in all arguments. Furthermore, we will assume that in
addition to (IC) and (BB’), such a generalized mechanism must satisfy (IR). In
straightforward extension to Proposition 5.1, it is quickly checked that generalized
mechanisms satisfying (BB’) and (IR) must be such that Vi(t) = πi(t) for t ∈
M0 (i.e., p0i (t˜) = 0 everywhere). Moreover, by an argument paralleling that in
Proposition 3.4(a), Vi must again be continuous over Ii(m). Combined with the fact
that (IR) requires Vi(t)  πi(t) over M1, these insights immediately give rise to the
following lemma:
Lemma 6.3. For any t ∈ Ii(m), i ∈ {1, 2}, and any vector r ∈ IR2 \ {0} pointing
into the interior of M1 at t, ∂rVi(t)  ∂rπi(t).
Next, over M1, the gradient of the value function, ∇Vi, is related to the gradient
of merger proﬁts, ∇πM, as follows:
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Lemma 6.4. ∇Vi = ∂∂πM πˆMi · ∇πM for i = 1, 2 over M1.
Proof. Since ∇Vi = ∇t˜πˆMi + ∂∂πM πˆMi ·∇πM overM1 by deﬁnition of the value function
V 1i , we need only show that∇t˜πˆMi = 0, which in turn follows directly from ∂∂t˜i πˆMi = 0
due to (IC), and ∂
∂t˜j
πˆMi +
∂
∂t˜j
πˆMj = 0 by (BB’).
From Lemma 6.4, it immediately follows that ∂rVi =
∂
∂πM
πˆMi · ∂rπM, which in
turn implies that each agent’s value function Vi must be constant on level sets of
πM over M1. Combined with Lemma 6.3, this leads to the following key result:
Proposition 6.5. Any general mechanism satisfying (IC), (BB’), and (IR) must
be such that,
(a) for any t ∈ Ii(m), i ∈ {1, 2}, and any r ∈ IR2 \ {0} such that (i) ∂rπM(t) = 0
and (ii) r points toward the interior of M1 at t, we must have ∂rπi  0;
(b) for any t ∈ Ii(m), i ∈ {1, 2} such that no r satisfying (i) and (ii) in (a) exists,
either the boundary M0 ∩M1 must be kinked (i.e., non-smooth), or the level
curves of πM and πi must have identical slopes.
See the Appendix for the proofs.
By part (a), at any point t on the boundary of M1 where (i) the boundary is
intersected by a level curve of πM and (ii) agent i can alter the merger decision by
a marginal deviation from truthful reporting, πi must be locally decreasing along
the part of the level curve of πM which penetrates M1. Part (b) essentially serves
to formalize the wide applicability of part (a): at points t ∈ Ii(m) where the level
curve of πM does not penetrate M1, the level curve of πM must be tangent to the
boundary, which implies by the required continuity of the value functions that the
level curve of πi must be tangent to the boundary as well. Thus, unless π
M and πi
are themselves aligned in a rather narrow sense, part (a) is applicable.
The power of Proposition 6.5 is illustrated in the following corollary, which ex-
cludes non-trivial implementation in a large and relevant class of environments:
Corollary 6.6. For merger environments such that (i) ∂
∂ti
πi > 0, (ii)
∂
∂tj
πi < 0, and
(iii) ∂
∂ti
πM > 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 	= j, I˜(m) must be empty for all mechanisms
satisfying (IC), (BB’), and (IR).
See the Appendix for the proof.
Conditions (i) and (iii) are very natural whenever the type variable corresponds
to higher productivity; with the additional requirement that ﬁrms are competing in
the same market, condition (ii) will typically hold.
The intuition for Corollary 6.6 is quickly seen: Over I˜(m) = I1(m) ∪ I2(m),
Proposition 6.5 is applicable for both agents i = 1, 2. Hence, on parts of the bound-
ary ofM1 where both agents can unilaterally alter the merger decision by a marginal
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deviation from truth-telling, both π1 and π2 must be decreasing along any level curve
of πM running into M1. Now, the merger environments described in Corollary 6.6
are such that, in a t1/t2-plane with t1 on the ordinate, the level curves of π
M have
a negative slope by condition (iii). Furthermore, by (i) and (ii), π1 will be strictly
increasing in any northwest direction, whereas π2 will be strictly decreasing in any
southeast direction. Hence, on any level curve of πM, π1 and π2 will be non-constant,
and increasing in opposite directions. Thus, I˜(m) must be empty by Proposition
6.5.
7 Considering Speciﬁc Merger Environments
We now reconsider the speciﬁc examples of merger environments presented in Section
2.2 in light of our results. We ﬁrst show that only trivial merger decisions are
implementable in Examples 1 and 2 due to the results in Section 6. Next, we show
more generally that the main obstacle to non-trivial implementation lies in private
information on stand-alone proﬁts πi rather than private information on post-merger
proﬁts πM, which permits eﬃcient implementation in examples 3 and 4.
7.1 Reconsidering the Examples
We start by reconsidering Examples 1 and 2 presented in Section 2.2. As it turns
out, any scope for non-trivial general mechanisms of the form presented in Section
6 is swiftly eliminated by Corollary 6.6 and Proposition 6.5, respectively, which in
particular also rules out any non-trivial share/transfer mechanisms.
Example 1 continued (Averaging-Cost Mergers). Recall that in this example,
merger proﬁts πM are strictly increasing in each type, whereas stand-alone proﬁts
are strictly increasing in own type and strictly decreasing in the other’s type. Thus,
the example falls into the class of environments covered by Corollary 6.6, implying
that any general mechanism (and thereby also any share/transfer mechanism) can
only implement merger decisions for which I˜(m) = ∅, that is, merger decisions which
depend only trivially on at least one agent’s report.
For share-transfer mechanisms, such ‘semi-trivial’ merger decision functions can
further be ruled because this class of merger environments violates the constant-
variation requirement of Proposition 4.9 on horizontal and vertical lines in T1 × T2-
space, as is quickly checked by means of of Proposition 4.10(b1). Hence, only share-
transfer mechanisms of the form m(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ T1 × T2, are implementable.
Example 2 continued (Rationalization Mergers). In this case, Corollary 6.6
is no longer directly applicable, as πM will be constant in ﬁrm i’s type for ti < tj,
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j 	= i. However, the argument implicit in Corollary 6.6 can quickly be extended to
this case by reconsidering Proposition 6.5.31
Recall that by Proposition 6.5, at any points on I˜(m), level curves of πM, π1, and
π2 must either have identical slopes, or both π1 and π2 must be (locally) increasing
(decreasing) in the same direction along level curves of πM. Since level curves of πM
consist only of horizontal/vertical segments, the ﬁrst possibility is trivially ruled out
by the fact that level curves of π1 and π2 have strictly positive slopes. The second
in turn is ruled out by ∂
∂ti
πi and
∂
∂ti
πi having opposite signs for any i = 1, 2, j 	= i,
implying that π1 and π2 will be increasing in opposite directions on any π
M-level
curve.32 Hence, the set I˜(m) must be empty for any general mechanism. Again,
for share-transfer mechanisms, semi-trivial merger decisions making use of only one
agent’s report are furthermore quickly ruled out by Proposition 4.10(b1).
By having ﬁrms’ stand-alone values independent of private information, Exam-
ples 3 and 4 in turn fall into a broader class of environments for which results
presented in the next section spell good news concerning not just non-trivial, but in
fact eﬃcient implementation.
7.2 Implementation when One Firm’s Standalone-Value is
Common Knowledge
The results presented in Section 4.4 for share/transfer-mechanisms and in Section 6
for more general mechanisms crucially hinge on the assumption that neither agent’s
stand-alone proﬁts are common knowledge. This is shown by the following result,
pertaining to environments where one of the agents’ stand-alone proﬁts (w.l.o.g.
agent 2’s) are independent of t1 and t2.
Proposition 7.1. If neither agent holds any private information on agent 2’s stand-
alone proﬁts, so ∇π2 = 0, then the eﬃcient merger decision can be implemented by
a share/transfer-mechanism satisfying (BB) and (IR) by agent 1 obtaining the full
share in the event of a merger and paying π2 to agent 2, and zero transfers if no
merger occurs. Moreover, if ∇πM and ∇π1 are not collinear on I∗, the shares and
transfers required to implement any eﬃcient merger decision under (BB) and (IR)
are unique.
31Alternatively, we may interpret Example 2 as the limiting case of a class of environments to
which Corollary 6.6 does directly apply. Consider the class of environments for which the costs
of the merged entity are given by the generalized mean of stand-alone-costs: cM = (12c
ν
1 +
1
2c
ν
2)
1
ν ,
ν ∈ IR. It is quickly seen that Corollary 6.6 is applicable to any such environment, and that the
environment of Example 2 obtains as ν → −∞. Note that this generalized form for cM nests other
interesting cases such as the arithmetic mean (i.e., Example 1) for ν = 1, the harmonic mean for
ν = −1, the geometric mean as ν → 0, and the maximum-function as ν →∞.
32More formally, the proof of Corollary 6.6 is quickly adapted to cases where, at every t ∈ T1×T2,
∂
∂ti
πM(t) > 0 need only hold for one agent.
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See the Appendix for the proof.
It is easy to see why—in spite of our general result—this particular class of
environments allows for implementation of the eﬃcient decision: Given ∇π2 = 0,
∇(πM − π1 − π2) = ∇πM − ∇π1, so that for s1 = 1, agent 1’s gross beneﬁts to
merging s1 · πM − π1 are perfectly aligned with social beneﬁts to merging, whereas
agent 2 is always indiﬀerent between merging and not merging. It is also obvious
that, for any other distribution of shares, private and social goals will generally be
misaligned, which explains the uniqueness-result.
A trivial corollary of Proposition 7.1 is that implementation of the eﬃcient
merger decision is also possible if both agents’ stand-alone proﬁts are common knowl-
edge, that is, if each agent’s private information pertains only to proﬁts under a
merger.33 Thus, both the ‘Synergy’- and ‘Corporate Culture’-examples discussed
in Section 2.2 permit implementation of the eﬃcient decision. However, in these
settings, the uniqueness result in Proposition 7.1 no longer holds, and it is easily
veriﬁed that in any environment with ∇π1 = ∇π2 = 0, the eﬃcient decision can
be implemented with any allocation of shares, so long as transfers are chosen ac-
cordingly. It is worth noting though that there is a unique allocation of shares
which implements the eﬃcient merger in a ‘cash-free’ way: By Proposition 3.4(a),
p0i = p
1
i = 0 for i = 1, 2 requires si = πi/(π1 + π2), so that the allocation of shares
must be proportional to ﬁrms’ (commonly known) stand-alone values.34
8 Conclusion
This paper has shown that share-transfer mechanisms cannot implement any merg-
ers in an ex-post incentive compatible fashion, if balance in shares and transfers and
individual rationality are required. Even for more general mechanisms, the scope for
implementation is limited. We have thereby shown that even if the potential merger
candidates jointly possess all information necessary to assess the proﬁtability of a
merger, the dispersion of this information across parties poses a serious problem to
the implementation of mergers.
This result stands in stark contrast to the encouraging results obtained in the
literature on auctions with interdependent valuations (cf. Maskin, 1992; Dasgupta
and Maskin, 2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001; Perry and Reny, 2002), where it has
been shown that an eﬃcient outcome is quite generally attainable. While the two
problems of eﬃciently allocating a good to buyers and forming eﬃcient partnerships
certainly display inherently dissimilar structures, recall that we argued at the outset
that one should expect the additional degree of freedom in incentive design which
33Proposition 2 in Brusco et al. (2005) is analogous; but recall that their setting diﬀers from
ours.
34 Brusco et al. (2005) come to an analogous conclusion in their setting.
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is oﬀered by the possibility of designing share allocations in addition to transfers to
improve prospects for an eﬃcient mechanism in the merger context. As arguments
in Section 7.2 show, the main hindrance to eﬃcient implementation in our setting
comes from private knowledge on reservation payoﬀs (i.e., on stand-alone proﬁts).
The fact that merger deals are rather frequently observed in reality must of
course lead us to conclude that at least one of the requirements we have imposed
on the merger decision process will typically fail to hold in real world merger deals.
Most likely, the requirement of ex-post incentive compatibility is excessively strong,
meaning parties in actual merger negotiations choose strategies that are optimal
only in expected terms. However, in such a context, our results nonetheless provide
the interesting conclusion that in any such Bayesian mechanism, there must be
some merger outcomes (be they eﬃcient or not) involving ex-post regret on behalf
of at least one of the parties. This insight provides an alternative explanation of
the ‘unhappy marriages’ often alluded to, without invoking any agency arguments
concerning self-interested managers.
An important caveat applies to this argument, however, as ex-post regret about
the strategy played need not necessarily imply regret about the merger decision itself.
Indeed, regret may concern an alternative strategy which would just as well have
led to a merger, but which would have provided the agent with a larger slice of the
merger cake. On the other hand, it is clear that any time a Bayesian mechanism
implements an ex-post ineﬃcient merger, at least one of the agents must indeed
exhibit ex-post regret about the merger decision itself. An important future line
of research should therefore lie in investigating the eﬃciency properties of Bayesian
merger mechanisms.35 What makes this task somewhat cumbersome is that in
a Bayesian implementation context, the distribution of types crucially aﬀects the
class of implementable mechanisms and thereby the set of implementable merger
decisions, which will likely make the analysis much less tractable than the ex-post
approach.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2. (a) Using requirement (IC) along with (1),
Ui(t′i; t
′′
i , tj)− Ui(t′′i ; t′′i , tj) = p0i (t′′i , tj)− p0i (t′i, tj)  0
Ui(t′′i ; t
′
i, tj)− Ui(t′i; t′i, tj) = p0i (t′i, tj)− p0i (t′′i , tj)  0,
from which the claim immediately follows.
(b) Equation (6) follows immediately from (IC), by which ∂
∂t˜i
ui(ti; ti, tj) = 0. To
prove condition (7), we show more generally that for any t′i, t
′′
i ∈ Ti and tj ∈ Tj such that
(t′i, tj), (t
′′
i , tj) ∈M1,
[si(t′′i , tj)− si(t′i, tj)] · [πM(t′′i , tj)− πM(t′i, tj)]  0. (A.1)
To see this, note that in order to avoid type t′′i claiming to be of type t
′
i and vice versa,
we must have
si(t′′i , tj) · πM(t′′i , tj)− p1i (t′′i , tj)  si(t′i, tj) · πM(t′′i , tj)− p1i (t′i, tj)
si(t′i, tj) · πM(t′i, tj)− p1i (t′i, tj)  si(t′′i , tj) · πM(t′i, tj)− p1i (t′′i , tj),
respectively. Jointly, these inequalities immediately imply (A.1), of which (7) is simply an
implication in marginal terms.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. (a) Consider any two sequences (tki,n)
∞
n=1, k ∈ {0, 1}, such that
limn→∞ tki,n = t
◦
i , and such that (t
0
i,n, tj) ∈M0 and (t1i,n, tj) ∈M1 for all n. Such sequences
exist by assumption. By incentive compatibility (IC),
Ui(t1i,n; t
0
i,n′ , tj)− Ui(t0i,n′ ; t0i,n′ , tj)  0 and
Ui(t0i,n′ ; t
1
i,n, tj)− Ui(t1i,n′ ; t1i,n′ , tj)  0
for all n, n′. Therefore,
si(t1i,n, tj) · πM(t0i,n′ , tj)− πi(t0i,n′ , tj)  p1i (t1i,n, tj)− p0i (t0i,n′ , tj)
 si(t1i,n, tj) · πM(t1i,n, tj)− πi(t1i,n, tj).
Letting n, n′ → ∞, using the continuity conditions on πi and πMi and rearranging gives
the result.
(b) We prove this result by using properties of the value function collected in the
following Lemma:
Lemma A.1 (Properties of the Value Function). Letting Vi(ti, tj) ≡ Ui(ti; ti, tj)
denote agent i’s equilibrium utility or value function, under any diﬀerentiable incentive
compatible mechanism (m, s, p),
(a) Vi(ti, tj) must be continuous in ti for any tj ∈ Tj,
(b) ∂∂tiVi(ti, tj) =
∂
∂ti
πi(ti, tj) for (t1, t2) ∈M0◦,
(c) ∂∂tiVi(ti, tj) = si(ti, tj) · ∂∂tiπM(t1, t2) for (t1, t2) ∈M1
◦,
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For interior regions of M0 and M1, part (a) immediately follows from (1) and the fact
that proﬁt, share, and transfer functions are all continuous by assumption. Continuity
on the boundary is an immediate implication of Proposition 3.4(a). Parts (b) and (c)
represent straightforward applications of the envelope theorem, by which ∂∂tiVi =
∂
∂ti
Ui.
Returning to the proof of Proposition 3.4(b), assume ﬁrst that m(t˜i, t˜j) is increasing
in t˜i at (t◦1, t◦2). Fixing tj = t◦j and suppressing it for notational convenience, let Ui(t
◦
i ; t
◦
i )
denote the equilibrium utility of an agent of type t◦i . Now, for ε > 0 small, by Lemma
A.1(c), an agent of type t◦i + ε will have equilibrium utility
V (t◦i + ε) = V (t
◦
i ) +
∫ t◦i+ε
t◦i
si(τ) · ∂∂tiπM(τ)dτ . (A.2)
By reporting t◦i − δ for δ > 0 small, using Lemma A.1, his utility will be
πi(t◦i + ε)− p0i (t◦i − δ) = πi(t◦i + ε)− πi(t◦i − δ) + πi(t◦i − δ)− p0i (t◦i − δ)
= πi(t◦i + ε)− πi(t◦i − δ) + Vi(t◦i − δ) =
∫ t◦i+ε
t◦i−δ
∂
∂ti
πi(τ)dτ + Vi(t◦i )−
∫ t◦i
t◦i−δ
∂
∂ti
πi(τ)dτ
= Vi(t◦i ) +
∫ t◦i+ε
t◦i
∂
∂ti
πi(τ)dτ . (A.3)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3), his deviation gain will be negative for small ε only if
∂
∂ti
πi(t◦i )  si(t◦i ) · ∂∂tiπ
M(t◦i ),
as was to be shown. Proving the claim for a locally decreasing m merely requires a switch
in signs for ε and δ.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. By assumption, for each i = 1, 2, there exists a t′i such that (t
′
i, tj) ∈
M0. By (IC), we must have
Vi(ti, tj)  πi(ti, tj)− p0i (t′i, tj).
Adding the two inequalities for i = 1, 2 and using the fact that p0i (t
′
i, tj) = p
0
i (ti, t
′
j) due to
Proposition 3.2(a), and that V1(t1, t2)+V2(t1, t2) = πM(t1, t2) and p01(t
′
1, t2)+p
0
2(t
′
1, t2) = 0
under (BB) gives the result.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. By assumption, there exist t′1, t′2 both arbitrarily close to t1 and t2,
respectively, such that (t′1, t2), (t1, t′2) ∈M0. (IC) thus implies
Vi(t′i, tj) = πi(t
′
i, tj)− p0i (tj)  si(ti, tj)πM(t′i, tj)− p1i (ti, tj)
= si(ti, tj)πM(ti, tj)− p1i (ti, tj) + si(ti, tj) · [πM(t′i, tj)− πM(ti, tj)].
for each i = 1, 2. Adding the inequalities for i = 1, 2 and using the fact that p01(t2) +
p02(t1) = 0 and [s1(t1, t2)+ s2(t2, t1)] ·πM(t1, t2)− [p11(t1, t2)+ p12(t2, t1)] = πM(t1, t2) under
(BB), we obtain
π1(t′1, t2) + π2(t
′
2, t1)  πM(ti, tj) + s1(t1, t2) · [πM(t′1, t2)− πM(t1, t2)]
+ s2(t2, t1) · [πM(t1, t′2)− πM(t1, t2)].
By continuity of the proﬁt functions, letting t′1 → t1 and t′2 → t2 yields π1(t1, t2) +
π2(t2, t1)  πM(t1, t2).
76 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.6. (a) By Proposition 3.2(a), p0i (ti, tj) = p
0
i (t
′
i, tj) and p
0
j (tj , t
′
i) =
p0j (t
′
j , t
′
i), where j 	= i. Under budget balance, p0i (t′i, tj) = −p0j (tj , t′i) and p0i (t′i, t′j) =
−p0j (t′j , t′i), from which the claim immediately follows.
(b) Observe ﬁrst that since ∂∂ti si = − ∂∂ti sj and ∂∂ti p1i = − ∂∂ti p1j due to (BB), and
∂
∂ti
p1i = π
M · ∂∂ti si due to Proposition 3.2(b), it suﬃces to show that ∂∂ti si = 0 under the
conditions stated.36 To prove this, we ﬁrst show that, for any (t1, t2) ∈ M1, (IC) and
(BB) imply
∂
∂t˜i
si(ti, tj) · ∂∂tj π
M(t1, t2) + ∂∂t˜j sj(ti, tj) ·
∂
∂ti
πM(t1, t2) = 0. (A.4)
Diﬀerentiation of condition (6) in Proposition 3.2(b) with respect to tj gives
∂
∂t˜j∂t˜i
si(ti, tj) · πM(t1, t2) + ∂∂t˜i si(ti, tj) ·
∂
∂tj
πM(t1, t2) = ∂∂t˜j∂t˜i p
1
i (ti, tj). (A.5)
Swapping indices, we obtain
∂
∂t˜i∂t˜j
sj(tj , ti) · πM(t1, t2) + ∂∂t˜j sj(tj , ti) ·
∂
∂ti
πM(t1, t2) = ∂∂t˜i∂t˜j p
1
j (tj , ti). (A.6)
Using budget balance (BB),
∂
∂t˜i∂t˜j
sj(tj , ti) · πM(t1, t2)− ∂∂t˜i∂t˜j p
1
j (tj , ti)
= −
(
∂
∂t˜i∂t˜j
si(ti, tj) · πM(t1, t2)− ∂∂t˜i∂t˜j p
1
i (ti, tj)
)
= −
(
∂
∂t˜j∂t˜i
si(ti, tj) · πM(t1, t2)− ∂∂t˜j∂t˜i p
1
i (ti, tj)
)
.
Inserting this condition in (A.5) and (A.6) yields (A.4).
Now, using (A.4), the claim in Proposition 4.6(b) is immediately obvious if ∂∂tiπ
M = 0.
Hence, assume that ∂∂tiπ
M 	= 0. Then, we may rewrite condition (A.4) as
∂
∂ti
si
∂
∂ti
πM
= −
∂
∂tj
sj
∂
∂tj
πM
. (A.7)
Assume now that, in contradiction to Proposition 4.6(b), ∂∂ti si 	= 0. Then the left-hand
side of (A.7) must be strictly positive by Proposition 3.2(b). Similarly, however, the
right-hand side is non-positive by Proposition 3.2(b), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4.10. (a) By Proposition 4.9, I ′ belongs to a level set of s′i · πM −
πi for some s′i ∈ [0, 1], which can be assumed to have measure zero w.l.o.g. Since πM
and πi are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, I ′ must then be smoothly path connected
36Strictly speaking, the ﬁnal conclusion concerning ∂
∂t˜i
pi only follows directly from Proposition
3.2(b) if πM 	= 0. However, if πM = 0, it is quickly seen that any transfer function ∂
∂t˜i
pi 	= 0
cannot be incentive compatible by a more basic argument paralleling that in Proposition 3.2(a)
for no-merger outcomes.
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and parameterizable by diﬀerentiable functions (t1(x), t2(x)) of x ∈ [0, 1]. Because s′i ·
πM(t1(x), t2(x))− πi(t1(x), t2(x)) is constant in x,
s′i ·
(
∂πM
∂t1
∂t1
∂x
+
∂πM
∂t2
∂t2
∂x
)
−
(
∂πi
∂t1
∂t1
∂x
+
∂πi
∂t2
∂t2
∂x
)
= s′i · ∂r(t)πM − ∂r(t)πi = 0. (A.8)
(a1) and (a2) immediately follow.37 (a3) is an immediate implication of (10) and (A.8).
To see (a3), recall from Proposition 3.4(b) that for both agents i, s′i · πM − πi must be
increasing in ti in the direction in which m is increasing. We know furthermore from
Lemma 4.4 that m must be locally increasing with πM−π1−π2, i.e. it must be increasing
in the direction q(t). Combining, this implies that on I˜(m), si ·πM−πi must be increasing
in the direction q(t), which is stated in (a3) using si(t) = ∂r(t)πi/∂r(t)πM by our previous
results to substitute for si.
(b) The proof of part (b) is analogous. As Ii(m) \ I˜(m) is perpendicular to the ti-axis,
the parametrization t1(x), t2(x) satisﬁes ∂∂x ti = 0. (A.8) thus becomes
s′i ·
(
∂πM
∂tj
∂tj
∂x
)
− ∂πi
∂tj
∂tj
∂x
= 0, (A.9)
which implies (b1)–(b2). (b3) again follows from Proposition 3.4(b) because si(t) =
∂
∂tj
πi
/
∂
∂tj
πM by (A.9).
Proof of Proposition 6.5. (a) Because r points into M1, ∂rV 1i  ∂rπi by Lemma 6.3.
Moreover, ∂rπM = 0 implies ∂rV 1i = 0 by Lemma 6.4. Thus, ∂rπi  0, as was to be
shown.
(b) If the subset of the boundary Ii(m) is not kinked, then it is only possible for an r
as speciﬁed in part (a) not to exist if the level curve of πM in t is tangent to the boundary.
But then Vi must be locally constant on the boundary by Lemma 6.4, which in turn is
compatible with the required continuity of Vi across the boundary only if πi (the value of
Vi over M0) is locally constant on the boundary as well.
Proof of Corollary 6.6. We ﬁrst show that at any t ∈ T1 × T2 and r ∈ IR2 such that
∂rπ
M(t) = 0, we cannot have ∂rπi(t)  0 for both i = 1, 2. To see this, let r = (r1, r2),
and note that r1 · r2  0 by assumption (iii) in the corollary. Then,
∂rπ1 · ∂rπ2 =
(
r1 · ∂∂t1π1 + r2 · ∂∂t2π1
)
·
(
r1 · ∂∂t1π2 + r2 · ∂∂t2π2
)
= r21 · ∂∂t1π1 · ∂∂t1π2 + r22 · ∂∂t2π1 · ∂∂t2π2 + r1 · r2 ·
(
∂
∂t1
π1 · ∂∂t2π2 + ∂∂t2π1 · ∂∂t1π2
)
,
which is quickly checked to be strictly negative by assumptions (i)—(iii). Thus, ∂rπ1 ·
∂rπ2 < 0, implying that we cannot have ∂rπi(t)  0 for both i = 1, 2.
Hence, by Proposition 6.5, I˜(m) = I1(m) ∪ I2(m) must either be empty or contain
only points t where the level curves of πM, π1, and π2 all have identical slopes, which in
turn is trivially ruled out by assumptions (i)—(iii).
37The formulation of part (a) implicitly assumes w.l.o.g. that ∂r(t)πM 	= 0. Note that if ∂r(t)πM =
0, then (A.8) implies ∂r(t)πi = 0, so that ∇πM and ∇πi would need to be collinear to begin with.
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Proof of Proposition 7.1. We ﬁrst show that, as claimed, a mechanism with s1 = 1, p11 =
−p11 = π2, p01 = p02 = 0 will implement any eﬃcient decision. Under such a mechanism,
agent 2 will always get a payoﬀ of U2(t˜2; t2, t1) = π2 no matter what signal t˜2 he sends,
so that truth-telling will always be weakly optimal. Concerning agent 1, observe that
transfers and shares are unaﬀected by any deviations which leave the merger decision
unaﬀected, so that we only need to show incentive compatibility for deviations which
aﬀect the merger decision. Given any (t1, t2), agent 1’s payoﬀ will be πM(t1, t2) − π2
from merging, and π1(t1, t2) from not merging. Hence, agent 1’s gains to merging are
πM(t1, t2) − π1(t1, t2) − π2, which will be positive for any type constellation such that
merging is eﬃcient, and negative for any type constellation such that merging is ineﬃcient.
Hence, under any eﬃcient mechanism, a type such that merging is eﬃcient (given the other
type) will loose from deviating from truth-telling, and so will a type such that no merger
occurs. It is trivially checked that the described mechanism satisﬁes (BB) and (IR).
To prove uniqueness, consider any eﬃcient merger decision m. Since ∇πM and ∇π1
are by assumption not collinear on I∗, Proposition 4.10(a) is applicable with
r(t) = a · [ ∂∂t2πM − ∂∂t2π1,−( ∂∂t1πM − ∂∂t1π1)]T
for some a 	= 0. Calculating the directional derivatives of πM and π1 on I(m) ⊆ I∗ along
r(t) then immediately shows that
∂r(t)π
M = r(t)T∇πM = a · [− ∂∂t2π1 ∂∂t1πM + ∂∂t1π1 ∂∂t2πM] = r(t)T∇π1 = ∂r(t)π1,
so that ∂r(t)πM = ∂r(t)π1 	= 0, where the latter inequality again follows from ∇πM and
∇π1 not being collinear. Hence, we must have s1(t1, t2) = 1 on I(m) ⊆ I∗, and thereby
on M1 by Proposition 4.6.
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Chapter 3
Are There Waves in Merger
Activity After All?
Dennis Ga¨rtner and Daniel Halbheer
1 Introduction
There is broad consensus that mergers occur in waves. Since the seminal contribu-
tion by Nelson (1959), many studies have reported a wave-like pattern in merger
activity, pointing out the merger waves of the mid 1980s and mid 1990s in the US in
particular.1 Guided by these observations, a vast empirical literature has sought to
identify potential causes and triggers for merger waves.2 This empirical strand has
more recently been complemented by eﬀorts to explain the phenomenon of merger
waves in the theoretical literature.3
While the general notion of mergers occurring in waves is practically undisputed,
there is no clear consensus on how to operationalize the concept of a ‘merger wave’
in a time series context. The empirical literature has put forward three distinct
approaches to modeling and identifying such waves. First, Golbe and White (1993)
have sought to identify waves by ﬁtting a sine curve to historic merger data. Second,
merger series have been modeled by autoregressive processes capable of producing
1Studies discussing the 1980s merger wave include Ravenscraft (1987), Golbe and White (1988,
1993), and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996). Mueller (1997), Andrade et al. (2001), and Harford
(2005) describe the 1990s merger wave. An extensive review of earlier merger waves is provided in
Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 154–159).
2See e.g. Ravenscraft (1987), Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001).
Gugler et al. (2005) examine hypotheses that have been put forward as explanations of merger
waves.
3Examples include Fauli-Oller (2000), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004), and Toxvaerd (2004).
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wave-like behavior (Shughart and Tollison, 1984; Clark et al., 1988; Chowdhury,
1993; Barkoulas et al., 2001). Third, and ﬁnally, merger series have been modeled
by means of parameter-switching models where waves in activity are caused by
discrete parameter switches (Town, 1992, Linn and Zhu, 1997).
This paper reexamines the case for detecting waves in merger activity in a time
series context using more recent, consistent data and reﬁned estimation techniques.
Following Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997), we employ a Markov regime switch-
ing model to describe the stochastic behavior of merger activity. We provide a thor-
ough motivation for this approach, starting from Nelson’s (1959, p. 126) observation
that aggregate merger series are characterized by “large bursts of activity separated
by lengthy intervals of very low activity,” which we take to suggest the presence
of two distinct unobserved states of merger activity, ‘high’ and ‘low’. By letting
mean and variance of the autoregressive model be determined by realizations of the
Markov process governing the evolution of the two states, waves are triggered by
switches in the unobserved state. While this approach borrows from Town (1992)
and Linn and Zhu (1997), we propose a slightly modiﬁed formal speciﬁcation in
which the autoregressive processes’ inertia persists also across state switches, lead-
ing merger activity to react less abruptly to such switches. More importantly, we use
new and consistent quarterly time series data covering merger activity both in the
US and the UK, extending from 1973:IV through 2003:IV and from 1969:I through
2003:IV, respectively.4
In this paper, we challenge the notion of the much-discussed 1980s merger wave
in the US. We argue that the discrepancy between our ﬁndings and previous econo-
metric identiﬁcations of this wave is driven by a further distinguishing feature of
our analysis: the use of more recent estimation techniques. To address the central
issue of wave identiﬁcation, we conduct inference on the regime indicator within
a Bayesian framework employing Gibbs sampling techniques (Gelfand and Smith,
1990; Albert and Chib, 1993). In contrast, the aforementioned studies by Town
(1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997) base wave identiﬁcation on Maximum Likelihood
techniques (Hamilton, 1989, 1993). In this latter approach, inference consists in ﬁrst
estimating the model’s unknown parameters via Maximum Likelihood, and then con-
ducting inference on the unobserved state conditional on the parameter estimates.
Bayesian analysis, on the other hand, avoids this two-step procedure by treating
both the model parameters and state variable as random variables and basing in-
ference on states on a joint distribution of parameters and states rather than on a
conditional distribution. This methodological diﬀerence can lead to quite diﬀerent
conclusions regarding the likely path of the unobserved regime indicator if parameter
uncertainty is suﬃciently high, as the uncertainty on parameter estimates does not
4Previous empirical studies examined the merger wave hypothesis using an assemblage of sepa-
rate series diﬀering in coverage and inclusion criteria. For a general discussion of available historical
time series merger data and their limitations, see e.g. Golbe and White (1988).
Chapter 3: Are There Waves in Merger Activity After All? 85
feed into uncertainty on states when employing a two-step estimation procedure.
Our main results are as follows. First, we ﬁnd that the US have witnessed only
the beginning of a wave in merger activity, this wave starting in 1995:IV. This result
is consistent with the observations in Mueller (1997), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001),
and Andrade et al. (2001), all of which report an upsurge in merger activity in the
mid 1990s. However, our investigation of industry level data does not support the
prominent notion that waves in aggregate merger activity represent the clustering
of surges within one or a few industries (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and
Boone, 2000; Andrade et al., 2001; Harford, 2005). Second, even when ﬁtting the
model only to the data prior to the estimated break date, we fail to identify the
much discussed 1980s merger wave. To explain our diﬀerence in ﬁndings, we argue
that if there is suﬃcient uncertainty surrounding the model’s parameters, then the
two-step Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure can convey a deceptive degree
of certainty about state inference. Third, the UK has witnessed two merger waves,
the ﬁrst starting in 1971:I and ending in 1973:IV and the second lasting from 1986:III
to 1989:IV. The dating of these merger waves is close to the evidence reported in
Hughes (1993, p. 16).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy comments
on the data employed. Section 3 provides a thorough motivation of the model. In
Section 4, we describe the inference problem and give a brief introduction to the
Gibbs sampling approach. Section 5 presents the main results of our estimation
both for the US and the UK series. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Data
Our paper follows the majority of previous studies, particularly Town (1992) and
Linn and Zhu (1997), in using the number of transactions as the measure of historical
merger activity.5 Speciﬁcally, we investigate the following series:
(i) The US merger series, covering 1973:I–2003:IV. The time series data are taken
from various issues of Mergerstat Review, a publication by FactSet Mergerstat
LLC. The series reports publicly announced mergers, acquisitions and unit
divestitures involving (i) at least one US company, (ii) a transaction volume
exceeding $1 million, and (iii) a purchase price exceeding 10% of the acquired
company’s equity (i.e., an interest exceeding 10% of the acquired ﬁrm’s equity).
(ii) The UK merger series, covering 1969:I–2003:IV. These data are published by
5Other prominent measures of merger activity suggested in the literature are the dollar value
of merger transactions (see e.g. Golbe and White, 1988, Scherer and Ross (1990) and the number
of transactions relative to appropriate population totals (see e.g. Hughes, 1993, p. 16; Gugler et
al., 2005).
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Figure 1: The Number of Merger Transactions, US Series, 1973:I–2003:IV (in Top
Panel) and UK Series, 1969:I–2003:IV (Bottom Panel).
the Oﬃce for National Statistics on a quarterly basis. The series consists of
publicly announced mergers and acquisitions involving UK companies only. In
contrast to the US data, there is no explicit cut-oﬀ bias relating to the value
of the transaction, but the deal has to aim at gaining de jure control of the
acquired company (i.e., a controlling interest exceeding 50% of the acquired
ﬁrm’s equity).
Plots of these series are presented in Figure 1.
3 A Markov-Switching Model of Merger Waves
As outlined above, the literature has advanced the idea that mergers follow a wave
pattern. We take this casual impression to suggest the presence of two distinct states
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of merger activity, high and low, as follows:6
Assumption 3.1. Each period t is associated with an unobserved latent state vari-
able St ∈ {1, 2}, where St = 1 implies that period t is a low-activity period and
St = 2 denotes a high-activity period.
The basic idea is then to let unobserved switches between states of high and low
activity feed into observed merger activity—in a sense to be made precise shortly—
so as to induce the alleged wave-like behavior. Hence, given Assumption 3.1, the
remaining key questions concerning our description of mergers are: (1) What de-
termines the unobservable state St in any period t, and (2) how exactly do the
unobservable states feed into observed merger activity yt?
The general framework in which we deal with these questions is the Markov
regime switching model originally proposed by Hamilton (1989). In a nutshell, this
approach treats both the sequence of observations yt and the sequence of states St as
(interdependent) random variables, speciﬁes a model which jointly generates the two
sequences, and then estimates the model using the observed series yt while treating
the sequence of states as ‘missing data’. This framework oﬀers several advantages
over more traditional approaches to break-point analysis which typically rely on
casual determination of candidate break-dates or ad hoc restrictions on the number
of break dates (see e.g. Chow, 1960, 1984; Andrews, 1993): First and foremost, a
major goal of our analysis is not only the estimation of regime-dependent structural
model parameters, but dating the waves (i.e. conducting inference on the break
dates themselves). This in turn requires modelling the probability law governing
changes in regime rather than imposing particular break-dates a priori. Through
the probability model, we can then let the data itself speak about the likely incidence
of signiﬁcant changes. Second, we would like to propose a uniﬁed structural process
capable of describing various merger series (such as across countries or industries)
with apparently diﬀerent frequency and timing of waves, which requires that wave
dates be determined endogenously by the process.
More speciﬁcally, concerning the determination of states, we shall assume that
states follow an independent ﬁrst-order Markov process. Thus, in any period t, the
probability of switching to a certain state in the next period t+ 1 depends only on
the state in period t. Speciﬁcally, we assume the following:
Assumption 3.2. The unobserved state variable St follows a ﬁrst-order Markov
process with transition probabilities from any period t to period t+ 1 given by
Pr(St+1 = 1|St = 1) = p11 and Pr(St+1 = 2|St = 2) = p22, (1)
6We shall comment on the idea of using more than two states when discussing our estimation
results further below. Let us just note for now that rasing the number of attainable states invokes
the usual trade-oﬀ between achieving a better ﬁt to the data and overparameterizing the model. As
a consequence, we suggest using the minimal number of states capable of producing the described
behavior in mergers.
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with p11, p22 ∈ [0, 1]. In any period t, these transition probabilities are independent
of past (log) merger realizations (yt, yt−1, . . .).
It is important to note that ‘merger waves’ as we understand and model them
need not display a highly regular periodic pattern. Indeed, the ﬁrst-order Markov
speciﬁcation implies that the process governing the states displays very little mem-
ory. This low-memory approach seems justiﬁed by the aforementioned literature
giving little impression that the documented bursts of high activity display a highly
regular periodic pattern.7 Some structure is of course nonetheless implied by our
Markov speciﬁcation, such as the expected duration of a high state being p22/(1−p22)
and the expected duration of a low state being p11/(1−p11), but these durations gen-
erally display a rather high variability. Furthermore, due to the ﬁrst order Markov
property, the remaining expected duration of a certain state is independent of how
long the process has already been in that state, which again reﬂects the low-memory
quality of the process.
Finally, note that the Markovian model encompasses the extreme possibility of a
state being ‘absorbing’ in the sense that, once the process reaches a certain state, it
remains in that state indeﬁnitely (so that the regime switch is permanent rather than
transitory). This is the case for the low-activity state if p11 = 1 and for the high-
activity state if p22 = 1. Conversely, whenever this is not the case, so p11, p22 < 1
and if in addition p11 + p22 > 0 (so there is no completely deterministic alternation
between states), then the Markov chain turns out to be ergodic (see e.g. Hamilton,
1989). Then, a further key characteristic of the state switching model is given by the
ergodic regime probabilities Pr(St = i), i.e. the unconditional probability of state
i ∈ {1, 2}.8 These can be shown to be given by Pr(St = 1) = (1−p11)/(2−p11−p22)
and Pr(St = 2) = 1− Pr(St = 1).
Let us now turn to the second question concerning the exact form of the state’s
impact on merger activity. We start from the idea that merger activity follows some
sort of mean reverting autoregressive process and augment this by assuming that
both the mean and the variance of this process are time-varying and dependent on
the states.9 Speciﬁcally, we make the following assumption:
7Although Golbe and White (1993) do report evidence of a sine wave pattern in US merger
activity based on data up to 1989, by inspection of the plots in Figure 1 we strongly suspect that
their model would no longer provide a very good ﬁt to our more recent series.
8A convenient way to think of the ergodic probabilities is in terms of the fraction of high and
low states observed in an inﬁnitely long realization of the Markov chain.
9A previous study by Shughart and Tollison (1984) reports little success in describing waves in
merger activity as a standard autoregressive process with constant mean and variance, yt − µ =∑k
i=1 φi(yt−i− µ) + εt with εt ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2), where the wave property would be reﬂected solely
by some of the higher-order autoregressive coeﬃcients φ2, . . . , φk being nonzero. However, such a
speciﬁcation can produce only rather ‘tame’, linear wave-like oscillations, while we suspect that the
large bursts of activity separated by long intervals of low activity identiﬁed in the aforementioned
literature can only be reconciled with a nonlinear model such as ours.
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Assumption 3.3. Conditional on the sequence of unobserved states St, (log) merg-
ers yt follow the AR(k) process
yt − µSt =
k∑
i=1
φi(yt−i − µSt) + εt, (2)
where (i) the εt are independently N(0, σ
2
St
) and independent of previous merger re-
alizations (yt−1, yt−2, . . .), (ii) µSt ∈ {µ1, µ2} and σSt ∈ {σ1, σ2} are determined
by the state in period t, (iii) µ2  µ1, and (iv) the autoregressive coeﬃcients
φ1, φ2, . . . , φk are restricted so that the roots of the associated lag polynomial, φ(L) ≡
1− φ1L− φ2L2 − · · · − φkLk, lie outside the complex unit circle.
We let the idea that St = 2 entails higher activity impose the normalization
µ2  µ1, while σ1 and σ2 are left unrestricted (except for the obvious nonnegativity
requirement). Furthermore, the familiar condition on the autoregressive parameters
φ1, φ2, . . . , φk ensures that the process is in some sense mean reverting, where this
mean however depends on the state sequence. Put somewhat diﬀerently, the con-
dition ensures that the only source of non-stationarity is through switches in the
regime (i.e. given a constant sequence of states, St = i for all t and i ∈ {1, 2}, yt
follows a stationary process).10
Speciﬁcation (2) diﬀers in a small but important way from Hamilton’s (1989)
original speciﬁcation,
yt − µSt =
k∑
i=1
φi(yt−i − µSt−i) + εt, (3)
which has been the workhorse model in the literature on mean and variance switching
Markov models and also happens to be the model used by Town (1992) and Linn and
Zhu (1997) to describe mergers in particular. The subtle but important diﬀerence is
that speciﬁcation (2) assumes ‘sluggish’ adjustments of the merger series to a state
switch, whereas by speciﬁcation (3), state switches cause an immediate full shift in
activity. To see this, observe that in speciﬁcation (2), what systematically aﬀects
today’s deviation from the mean, yt − µSt , is a weighted sum of past deviations
from the current mean, yt−i − µSt , whereas in speciﬁcation (3), today’s deviation is
determined by past deviations from the contemporaneous mean, yt−i − µSt−i . Thus,
10The literature has also proposed non-mean reverting processes such as random walks to describe
merger activity (see e.g. Chowdhury, 1993). Even though standard tests reject the unit root
hypothesis for our UK merger series, this is indeed not the case for the US series. However, it is a
well understood fact that in general, unit-root tests have very little power over Markov-switching
alternatives (see e.g. Nelson et al., 2001), so that such tests do not invalidate our proposed model.
Furthermore, if we perform the unit root tests using only US data prior to 1995:III (which amounts
to discarding little more than a quarter of the data), the unit root hypothesis is clearly rejected.
We take this as evidence favoring our Markov-switching model over the random walk hypothesis.
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the two models imply rather diﬀerent dynamic consequences of a shift in regime.
This is most eﬀectively illustrated by setting k = 1 in both (2) and (3) above and
considering a permanent shift from state 1 to state 2 between dates t and t + 1.
According to speciﬁcation (3), the switch to state 2 at date t raises the value of any
subsequent yt+j (j  0) by µ2 − µ1 over its respective value if no state-switch had
occurred. In model (2), on the other hand, the impact of the state switch at t only
raises subsequent yt+j by (1−φj1)(µ2−µ1)  µ2−µ1 for any j  0.11 Hence, model
(3) suggests that the merger series immediately jumps toward the new mean after
a state switch, whereas model (2) describes a more gradual, ‘sluggish’ gravitation
toward the new mean. Note however that the diﬀerence of the state switch’s impact
between the models disappears as j rises, so that the models diﬀer most markedly
during the adjustment period.
We favor speciﬁcation (2) over (3) for two somewhat interrelated reasons. First,
casual inspection of real merger data suggests that the transition to a signiﬁcantly
higher (or lower) level of merger activity is indeed sluggish rather than immediate.
Second, perhaps contrary to other common applications of mean switching models,
there seems to be no intuitive reason to suggest that the merger process does not
display the same amount of inertia when switching to a high or low activity state as
within a given state. Indeed, if for instance we suspect the sluggishness in merger
series to be a consequence of the fact that real world mergers may take considerable
time to process (due to preparation, approval, etc.), thereby causing sluggish ad-
justment to any unobserved structural shocks, then this sluggishness should persist
also when the economy moves to a generally higher or lower level of activity (i.e.
when it is hit by a ‘large’ shock).12 For these reasons, we shall employ speciﬁcation
(2) for the remainder of our analysis.13
As a ﬁnal remark, we should point out that more generally, mean and variance
switching is not the only way in which high and low activity states may be thought
to aﬀect mergers. For instance, an alternative speciﬁcation might have states impact
only the growth rate rather than the mean level of the merger series.14 However,
we view the mean-switching speciﬁcation as closest in spirit to the wave notion
developed in the literature. What may nonetheless seem somewhat extreme at ﬁrst
sight is that our mean switching model appears to posit that waves always have the
11 Recall that in an AR(1) model, |φ1| < 1 by the restriction on the autoregressive coeﬃcients
in Assumption 3.3.
12This argument can be formalized by noting that speciﬁcation (2) can be interpreted as a
standard AR(k) model where the state only aﬀects the distribution of the error term. This can
be seen by rewriting model (2) as yt =
∑k
i=1 φiyt−i + ε˜t, ε˜t ∼ N(µ˜St , σ2St), where µ˜St =
(
1 −∑k
i=1 φi
)
µSt .
13As shown in the Appendix, a nice technical side-eﬀect of using speciﬁcation (2) is that inference
on states does not involve an approximation (see e.g. Kim and Nelson, 1999, pp. 68–70).
14For instance, Owen (2004) pursues such an idea for UK mergers by ﬁtting a three-state mean
switching Markov model to the diﬀerenced level data ∆yt ≡ yt − yt−1.
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same magnitude (or, stated diﬀerently, the described ‘bursts of activity’ always have
the same magnitude).15 However, we would like to argue that empirically, a major
task in identifying waves is being able to tell actual waves from smaller ‘ripples’,
and a straightforward way to accomplish this is to posit that waves always have a
certain height. We will return to this point in our discussion of the 80s merger wave
in Section 5.3.
4 Estimation Techniques
We estimate the model parameters and the path of the latent Markov switch-
ing regime indicator within a Bayesian framework employing Markov chain Monte
Carlo simulation methods. Letting β ≡ (µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, φ1, φ2, . . . , φk, p, q) denote
the model’s parameters, letting YT = (y1, y2, . . . , yT ) denote the data observed, and
letting ST ≡ (S1, S2, . . . , ST ) denote the unobserved sequence of states, Bayesian
inference in our model takes the form of using the data YT and the model speci-
ﬁed in Section 3 to map a given prior distribution of parameters, p(β), into a joint
posterior distribution of states and parameters, p(ST ,β|YT ).
Rather than investigating p(ST ,β|YT ) analytically, Markov chain Monte Carlo
methods provide a simple way of simulating draws from this distribution. We use
a particular form of these methods, the Gibbs sampling technique, which is an
iterative scheme based on simulating successive draws from the conditional posterior
distributions of the state vector ST and the appropriately partitioned parameter
vector β:
(i) p(ST |β,YT )
(ii) p(p|µ,σ,φ,ST ,YT )
(iii) p(µ|σ,φ,p,ST ,YT )
(iv) p(σ|µ,φ,p,ST ,YT )
(v) p(φ|µ,σ,p,ST ,YT ),
where µ ≡ (µ1, µ2), σ ≡ (σ1, σ2), φ ≡ (φ1, φ2, . . . , φk), and p ≡ (p11, p22).16
In contrast to the full posterior p(ST ,β|YT ), each of the marginal posterior
distributions (i)–(v) can be handled analytically. Simulated draws from (i)–(v) are
thus easily obtained, and the Gibbs sampler provides a way of iterating on such draws
to simulate draws from the full posterior p(ST ,β|YT ). We oﬀer the details of the
15Note that in our model with sluggish adjustment to the mean, this is only strictly true in
expectation for waves having the same duration. If the process is sluggish, then the shorter a
wave, the lower its peak.
16For a general introduction to Gibbs sampling, readers are referred to Geman and Geman (1984)
and Gelfand and Smith (1990). A textbook treatment of the method can also be found in Kim
and Nelson (1999).
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sampling procedure and the straightforward derivation of the posterior distributions
(i)–(v) in the Appendix.
Given the tool to generate representative sets of draws from p(ST ,β|YT ), prop-
erties of this distribution such as individual parameters’ marginal distributions
and moments are easily characterized by use of their sample equivalents. To ad-
dress the central issue of wave identiﬁcation, we will be particularly interested in
Pr(St = 2|YT ), the posterior probability of being in a high merger activity state
at any date t. These probabilities are obtained by averaging across the simulated
paths for the states, each simulated while cycling through the above posterior dis-
tributions.
Basing state inference on Pr(St = 2|YT ), while natural in the Bayesian framework
of Gibbs Sampling, elegantly overcomes a potential pitfall to classical inference. In
a classical setting, inference on states is obtained through a two-step procedure by
ﬁrst obtaining a Maximum Likelihood parameter estimate βˆ, and then calculating
Pr(St = 2|YT , βˆ), the probability of St = 2 in any period t under the assumption
that βˆ corresponds to the true parameter values.17 From a Bayesian perspective,
the derived inference on states is thus to be read as contingent on the econometri-
cian having full conﬁdence in his parameter estimate βˆ. But only rarely will this
correspond to the econometrician’s true conﬁdence in βˆ. Moreover, alternative con-
ceivable values of β will typically lead to diﬀerent values of Pr(St = 2|YT ,β), so
that uncertainty about β will feed into uncertainty on states. As a result, basing
state inference on Pr(St = 2|YT , βˆ) rather than on Pr(St = 2|YT ) can convey a false
degree of certainty about states by neglecting uncertainty about parameters.
To make this important point more transparent, note that Pr(St = 2|YT ) and
Pr(St = 2|YT , βˆ) are related by
Pr(St = 2|YT ) =
∫
Pr(St = 2|YT ;β)p(β|YT )dβ, (4)
where p(β|YT ) denotes the posterior density of the parameter vector. By (4), our
Bayesian inference based on Pr(St = 2|YT ) can be interpreted as considering Pr(St =
2|YT ;β) for any conceivable parameter constellation β—that is, for the maximum
likelihood estimate βˆ in particular, but also for any other conceivable β—, weighting
it with the respective posterior probability of β, and adding up across β to produce
Pr(St = 2|YT ). It is straightforward to see from (4) that if posterior parameter
uncertainty is suﬃciently high and conditional inference on St is suﬃciently sensitive
to β, then Pr(St = 2|YT , βˆ) can diﬀer substantially from Pr(St = 2|YT ). We will
provide an impressive illustration of this diﬀerence below in our investigation of US
merger activity, where we shall in fact argue that this methodological point is likely
to have played a substantial role in previous identiﬁcations of a 1980s merger wave.
17For details on standard maximum likelihood methods, refer to Hamilton (1989, 1993).
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5 Estimation Results
This section reports the results of ﬁtting our lagged mean and variance switching
model as given by Assumptions 3.1 through 3.3 to US and UK log merger series.18
In a ﬁrst step, Section 5.1 analyzes the entire quarterly US merger series from 1973
through 2003. Its main ﬁnding, the identiﬁcation of a wave beginning in the mid
1990s, is augmented by a look at industry level data in Section 5.2. In a second step,
to investigate the lack of evidence for an 1980s merger wave in more detail, Section
5.3 reestimates the model using only data up to 1995. Section 5.4 argues that in so
doing, the estimation techniques described in Section 4 play a decisive role. Finally,
Section 5.5 oﬀers a shift of focus to the UK by ﬁtting the model to the quarterly
UK merger series spanning 1969 through 2003.
As outlined, inference is conducted in a Bayesian context using the Gibbs sam-
pling method to derive posterior distributions of the model parameters and to assess
the sequence of unobserved states. In all cases, Gibbs sampling involved 20,000 it-
erations, where a burn-in sequence consisting of the ﬁrst 1,000 draws was discarded
prior to any inference. Output of the sampler was closely monitored to ensure proper
convergence of the ﬁlter.
5.1 The Tidal Wave of the Mid 1990s:
US Mergers, Full Series 1973:I through 2003:IV
First, we consider the full series on US mergers over the entire available time span
from 1973:I through 2003:IV, as presented in Figure 1. Preliminary estimation of
the model with various lag lengths k suggested setting k = 4.
For all model parameters, Table 1 gives summary statistics both on the priors
used and on the marginal posterior distributions obtained. The priors on all pa-
rameters where chosen to be relatively uninformative within the class of admissible
conjugate priors (which are: normal distributions for the parameters µSt and φi, in-
verted gamma distributions for σ2St , and beta distributions for p11 and p22). To give
an impression of the posterior parameter distributions beyond the mere summary
statistics, Figure 2 plots histograms representing the estimated marginal posterior
distributions of the parameters. Despite our focus on Bayesian inference, Table 1
also gives maximum likelihood point estimates of all parameters in the last column.
The ﬁrst feature obvious from Table 1 is that the data indeed leads to signiﬁ-
18The main reason for using log rather than level merger data is that all series considered are
nonnegative by construction. Strictly speaking, the model as deﬁned by (1) and (2) therefore
provides no valid description of the level series due to its capability of producing negative obser-
vations. However, all subsequent inference was nonetheless also conducted after ﬁtting the level
merger data to the model. Qualitative results, speciﬁcally concerning inference on states, diﬀer
only little from those obtained for the log merger series. Any remaining noteworthy diﬀerences are
explicitly pointed out in the subsequent discussion.
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priors posteriors ML
mean std mean median std 95%-band MLE
µ1 6.7 1000.00 6.386 6.390 0.083 ( 6.204, 6.538) 6.3959
µ2 6.7 1000.00 7.687 7.677 0.103 ( 7.510, 7.924) 7.6653
σ1 0.2 0.28 0.137 0.136 0.008 ( 0.123, 0.153) 0.1320
σ2 0.2 0.28 0.096 0.095 0.010 ( 0.079, 0.118) 0.0834
φ1 0.0 1.00 0.683 0.683 0.098 ( 0.488, 0.874) 0.6578
φ2 0.0 1.00 0.063 0.063 0.113 (−0.159, 0.287) 0.0538
φ3 0.0 1.00 −0.114 −0.114 0.112 (−0.334, 0.103) −0.1136
φ4 0.0 1.00 0.146 0.145 0.085 (−0.021, 0.313) 0.1386
p11 0.9 0.21 0.987 0.991 0.012 ( 0.955, 1.000) 0.9886
p22 0.9 0.21 0.997 1.000 0.010 ( 0.969, 1.000) 1.0000
Note: Result of 20,000 Gibbs-Sampling iterations, iterations 1,000 through 20,000 used for
inference. 95%-band refers to 95% posterior probability bands.
Table 1: Estimation Results for US Merger Activity, 1973:I through 2003:IV.
cant updates in the priors on all parameters, as shown by direct comparison of the
standard deviations of priors and posteriors. Furthermore, Figure 2 reveals that
the corresponding marginal posterior distributions are single peaked and well be-
haved. As may have been expected from a glance at the original data, comparing
the posteriors for µ1 and µ2 reveals that mean log merger activity in the high state
2 signiﬁcantly exceeds that in the low state 1.
Although not literally interpretable as state-contingent means of the untrans-
formed series due to the nonlinear log transformation, the median values of exp(µ1)
and exp(µ2) suggest that in level terms, merger activity in the low and high activity
state are in the region of 596 and 2,160 mergers per quarter, respectively. Further-
more, log mergers seem to be signiﬁcantly less volatile in the high activity state,
as shown by a comparison of the posteriors on σ1 and σ2. Again however, caution
is called for when drawing conclusions concerning the volatility of the level merger
series, as the log transformation compresses diﬀerences at higher absolute levels of
activity. Indeed, ﬁtting the model to the level merger data suggests that in level
terms, mergers are signiﬁcantly more volatile in the high-activity state. Next, esti-
mates on the autoregressive coeﬃcients φi show that mergers display a considerable
degree of inertia also within states. Moreover, mean and median of the largest root
across samples both ﬁgure at 0.84, suggesting a signiﬁcant degree of intertia in the
merger series. Finally, the posteriors on the transition probabilities p11 and p22 let
us conclude that switches in regime are rather unlikely. Speciﬁcally, the median
expected duration of a low activity state, p11/(1 − p11) is approximately 27 years
(mean expected duration is heavily inﬂuenced by the skewness in the posterior on q
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Figure 2: Marginal Posterior Distributions of Parameters for US Log Merger Series
1973:I–2003:IV.
and lies around 133 years). Conversely, estimates on p22 show that the high activity
state seems to be essentially absorbing, so that a regime of high merger activity is
unlikely ever to be left again—this result being driven, of course, by the fact that
there does not seem to have been a single reversion from high to low activity in the
series so far. Finally, for the ergodic probability of being in a high state (uncondi-
tional on the data), Pr(St = 2) = (1 − p22)/(2 − p11 − p22), the mean posterior is
86.5%, whereas the median is 99.7%.
With these results on the model’s parameters in mind, let us now return to our
main objective, the identiﬁcation of waves in mergers. Figure 3 plots the probability
of being in a high state in any period t given the observed US merger data, Pr(St =
2|YT ). This probability plot is shown in the top panel of Figure 3, whereas the
bottom panel reproduces the underlying log merger series (along with the posterior
median of µ1 and µ2 as dashed horizontal lines) for convenience. To highlight the
most likely state for any period t, periods for which Pr(St = 2|YT ) > 0.5 are shaded.
However, any interpretation of this ‘best guess’ should take account of the underlying
value of Pr(St = 2|YT ) as a straightforward measure of conﬁdence in this guess: The
closer Pr(St = 2|YT ) to 0.5, the more uncertainty surrounds the best guess.
Figure 3 shows that our estimation produces strikingly clear inference concerning
the unobserved state. First, we ﬁnd compelling evidence that over the entire period
between 1973 and 2003, US merger activity has in fact experienced only a single
regime switch, that switch being from low to high activity. Cast into the wave
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Figure 3: Estimated Probability of Being in State of High Merger Activity, US
Log Merger Series 1973:I–2003:IV (in Top Panel, Bottom Panel displays Log Merger
Series).
terminology, this suggests that since 1973, the US have so far witnessed only the
beginning of a single ‘tidal wave’ in merger activity. Second, while this observation
alone may come as no major surprise given a glance at the log merger plot, the
clear-cut jump in the probability plot also allows us to date the beginning of this
tidal wave rather precisely. Speciﬁcally, the assessed probability of a high state of
merger activity jumps from 0.189 in 1995:II and 0.375 in 1995:III to a value of 0.920
in 1995:IV. We may thus conclude that the wave in US merger activity is very likely
to have been triggered between the third and fourth quarter of 1995.19
Rounding up, we should stress three points relevant to the interpretation of
these results. First, as pointed out in Section 4, using Pr(St = 2|YT )—rather than
Pr(St = 2|YT , βˆ) for a point estimate of the parameters βˆ—means taking account
of uncertainty about the model’s structural parameters for the inference on states.
19Speciﬁcally, the probability of the US having witnessed a single state switch from low to high
between 1995:III and 1995:IV (rather than at any other date) can be calculated at 54.2%, which
is contrasted by the probability of a corresponding single switch one quarter earlier (i.e. between
1995:II and 1995:III) of 18.5%, of 3.7% two quarters earlier, and 7.5% one quarter later.
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It is all the more noteworthy that Figure 3 conveys an appreciably clear message
concerning the likely sequence of states. Second, although we shall more thoroughly
investigate the failure to identify the hump in merger activity around the mid 1980s
as a wave in a moment in Section 5.3, let us note for now that this result is even
more clear-cut when ﬁtting the state-switching model to the level rather than the
log-merger data. Intuitively, this is due to the simple fact that the log transformation
exaggerates the mid 1980s hump in merger activity relative to the level data. Finally,
we should point out our estimation procedure’s weakness in producing inference on
states at the very beginning of the series: For technical reasons, inference on states
actually begins only in 1974:I (rather than in 1973:I), and inference on states in
these early periods is generally somewhat sensitive to starting values used.20
5.2 Reﬂections of the US 1990s Wave at the Industry Level
As a prominent explanation of the clustering of merger activity in time, the literature
has advanced the idea that surges in aggregate merger activity represent ﬁrms’
optimal responses to industry-level shocks.21 According to this hypothesis, waves
in merger activity at the aggregate level will be the result of temporary surges in
merger activity in one or a few industries. Concerning our above ﬁndings, this
naturally raises the question of whether the marked increase in US merger activity
in the mid 1990s was dominated by any speciﬁc industries. While the available data
do not permit us to estimate our model at the industry level, casual investigation of
annual industry level data suggests that the mid 1990s wave is hardly attributable
to one or a few industries alone.
To this end, of the 50 industries identiﬁed by the Mergerstat Review , Figure 4
plots annual merger data for those eleven US industries with the strongest merger
activity between 1990 and 2003, where industries were ranked according to overall
activity (in terms of numbers of mergers) for that period. While Figure 4 shows
that industries were certainly not uniformly hit by a wave in 1995, it is nevertheless
20To understand the ﬁrst point, note that our estimation of an AR(k) model takes the ﬁrst
k observations of yt as exogenously given, which is why inference on states begins in 1974:I.
Concerning the second point, inferring states by means of the Hamilton ﬁlter requires specifying
the initial exogenous probability of being in a high activity state, Pr(S0 = 2|β; y−k+1, . . . , y0). All
inference shown was produced using an uninformative but nonetheless somewhat arbitrary initial
probability of 0.5, although simulations with alternative initial probabilities were run to check the
results for robustness. Speciﬁcally, for the full US merger series considered here, results turn out
to be very robust despite the relatively high level of merger activity at the very beginning of the
series. Intuitively, this stems from the fact that, even though the data suggests that the US may
have been in a high level of merger activity immediately prior to 1973, the strong downward trend
at the beginning of the sampling period clearly leads us to conclude that the US economy must
nevertheless have already found itself in a low state of merger activity at the time our inference on
states begins.
21See for instance Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Andrade et al.
(2001), and Harford (2005).
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Figure 4: Annual US Industry Level Merger Activity, 1990 through 2003 (Source:
Mergerstat Review).
apparent that the resulting aggregate wave is anything but the result of a single
industry level burst. For instance, the largest industry level share in overall annual
merger activity was in Computer Software, Supplies and Services at its pronounced
peak in 2000, with a share of 26%. Although signiﬁcant, such shares still make it
impossible to explain the pronounced jump in aggregate mergers—from around 600
per quarter before the wave to over 2,000 thereafter—as caused only by a small
subset of industries. Furthermore, as the bottom right plot in Figure 4 shows, even
after removing the 11 most active industries (which account for 52% to 66% of
annual merger activity between 1990 and 2003), residual merger activity still gives
a strong impression of a mid 1990s merger wave.
5.3 What ever happened to the 1980s Merger Wave?
US Mergers 1973:I through 1995:III
One of the most striking ﬁndings in Section 5.1 has been our failure to identify even
the faintest hint of the much-discussed 1980s merger wave. Indeed, a simple look at
the log merger series depicted in Figure 3 may indeed raise questions about there
being something less pronounced—but nonetheless ‘wave-like’—about the visible
hump in merger activity in the mid 1980s.
As pointed out previously, an arguably rather strong assumption implicit in our
two-state model is that waves always come in similar sizes (where ‘size’ refers to a
wave’s peak height). Along these lines, a perfectly valid reservation with our result
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priors posteriors ML
mean std mean median std 95%-band MLE
µ1 6.4 1000.00 5.804 6.274 1.179 (2.467, 6.451) 6.3129
µ2 6.4 1000.00 6.604 6.588 0.206 (6.323, 7.037) 6.7007
σ1 0.1 0.14 0.125 0.128 0.036 (0.053, 0.200) 0.1222
σ2 0.1 0.14 0.105 0.105 0.030 (0.055, 0.161) 0.0753
φ1 0.0 1.00 0.704 0.728 0.136 (0.399, 0.932) 0.4655
p11 0.9 0.21 0.736 0.890 0.292 (0.078, 1.000) 0.9495
p22 0.9 0.21 0.793 0.907 0.252 (0.115, 1.000) 0.8518
Note: Result of 20,000 Gibbs-Sampling iterations, iterations 1,000 through 20,000 used
for inference. 95%-band refers to 95% posterior probability bands.
Table 2: Estimation Results for US Merger Activity, 1973:I through 1995:III.
might be that, even if US merger activity between 1973 and 2003 was dominated by
a single gigantic tidal wave in the mid 1990s, the assumption of similarly-sized waves
downplays the importance of underlying, less gigantic, but nonetheless signiﬁcant
and perhaps more regular wave-like merger activity.
As a straightforward way to investigate this possibility, this section presents
estimates for the two-state model using only the data prior to the estimated break
date which started the tidal wave, i.e. from 1973:I through 1995:III. Note that this
corresponds to discarding little more than a quarter of the full series, which should
leave us with suﬃcient data points to identify waves. Table 2 gives the parameter
estimates resulting from ﬁtting an AR(1) model. Comparison with estimation results
from the full series in Table 1 shows that parameter inference is rather imprecise for
the subsample. Figure 5 again shows the inferred probabilities of being in a high
activity state for this particular subsample period. By comparison with the clear-
cut result presented in Figure 3 for the entire sample period, Figure 5 suggests that
waves are rather hard to identify in the merger data up to 1995:III. Although the
plot does indeed hint at a somewhat increased probability of a high activity state
around the mid 1980s (as well as around the mid 1990s as a warm-up to the ensuing
large wave), this hint remains very faint due to the fact that, except for a short
period around 1987, the probability of a high activity state stays in a rather tight
band around 0.5. Overall, the fact that the inferred probability of a high activity
state, Pr(St = 2|YT ), stays far clear of either 0 or 1 implies that the data reaches
no clear conclusion concerning a likely sequence of states.22
22An alternative approach would be to extend our two-state model by introducing a third state,
thereby explicitly allowing for both ‘medium’ and ‘high’ waves. However, casual inspection of
the series strongly suggests that in such a three-state model, all quarters following 1995:III would
rather clearly be associated with the ‘high wave state’, leading to inference on ‘low’ vs. ‘medium’
state comparable to the two-state analysis presented in this section.
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Figure 5: Estimated Probability of Being in State of High Merger Activity, US
Log Merger Series 1973:I–1995:III (in Top Panel, Bottom Panel displays Log Merger
Series).
This indecision in state inference is a ﬁrst clear indication that the US have not
witnessed a change in the mean level of merger activity at all during the 1980s.23
A second striking feature of the probability plot in Figure 5 is its strong qualitative
similarity with the underlying time series of log mergers, reproduced in the bottom
panel of Figure 5. Indeed, the high-activity estimate in the top panel comes quite
close to representing a positive aﬃne transformation of the log merger series in the
bottom panel. This is something we should expect to see from ﬁtting a regime
switching model to a series generated by a process with no actual switch in regime.
Third, Albert and Chib (1993) point out that ﬁtting a Markov switching model to
non-switching data results in rather large posterior bands on parameters, particu-
23Note that in ﬁnite samples, given the data YT , P(St = 2|YT ) will of course generally deviate
from 0.5 for any t even if the data were indeed generated by a stationary autoregressive process
with no change in regime (i.e., a process with µ1 = µ2 and σ1 = σ2) due to remaining posterior
uncertainty about the model parameters. Sample runs of the Gibbs Sampler on simulated data
involving no regime change (and parameter values similar to those inferred for US mergers) revealed
pictures quite similar to Figure 5.
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Figure 6: Mean Residuals (with 95% Posterior Bands) for US Log Merger Series
1973:I–2003:IV.
larly concerning the means µ1 and µ2 and the transition probabilities p11 and p22,
which is reﬂected in our results. Finally and perhaps most importantly, inference
runs with simulated data show the posterior distributions of µ2 − µ1 for our US
subsample to be quite comparable to the posterior distributions of µ2−µ1 resulting
from simulated series with similar but constant model parameter values (i.e. a series
with no state switch).
In sum, therefore, we ﬁnd little evidence in support of the notion of a 1980s
merger wave even in the truncated series. It is important however to be clear about
the exact meaning of this result, as it does not contradict of course the 1980s having
witnessed somewhat increased merger activity. What our result ﬂeshes out is that
this increased activity is rather unlikely to have been associated with a nonlinear
shift in regime to the underlying autoregressive process (i.e. a ‘burst in activity’,
such as the boom following 1995:III). Rather, it appears to be quite compatible
with regular, well-behaved random shocks hitting a stationary linear autoregressive
process. This is perhaps best illustrated by Figure 6, which plots the mean residuals
(i.e. estimates of εt) resulting from the original estimation of the model over the
full data range from 1973:I through 2003:IV.24 Overall, these residuals appear well-
behaved and compatible with our model assumptions of serial independence and
normality. Nonetheless, one might indeed see the ﬁrst half of the 1980s as having
been hit by a sequence of slightly above-average shocks which—ampliﬁed by the
processes’ strong positive autocorrelation—have given rise to a period of somewhat
increased merger activity. We argue, however, that this is compatible with the usual
behavior of a stationary autoregressive process rather than signifying a non-linear
burst such as a discrete switch in mean over that period. In other words, in terms
24Recall that in a Bayesian estimation context, we consider posterior (i.e. ‘updated’) distributions
of the parameters rather than particular point estimates. Thus, the resulting residuals themselves
are random not only due to uncertainty about the unobservable state, but also due to posterior
parameter uncertainty. Figure 6 displays both the mean and 95% posterior probability bands for
the residual in any period.
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of our regime switching model of waves, we would like to suggest that the 1980s
merger wave symbolized a ‘ripple’ rather than a real wave.
5.4 Parameter Uncertainty Matters:
(Mis)identifying the 1980s Wave
The preceding section has thoroughly discussed our ﬁnding that, in contrast to
the 1990s merger wave, the increased merger activity in the 1980s constituted no
extraordinary burst in activity. This leaves unexplained, however, why the afore-
mentioned studies by Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997), both of which similarly
ﬁt a two-state mean-switching Markov model to US merger data, have identiﬁed an
1980s merger wave nonetheless.
Candidate reasons for this diﬀerence are manifold, as the studies diﬀer in the
particular series used, the time span considered, and details in model speciﬁcation.
As this section argues, however, the main diﬀerence in our interpretation of the
1980s merger wave is likely to stem from a more subtle, methodological reason: the
reﬁned methods of inference oﬀered by the Gibbs sampling approach.
Recall that by means of this approach, our inference on regimes as presented
in Figures 3 and 5 is based on Pr(St = 2|YT ). This contrasts with Town’s (1992)
and Linn and Zhu’s (1997) inference based essentially on Pr(St = 2|YT ; βˆ), the
likelihood of a high state of merger activity while treating the underlying model
parameters as given by the result of a preceding maximum likelihood estimation.
Put diﬀerently, previous studies have asked the following question: Given that we
believe the obtained parameter estimates to correspond to the true parameter values,
what is the likelihood of a high-activity state in any period? What this question
obviously forgets to ask is just how reliable these parameter estimates actually are.
Thus, if parameter estimates involve a high degree of uncertainty, answers to this
question can severely overstate the evidence in favor of a high state of activity, and
this appears to be highly relevant to the discussion of the 1980s merger wave.
To drive this point home, using our data spanning 1973:I through 1995:III, we
have replicated the procedure in Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997) by calculating
the probability of a high activity state while holding the model parameters ﬁxed at
their maximum likelihood estimates reported in Table 2. Figure 7 plots the results.
Clearly, by comparison with Figure 5, neglecting parameter uncertainty both leads
to considerably more clear-cut inference on regimes and accentuates evidence for a
high state of activity in the 1980s. Interestingly, the resulting sharp identiﬁcation
of a merger wave lasting from late 1984 to late 1986 is not very far from ﬁndings
in Town (1992), who identiﬁes 1986:IV as a period of intense merger activity, and
ﬁndings in Linn and Zhu (1997), who identify the ‘mid-to-late 1980s’ as a merger
wave.
Chapter 3: Are There Waves in Merger Activity After All? 103
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P(
S_
t=2
)
Figure 7: Probability of Being in High State of Merger Activity, US Log Merger
Series 1973:I–1995:III, Calculated at Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates.
5.5 But Waves Do Exist: The UK Merger Wave Experience
Next, we inspect the UK merger series, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1,
for its wave-like behavior. Analyzing the UK series turns out to be rewarding not
only from the point of view of understanding UK merger activity, but also as a
more general validation of our proposed Markov switching merger model and the
wave hypothesis in particular. Indeed, the preceding analysis of the US merger data
may be seen as somewhat disappointing as regards the wave hypothesis: While the
proposed model itself does seem to provide a very good description of the US data,
it does so in a fashion that hardly reﬂects the repeated bursts of activity attributed
to mergers by the literature—namely by identifying only a single switch from low
to high activity around the mid 1990s, but no subsequent reversion to low activity,
let alone a second or even a third wave. Given the limitation of our analysis to
the last 30 years of US merger activity, this ﬁnding is of course not an invalidation
of the wave hypothesis per se. However, the idea of a wave-like process governing
US mergers would certainly be reinforced by observing more complete and possibly
repeated wave cycles in other series such as the UK’s.
To analyze the UK data, we estimate an AR(1)-version of the model in Section
3. Table 3 reports summary statistics on both the priors used and on the estimated
posterior distributions of the parameters. As with the full US series, the UK series
permits a signiﬁcant update on the model parameters’ priors, shown by the marginal
posteriors’ standard deviation and posterior bands. Again, the inferred high activity
mean µ2 signiﬁcantly exceeds the low activity mean µ1. Interestingly, the ratio of
high to low activity (in log terms) seems comparable across the US and the UK,
as the high activity mean µ2 exceeds the low activity mean µ1 by an average (and
mean) 20% for both series. Also, shocks to UK mergers again appear to be less
volatile in the high activity state, although this is much less signiﬁcantly so than
for the full US series (as would be expected, ﬁtting the model to the untransformed
data reveals much higher volatility in the high than in the low activity state). The
104 5 Estimation Results
priors posteriors ML
mean std mean median std 95%-band MLE
µ1 5.00 1000.00 4.789 4.823 0.342 (4.655, 4.957) 4.8328
µ2 5.00 1000.00 5.756 5.781 0.325 (5.057, 6.037) 5.8324
σ1 0.15 0.21 0.193 0.193 0.020 (0.141, 0.225) 0.1915
σ2 0.15 0.21 0.173 0.169 0.033 (0.126, 0.255) 0.1497
φ1 0.00 1.00 0.603 0.583 0.105 (0.455, 0.896) 0.5511
p11 0.90 0.21 0.973 0.985 0.067 (0.892, 0.999) 0.9810
p22 0.90 0.21 0.908 0.928 0.094 (0.724, 0.991) 0.9061
Note: Result of 20,000 Gibbs-Sampling iterations, iterations 1,000 through 20,000 used
for inference. 95%-band refers to 95% posterior probability bands.
Table 3: Estimation Results for UK Merger Activity, 1969:I through 2003:IV.
estimate of φ1 suggests that autocorrelation in the UK series is signiﬁcantly positive
and again quite comparable to the degree observed in the US data. Finally, however,
the unobserved state is more likely to change in any period for the UK series, as
shown by the posteriors on p11 and p22. Particularly, the median expected duration
of a low activity state is 16 years whereas the median expected duration of a high
activity state is 13 quarters in the UK. Concerning the ergodic probability of being
in a high state (unconditional on the data), Pr(St = 2), the mean posterior is 22.9%,
whereas the median is 17.0%.
Next, Figure 8 shows the estimated probabilities of being in a high activity
state for the UK merger series. The probability plot shows strong evidence that
the UK has witnessed two distinct merger waves between 1969 and 2003. The ﬁrst
wave seems to have lasted from 1971:I through 1973:IV. Due to the aforementioned
inference problems at the beginning of the series as well as because the merger series
seems somewhat ‘undecided’ prior to 1971, we cannot precisely date the beginning
of the ﬁrst wave. Indeed, our inference leaves open to some extent whether the UK
started oﬀ in a high or low activity state in 1969.25 It appears quite clear, however,
that this ﬁrst wave found its end in 1973:IV, as Pr(St = 2|y˜T ) drops from 0.836 in
1973:IV to 0.066 in 1874:I. The second wave in turn is reliably estimated to have
started in 1986:III and ended in 1989:IV (the probability of a high state jumps from
0.320 in 1986:II to 0.955 in 1986:III and dips from 0.936 in 1989:IV to 0.109 in
1990:I).
25In fact, by investigating annual data, Hughes (1993, p. 17) argues that merger activity culmi-
nates in twin peaks of activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Figure 8: Estimated Probability of Being in State of High Merger Activity, UK
Log Merger Series 1969:I–2003:IV (in Top Panel, Bottom Panel displays Log Merger
Series).
6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to revisit quantitative evidence on the merger wave
hypothesis. Using a model of Markovian parameter switching, recent merger data
and reﬁned methods of inference, we have sought to identify and date waves in
merger activity. A key ﬁnding has been that, concerning merger activity in the US
and the UK over the past 30 years, the interpretation of merger activity as a mean
and variance switching autoregressive process provides a promising quantitative op-
erationalization of the wave hypothesis.
Moreover, ﬁtting such a model to the data has produced the following merger
wave chronology: First, since the beginning of our US series in 1973, the US appear
to have witnessed only the beginning of a single large merger wave, this wave having
been kicked oﬀ between the third and fourth quarter of 1995. Particularly, as a
second major result and in contrast to other recent empirical work, we ﬁnd very
little evidence for the much discussed 1980s merger wave. We have argued that
there is a methodological reason for this discrepancy in ﬁndings, as less reﬁned
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inference methods which neglect parameter uncertainty are likely to have played
a signiﬁcant role in the econometric misidentiﬁcation of 1980s merger activity as a
wave. Third, ﬁtting our model to UK merger activity between 1969 and 2003 clearly
identiﬁes two UK merger waves, one in the early 70s and a second in the late 1980s.
We hope that these ﬁndings will serve as a sound basis for a further discussion and
investigation of possible underlying causes for merger waves. Particularly, the rather
precise identiﬁcation and precise timing of distinct states of merger activity based
on our Markov-switching model openly calls for an economic interpretation and
explanation of these states. Investigating one such hypothesis, our brief digression
in Section 5.2 concerning industry-level data for the US has argued that, whatever
the trigger for the US 1990s wave, industries seem to have been rather uniformly
aﬀected by it. Resende (1999), using an industry-level Markov switching model,
reaches a similar conclusion concerning UK merger activity. Interestingly, while this
leads us to conclude that nationally, industries in each the US and the UK seem
to have been similarly aﬀected by the observed waves, comparison of our results in
Sections 5.1 and 5.5 quickly reveals that there is no sign of a similar ‘coordination
of waves’ across countries over the last 30 years.
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Appendix: Implementing the Gibbs Sampler
This appendix demonstrates the application of Gibbs sampling to Bayesian estimation of
the Markov switching model as given by Assumptions 3.1 through 3.3.
A.1 The Sampling Scheme
Collect the state variables and the model parameters in the vector θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4,θ5),
where θ1 = (S1, S2, ..., ST ), θ2 = (p11, p22), θ3 = (µ1, µ2), θ4 = (σ−21 , σ
−2
2 ), and θ5 =
(φ1, ..., φk). To obtain a sample from the posterior distribution of interest, p(θ|YT ), we
employ the following iterative procedure:
(S1) Specify arbitrary initial values θ(m)2 , θ
(m)
3 , θ
(m)
4 , and θ
(m)
5 for m = 0.
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(S2) Cycle through the full set of conditionals, drawing
(i) θ(m+1)1 from p(θ1|θ(m)2 ,θ(m)3 ,θ(m)4 ,θ(m)5 ,YT )
(ii) θ(m+1)2 from p(θ2|θ(m+1)1 ,θ(m)3 ,θ(m)4 ,θ(m)5 ,YT )
(iii) θ(m+1)3 from p(θ3|θ(m+1)1 ,θ(m+1)2 ,θ(m)4 ,θ(m)5 ,YT )
(iv) θ(m+1)4 from p(θ4|θ(m+1)1 ,θ(m+1)2 ,θ(m+1)3 ,θ(m)5 ,YT )
(v) θ(m+1)5 from p(θ5|θ(m+1)1 ,θ(m+1)2 ,θ(m+1)3 ,θ(m+1)4 ,YT ).
(S3) Repeat (S2) for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
Geman and Geman (1984) have shown that the sequence θ(1),θ(2), . . . converges in distri-
bution to a random quantity that has posterior distribution p(θ|YT ). Discarding the ﬁrst,
say, b iterates to attain the desired convergence in distribution (the “burn-in” period), we
approximate the joint and marginal distributions of (θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4,θ5) by the empirical
distributions of (θ(m)1 ,θ
(m)
2 ,θ
(m)
3 ,θ
(m)
4 ,θ
(m)
5 ), where m = b+ 1, . . . ,M .
The set of conditionals used in (S2) are derived in Sections A.2 to A.6.
A.2 Generating θ1 = (S1, S2, . . . , ST ) from p(θ1|θ2,θ3,θ4,θ5,YT )
Suppressing the conditioning on θ2, . . . ,θ5, the distribution of θ1 conditional on the data
may be written as
p(θ1|YT ) = p(ST |YT )
T−1∏
t=1
p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,YT ).
A full draw of the vector θ1 may thus be generated iteratively by drawing ST from
p(ST |YT ), and then recursively drawing each St, t = T − 1, . . . , 1, from p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,
YT ), its distribution conditional on having drawn St+1, . . . , ST and on the data YT .
The probabilities p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,YT ) required in each such step may in turn be
based on the ﬁltered probabilities p(St|Yt) produced by the well-known Hamilton ﬁlter
(Hamilton, 1989). As we show at the end of this section,
p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,YT ) = p(St|St+1,Yt), (A.1)
so that the realizations of St+2, . . . , ST and yt+1, . . . , yT are irrelevant when drawing St
in the above procedure. Furthermore, by simple application of Bayes’ law (and using the
Markov property of St),
p(St|St+1,Yt) = p(St+1|St)p(St|Yt)
p(St+1|Yt) =
p(St+1|St)p(St|Yt)∑
S˜t∈{1,2} p(St+1|S˜t)p(S˜t|Yt)
. (A.2)
Noting that the transition probabilities p(St+1|St) appearing in (A.2) are determined by
θ2 (which is ﬁxed) and that p(St|Yt), t = 1, . . . , T can be determined by the Hamilton
ﬁlter given θ2, . . . ,θ5 provides us with the following scheme for generating θ1:
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(i) Employ Hamilton’s ﬁlter to obtain the ﬁltered probabilities p(St|Yt) for t = 1, 2, ..., T
(given the ﬁxed parameters θ2, . . . ,θ5) and save them. The last iteration of the ﬁlter
provides p(ST |YT ), from which ST is generated.
(ii) Iteratively generate St conditional on Yt and St+1 , for t = T −1, T −2, ..., 1, making
use of (A.2) and the ﬁltered probabilities derived above.
To make this procedure more concrete, let
ξˆt|t ≡
[
p(St = 1|Yt)
p(St = 2|Yt)
]
contain the ﬁltered probabilities for each state i = 1, 2 at date t, let
ηt ≡
[
p(yt|St = 1,Yt−1)
p(yt|St = 2,Yt−1)
]
collect the conditional densities of yt for each state i = 1, 2 (given the ﬁxed state-contingent
parameters), and let P represent the transition matrix for the state vector (pij is the row
i, column j element thereof). The Hamilton ﬁlter provides the relation
ξˆt|t =
(ηt Pξˆt−1|t−1)
1′(ηt Pξˆt−1|t−1)
,
where ‘’ denotes element-by-element multiplication, and 1 denotes a (2 × 1) vector of
1s. Herewith, employing the ‘uninformative’ initial value ξˆ0|0 = (0.5, 0.5)′, we generate all
subsequent ξˆt|t. Moreover, the distribution of St conditional on St+1,Yt required in (A.2)
may be expressed explicitly as
p(St = i|St+1 = j,Yt) =
pije′iξˆt|t
e′jPξˆt|t
. (A.3)
Finally, we establish equation (A.1), which says that St+2, . . . , ST and yt+1, . . . , yT
contain no information on St beyond that already contained in St+1 and y1, . . . , yt. Letting
Yt+1,T ≡ (yt+1, yt+2, . . . , yT ), T > t, denote the vector of observations from date t + 1
through T , we have
p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,YT ) = p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt,Yt+1,T )
=
p(St,Yt+1,T |St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt)
p(Yt+1,T |St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt)
=
p(Yt+1,T |St, St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt)
p(Yt+1,T |St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt) · p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt). (A.4)
Now
p(Yt+1,T |St, St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt) =
T−t∏
j=1
p(yt+j |St, St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt+j−1),
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where, by deﬁnition of our model,
yt+j |St, St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt+j−1 ∼ N
(
µSt+j −
∑k
i=1 φi(yt+j−i − µSt+j ), σ2St+j
)
for j = 1, ..., T − t. Hence, p(Yt+1,T |St, St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt) is independent of St, which
implies p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,YT ) = p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt) from (A.4). Next, by a similar
transformation as above,
p(St|St+1, . . . , ST ,Yt) = p(St+2, . . . , ST |St+1, St,Yt)
p(St+2, . . . , ST |St+1,Yt) · p(St|St+1,Yt).
Given St+1 and Yt, St+2, . . . , ST will be independent of St by the Markov assumption on
the state sequence, from which equation (A.1) follows.
A.3 Generating θ2 = (p11, p22) from p(θ2|θ1,θ3,θ4,θ5,YT )
Since given the sequence of states θ1, p11 and p22 are independent of the data set and the
model’s other parameters, θ2 may be drawn conditional only on θ1. Based on standard
Bayesian results on Markov chains, Albert and Chib (1993) derive the following likelihood
function:
L(θ2|θ1) = pn1111 (1− p11)n12pn2222 (1− p22)n21 ,
where nij refers to the number of transitions from state i to state j contained in the
sequence θ1. Considering the form of the likelihood function, we assume two independent
beta distributions for the priors of p11 and p22:
p11 ∼ Beta(α1, γ1)
p22 ∼ Beta(α2, γ2),
where α1 and γ1 (α2 and γ2) are known parameters. By the independence assumption,
the prior distribution is given by
g(θ2) ∝ pα1−111 (1− p11)γ1−1pα2−122 (1− p22)γ2−1.
Combining the priors and the likelihood function, we obtain
p(θ2|θ1) ∝ pα1+n11−111 (1− p11)γ1+n12−1pα2+n22−122 (1− p22)γ2+n21−1.
Thus, p11 and p22 may be sampled from the (independent) posterior distributions
p11|θ1,θ3,θ4,θ5,YT ∼ Beta(α∗1, γ∗1),
p22|θ1,θ3,θ4,θ5,YT ∼ Beta(α∗2, γ∗2),
where
α∗1 = α1 + n11, γ
∗
1 = γ1 + n12
and
α∗2 = α2 + n22, γ
∗
2 = γ2 + n21.
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A.4 Generating θ3 = (µ1,µ2) from p(θ3|θ1,θ2,θ4,θ5,YT )
We may conveniently rewrite our model for t = 1, 2, ..., T as
yt −
k∑
i=1
φiyt−i = µSt
[
1−
k∑
i=1
φi
]
+ εt,
and, letting 1[·] denote the indicator function and deﬁning
xt ≡
[
1−
k∑
i=1
φi
] [
1[St=1]
1[St=2]
]
,
as
yt −
4∑
i=1
φiyt−i = x′tθ3 + εt.
Dividing both sides of the preceeding equation by the known standard deviation, σSt , leads
to
y∗t = x
∗
t
′θ3 + ε∗t t = 1, 2, ..., T ,
where
y∗t ≡
1√
σ2St
(
yt −
4∑
i=1
φiyt−i
)
and
x∗t ≡
1√
σ2St
xt.
The model can be expressed more compactly in matrix notation as
Y∗ = X∗θ3 + ε,
where Y∗ ≡ (y∗1, y∗2, . . . , y∗T )′ and X∗ ≡ (x∗1,x∗2 . . . ,x∗T )′. Note that this model satisﬁes the
assumptions of the classical regression model, since ε ∼ N(0, IT ).
Following standard practice, we assume a bivariate normal distribution for the priors
of µ1 and µ2:
θ3 ∼ N(µθ3 ,Σθ3),
where µθ3 and Σθ3 are known parameters.
Then, from standard Bayesian statistics, the posterior distribution from which the
means are sampled is given by
θ3|θ1,θ2,θ4,θ5,YT ∼ N(µ∗,Σ∗),
where
Σ∗ =
(
Σ−1θ3 +
T∑
t=1
x∗x∗t
′
)−1
,
µ∗ = Σ∗
(
Σ−1θ3 µθ3 +
T∑
t=1
x∗t y
∗
t
)
.
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We then draw (µ1, µ2) from the above bivariate normal distribution. To meet the
normalization constraint µ1 < µ2, we employ rejection sampling: We accept the draw if
the constraint is met, otherwise it is discarded and resampled.
A.5 Generating θ4 = (σ
−2
1 ,σ
−2
2 ) from p(θ3|θ1,θ2,θ3,θ5,YT )
We shall assume that the prior distributions for the inverse of the variances (σ−21 and σ
−2
2 ,
respectively, also called the ‘precisions’) are independently Gamma:
σ−21 ∼ Γ(N1, λ1)
σ−22 ∼ Γ(N2, λ2),
where N1 and λ1 (N2 and λ2) are known parameters.
Observe that conditioning on θ1,θ2,θ3,θ5, and YT is equivalent to observing
εt = (yt − µSt)−
k∑
i=1
φi(yt−i − µSt) t = 1, 2, ..., T .
Let
SSR1 ≡
T∑
t=1
ε2t1[St=1], n1 ≡
T∑
t=1
1[St=1],
SSR2 ≡
T∑
t=1
ε2t1[St=2], n2 ≡
T∑
t=1
1[St=2],
such that, for every state i = 1, 2, SSRi denotes the sum of squared residuals and ni the
number of times that the state sequence has been seen in that particular state.
Then, from standard Bayesian statistics, the (independent) posterior distributions
from which the ‘precisions’ are sampled are given by
σ−21 |θ1,θ2,θ3,θ5,YT ∼ Γ(N1 + n1, λ1 + SSR1),
σ−22 |θ1,θ2,θ3,θ5,YT ∼ Γ(N2 + n2, λ2 + SSR2).
A.6 Generating θ5 = (φ1, . . . ,φk) from p(θ5|θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4,YT )
Proceeding exactly as above, we may rewrite our model as
y∗t = x
∗′
t θ5 + ε
∗
t , t = 1, 2, . . . , T
where
y∗t ≡
1√
σ2St
(y − µSt)
and
x∗t ≡
1√
σ2St

yt−1 − µSt
yt−2 − µSt
yt−3 − µSt
yt−4 − µSt
 .
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Again, the model can be expressed more compactly in matrix notation as
Y∗ = X˜
∗
θ5 + ε,
where Y∗ ≡ (y∗1, y∗2, . . . , y∗T )′ and X˜
∗ ≡ (x∗1,x∗2 . . . ,x∗T )′. As before, this model satisﬁes
the assumptions of the classical regression model, since ε ∼ N(0, IT ).
Following standard practice, we assume a multivariate normal distribution for the
priors of φ1, . . . , φk:
θ5 ∼ N(µθ5 ,Σθ5),
where µθ5 and Σθ5 are known parameters.
Then, from standard Bayesian statistics, the posterior distribution from which the
autoregressive coeﬃcients are sampled is given by
θ5|θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4,YT ∼ N(µ∗,Σ∗),
where
Σ∗ =
(
Σ−1θ5 +
T∑
t=1
x∗tx
∗
t
′
)−1
,
µ∗ = Σ∗
(
Σ−1θ5 µθ5 +
T∑
t=1
x∗t y
∗
t
)
.
We then draw φ1, . . . , φk from the above multivariate normal distribution. To meet the
restriction that the autoregressive coeﬃcients lie within the stationary region, we employ
rejection sampling: We accept the draw if the roots of the polynomial in the lag operator
lie outside the unit circle. Whenever the sampled values do not lie in stationary region,
the draw is discarded and resampled.
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